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Designing  a well-functioning  intergovernmental  fiscal system  is
essential  to the success  of all the transitional  economies'  major
reform  goals:  privatization,  macroeconomic  stability,  more  effi-
cient  performance  and  economic  growth,  and  an adequate  social
safety net.
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Regions  - is part of a larger effort  in both  departments  to analyze  issues  relating  to decentralization,  and
in particular,  the role of subnational  governments  in the reform  pmcess. Copies  of the paper  are available
free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Bonnie  Pacheco,
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The decentralization  of government  in Eastern  subnational  governments  may look to "coping
Europe represents  a reaction  both from below (to  mechanisms"  such as holding  onto their enter-
tight central  political  control) and from above  (to  prises (which  provide  vital social services),
privatize  the economy  and relieve  the central  developing  extrabudgetary  revenues,  or borrow-
government's  fiscal stress).  ing. These  coping  mechanisms  threaten  privat-
ization,  reduce  budgetary  transparency,  and
In all transitional  economies,  the developing  impede  stabilization  policies.
structure  of intergovernmental  relations  is
intimately  related  to such  critical policy issues  as  Bird and Wallich  describe  the risks  to
privaization, stabilizatic  l, and the social  safety  piivatization,  to macroeconomic  stability,  and to
net. In the fiscal sphere,  tax reform,  deficit  an adequate  social  safety  net that present  policies
control,  and intergovernmental  finance  are a  toward  local government  may imply.  Its themes
tripod.  Unless  each leg is set up properly,  the  are  that the subnational  sector  needs to be more
whole  structure  could  collapse.  realistically  factored  into national  plans  - and
that subnational  expenditures  be more clearly
The present  strategy  of devolving  expendi-  assigned  and revenue  needs more realistica9;y
tures  downward  while holding  back  on revenue  assessed.  S&ch  assessments  are likely  tv ac-
flows  and transfers  to balance  the central  budget  knowledge  a larger sphere  for subrational
is unlikely  to succeed  for more than a year or  governments  and the need for accec!  tm
two at bestL  robust revenue sources. Giving local government
a share in the personal  income  tax is one possible
Net spending  reductions  at the subnational  and perhaps  desirable approach  to meeting  these
level may be difficult  to achieve.  From 10 to 40  revenue  needs.
percent  of outlays  go to the subnational  sector,
and in many  countries  local governments  provide  Careful  attention  needs to be paid to the
much  of the social safety  that makes  the pain of  design  and implementation  of the
the economic  transition  politically  tolerable.  intergovernmental  fiscal  transfers  likely to
And, most housing  and many enterprises  have  remain  prominent  features  of the
been shifted  to local ownership,  with the mainte-  intergovernmental  landscape  for years to come.
nance and subsidy  cost this implies.  Since  the  Caution  is also needed  on borrowing  by
revenue  sources  assigned  to local governments  subnational  government.  Consolidating  and
cannot finance  expected  levels of local activity,  integradng  extrabudgetary  funds  at the
the result of shifting  spending  downward  is  subnational  (and national)  levels  is crucial  to
likely to be strong  demands  for increased,  rather  enhanced  budgetary  transparency  and
than decreased,  transfers.  Altematively,  macrostability.
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  dissemirsates  the fmdings  of work  under  way  in the  Bank.  Anobjecii vof the  series
is to get these  findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than  fully polished.  The findings, interprAtations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  rexesent official  Bank  policy.
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ECONOMIES:
TOWARD A SYSTEMIC  FRAMEWORK  OF ANALYSIS
...  A chang  of government  is not a chang of system, merely  one of the politicdl  conditions  for
it.  Tho change of system  is a historical process that seer-  liksely  to require a long period of
time.  &'
. INTRODUCTION  AND SUMMARY
Why  'Local" Fimnce Matters.
1.  An important  and unduly  neglected aspect  of the process of transition  in Eastern Europe is the extensive
decentralbiation,  both political  and fiscal, that is taiing place in many of the countries newly  emerging  from behind
the socialist veil.  Decentralization  represents  both a reaction ftom below to the previously tight political control
from the center and an attempt  from above to further the privatzation of the economy and to relieve the strained
fiscal situation of the central govermnment.  The aspirations  of, and the role of, local government  are becommg
stronger in most of the transitional  economies.
2.  The on-going reforms in subnational  finance in these economies  are much more important than seems
generally to be recognied.  In some countries in transition, the subnational  govemments (broadly defined) are
quantitatively  significant, accounting  fur a large, and often gromwing,  share of public sector activity.  In aU the
transitional  economies,  the developing  structure  of intergovenmental  relations  is intimately  related to such critical
policy issues as privaizaon,  the social safety net, and stabiliatioL  Within  the fiscal sphero, tax reform, deficit
control, and intergovenmental  fnce  constitute  a tripod: unless each leg is set up properly, the entire structure
may collapse.
3.  Our assertion is that the design  of a weU  fumctioning  intergovernmental  fiscal system is key to almost all
of the transition  economies' major reform goals.  Intergovernmental  finances  wil  have a major impact on the
efficiency  with which the transition  economies  perform; on their macroeconomic  stability;  on the social safety net
and on the success  of their privatzation policies.
4.  Fiscal balance at  the subnadonal level is key to macroeconomic  stabiliqy.  Given the paramountcy of
stabilization  goals in almost all of the countries, the central governments  have used all the tools in their meager
arsenal to bring stability to the macroeconomyY One such tool has been to shift the deficit down, ensuring an
adequate  revenue  flow to the center  - oither by shifting  expenditure  responsibilities  down or by retaining  additional
revenues, even where budgets at the subnatonal level are severely iupaiued  Hungary and Russia come to mind,
but there are others.
5.  The results  of this policy, ironically,  could contribute  to further instability: the budget constraint in these
countries is still so  soft  that subnaional governments  may respond  by  accumulating  arrears, borrowing  (strong-
arming their enterpises to finance  public expenditures  - sice  enterprises  have easier access to bank credit than
do the governments  themselves)  or developing  extrabudgetary  sources  of revenue. Pushing  the deficit down may
not reduce it, but may merely  repress it. Worse, some of these 'coping mechanisms  '  also reduce the transparency
of budgetary operations,  and make the pursuit of appropriate  national budgetary  policies even more difficult than
it is now.
-JJanos  Komai, T'he  Socialist  System;  (Princeton  University  Press, 1992), p.577.
Zlbe terms  subnational and 'local'  are used more or less interchangeably,  unless speaking  of a three tier, or
federal  system, in which  case subnational  refers to all levels below  the federal, and local refers to the lowest level.6.  A well-fimctiong  - responsibiity for which has bee  trafered  'downstairs'  in a
number  of countries -cannot be effetively caried out by an undefund  subuational  sector. Where the safaty  not
is cridcal for the success of Iho  transition  to a market economy, nd  it therfore  a national policy objctive,  -as
in Russa,  and ,tguably, in Polund  and other countrie  - the burden  of finaing  the safety not should not be on
local governments,  even though, being closer to tho people, subnationl gove  ormnts  migt  administer it.
7.  From an atlocative  prpctdve,  the system  of intove  n  fiscal rebltions  will also dtermine in a
major way the officiency  with which thb  eoanomies perform, and their fu  omic  o.  Locl
government  ownesip  of enteprs  - and local ir  in their revenus  - will inevitably  encourge domestic
protectionism (e.g.  'domestic purch  rqimes  and  inter-jurisdictional  trade bariers  to  protect local
monopolies)  harmful to economic  grwth
8.  Finaly,  becaus  some countries -notably Ruia-  ar,  so to speak, 'nation-building,' with significant
centrifual fores  emanating  from the  ubnatonal level, inteovermentl  finane is also crueil  to future  natioal
cohesion. In Russia it may be crucial even to the contied  existence of the Federadon. Even where national
cohesion is not at  risk,  demands for greatr  'participatory democracy' have heightened demands from the
subnational  level. The strong  desire for local politieal control and unfettered  local autonomy  is a natural outcome
of the end of central plmning. Combined  with an inadequate  fiscal base, however, loal  aspirations and fiscal
capabilities  are increasingly  at odd., which is giving rise to growing tensions  in a number  of countries.
9.  Even gvimhi2n  is complicated  by the current environment.  Following  the transfer in many countries
of a significant  number  of  anterpie  to  1matonal  ownership,  responsibility  for privatization  now also rests with
subnational  govenments.  Their interess hero  ar  unclear at bese they still rely on  ethir  I enteprises for  profits
and tax revenues, ad  if privzd,  subational govenments will hav  to assume the substantial  'non-production'
expenditues - for nurei_e,  housing,  schoob, etc.-  tht  will  e spun off by the enterpris  as they privatize. A
system of inegonmeta  finacs  tht  doe  not accommoda  thes  shifts in expenditure  responsibilities  and
provide  coreponding  revenues, will impedo  the proco  of privatization.
10.  In sum, intergovermentl  fiscal rlations  - far from being merely  a 'local matter' - are key to simost
of a8l  of the transition  economies' reform goals.
Traditional  vs Systomic  Frumewors
11.  The traditional anaysis of intergovenmenta  finance examines the fiscal functions  of local and central
govermments  in terms of their respective  roles and responsibilides  for stabilization,  income  distribution,  expenditure
provision, the appropriate assignment of tax functions, and the design of  a  transfer system that provides
appropriate  incentives. The 'benefit model' of service provision  suggest  that  local governments  - whose role in
this analysis is essentially that  of service provider - should be financed  to the extent possible  by charging for the
services  they provide, with local taxes  making  up the remaining  gap, supplemented  as appropriate  by trsasfers and,
in limited degree, borrwing.
12.  This  perspective  is of course  important  in the trasitional economies  also. But  it misses  several  key features
of the roles, responsibilities  and economic  functions  of subnational  govemments  in the former socialist  economies.
First, the emphasis  in traditional  analysis on the local goverment as a service  provider ignores its important  roles
as produr  and as  wngr,  as wel as the complicated  relationships  between  enterprises  and local government  in most
transitional  eccnomios. The importunt  role of local governments  as owners means thst they have a major role to
play, either as potential impediments  to, or supporters of,  Drivatization. Moreover, the asset stock recuntly
trnsferred  to them in the decentralition  process represents  a potential  source of revenue  (or, in some instances,
of losses).  The interaction  of subuational  finance  and privatizadon  thus merits  careful  attention  in the transitional
economies.-3-
13.  Second, th  traditional  approach  ignors th  shrining role of govenment. in most t  itional conomies,
govenment, both local avd cetral,  played  a major  producdon  role and wa  the major invoeor in the economy,  and
tae expendite  side of the budget is clutered with expditur  - not only sbidies,  but direct investmnt,
inventory finance and  wages - which in  a  market  conomy, are not  the  responsibility of  govemment.
Unfortunately,  in all des  countries govemment  reve  is cclining  mora npidly tha  governmnts  mo  abl, to
dives themsevas of thes  expenditu  responsibiities, thus  ontributinq  to u1bahinit  problems.  One repon
in may  countrie ha boen to try to shift the deficit  downwans by  mang  local govemnts  responsible  for morm
expenditure, while smtanously  reducing  centrl  tansfers to the onatonal  sctor.
14.  The obvious  need for flexibility  in today's apidly changing  envirment bas  led many central  govenmts
to attempt  to preservo  som  dogrees  of freedom  by continuing  with the 'negotiated' tax sharng systoms  of the pat.
But this approch is less and lea  acceptable  in countries  where domands  for  fair" treatmnt and ec2alization  are
strong and where local govemments are seeking gater  autonomy.  It is also incompatible with the efficient
provision  of local public services. It is theeforo especially  importat  to replace  the presnt  'bargained' outcomes
with  an intergovrnmetal  fiscal  framework  -of transfers,  of local revenues,  and of local expenditure  responisibilities
- that is both firm enough to serve as a basis for action  and flexible enough to be compatible  with the on-going
structual changes and reform.
15.  The present sftrgy  of devolving  exuenditures  downward while holding back on tansfers is unlily  to
prove successfl for more than a year or two at best.  Indeed, net expenditure eduction at the subnatonal level
may prove very difficult to achieve.  The subnational  sector is significant  in expendituro  terms in many trasition
economies  -in Rusia,  and the CSFR, it accounts  for over 40% of total outlays.  Elsewhr  they account for 10-
30% of total  outlays. At pesent,  for example,  state enterprises  provide  a wide range of social  sector outlays: with
privatiznton, many  of these  outlays  will have to be taken  over by local governments. Moreover, in most countries,
the local government  sector plays a critical  role in tenn  of providing a 'social sae  net'  which makes the pain
of the wrenching economic transition more politicaliy  tolerable.  Since the trvenue sourcs  assigned to local
governments  simply  cannot finance  the level  of expected  local activity  in th  i_mmedito  fture,  the result of shifting
expenditures  downward  is likely  to be strong demands  for increasd, rather than reduced, transfers.  In sum, as and
when expenditure  assignments  become cleaer,  and decentraliation develops further, the likelihood  is that the
subnational  share in other transition  economies  wiUl  also grow.  This means that tho intergovernmental  system  wil
have to be sensitive  to these developments:  Notable across  the transition economs  is the fact that there has been
a general absence  of concrete empirical  estli -leg of 'correspondencew  between  tax and expenditure  assignments  and
need for transfers. Legislation on  intergovenmental finance relations has typicaUy been developed with no
quantitative  assssment  of its implications.
16.  Despite  all the talk about *autonomy'  and fiscal 'independenceo,  few of the countries  surveyed  offer their
subnational  govemments  much in the way of fiscal  discretion  on the expenditure  side. Indeed,  most recent  legislation
has focussed  on codifying  the revenue  side of the equation  -before  deciding  what expenditure  responsibilities  of
subnational  governments  should be, putting the cart before the horse, so to speak. Expenditure 'autonomy'  is
enshrined  in legislation,  but not really effective:  there are still  centrl  'norms' which govern  allowable  expenditures
in virtually every sector, and centml spending  mandates  remain  in place.
17.  The new subnaional governments  wiUl  also need  substantial  help and guidance  in developing  adequate  lqol
revnuo systems. The local *autonomy'  that has been enshrined in recent legislation  has often meant separating
the spheres of responsibility  to the greatest extent possible, so that each level of government  reigns in its own
sphere: in revenue terms, this translates into a pm-disposition  towards *tax assignment  models, and a goal of
reduced  *transfor  dependance' on the center. The fact  that in the pre-reform  system, most subnational  governments
received  revenues from 'their'  enterpises  has led to a strong bias  towards derivation-based  sharing models in
which  revenues go to the jurisdiction in which they are collected.
18.  It is critical that subnational  revenue  needs and possibilities  be realistically  factored  into national  plans for
tax reformL  Failure to look at intergovemmental  dimensions  of national tax policy  changes can lead to problems.-4-
In Russia and Hungary, a share of major natonal taxes has boen assigned to the subnational  Ilvel, and recent
national tax policy  changes have wrought havoc with the aggrpto  subnational  revenue base, with vecy eaic
effects across subnational  jursdictions. Secod,  any thought of  aasidg. ut',  when the tax itself is undergoing
continuous  definition,  is problemical.  In m-y  transition  economie,  however, local governments  have come  out
strongly  in favor  of revenue assigmet under which they  got 'all'  the  'renues  from  vtheir  taxes. This  seeming
revenue  indepndence leaves  them with sgnifict  residual  vulnbility  to tax policy  changs,  however,  a fact  that
seems genrally  not to have ben  recowzed.  If this vunbity  wore to take  ito  accout,  as it dsould be,
national fiscal policy reforms would of course be constaned. Rcent  tax  reforms at  the national level,
administrative  weans  and  other factors havo meant significat  rvenue  vowlatiliy,  with significant  over and
undershooting  of budgetay tagets.  This situaon  obviously  has  implications  for the desirability  of 'tax assigment'
models  per s,  and  the design  of sharing/transfor  systms.
19.  In most countries, for example,  the pndcipal  locaI"  tax is some form of property tax: but in many cases,
national  governments  have hamstrung  the revenue  potential  of this tax by grting  exemptions  to newly privatized
land, housing,  and enterprises.  In other instances,  local governments  are supposd  to recive a share of certain
national taxes, often on a derivation  basis (e.g. origin, or residence):  but such povisions raise both techcal  and
allocative  problems,  in addition  to biasing national  tax policy  decisions  in often undesirable  ways.  Even  when  the
local tax base is feasible  and  adequate  in principle,  in practice  it will gerally  take some years before the system
can be expected  to produce sufficient  revenues  to meet  perceived  locw,;  needs.
20.  Despite  al  the talk  about *autonomy-  and fiscal independence,  none of the countries  surveyed  offer their
subnational  govemvents any fiscal  discretion,  even over  the muior taxes  they ane wssigped:  rates and bases  continue
to be set by the center, in the context of the unitary tax sysem. lho paucity of locally-controlled  tax resourees  in
most  transitional  countries,  when  combiaed  with  the universl reluctnce of politicians  to tax constituents  too  directly
and openly, makes  it inevitable  that hard-pressed  local governments  wiU  turn to other avenues  for revenue:  they  will
wmand increased  transfers, they  will try to borrow, and they will try to exploit  tG  the full the new assets they  nave
acquired  as part of the decentralization-privadzation  process.
21.  The level, design  and effects of interaovemmental  fiscal transfer. thus constitute key elements in the
emerging  intergovemmental  and local finance system. of the tnsitonal  economies.  There is a general absence
of 'formula'- based  trasfers.  These remain  negotiated  in aggregate  and by individual  localities. Critical  decisions
must be made  with respect  to the overal size of such  transfers  (the 'distributable pool') as wel as with respect  to
the  distribution formulas to be employed, taldng into account both the severe fiscal pressures on the central
government  and  the vital tasks to be performed  by the local govemnts  in the emerging  new strcture  of the public
sector.  Practical  measures  of *tax  capacity,  *expenditure  need' and perhaps  fiscal effort' need to be developed
for use in such formulas. Institutions  must be developed  at both the central and local levels to ensure  that transfers
(or subsidized  credits) are put to the best possible  use: such institutions  may include, for example, at the center,
agencies  concerned  with monitoring  the perfonrance of local govemments  and  with providing them with needed
technical  assistance  and support  and, at the subnational  level, various intermediary  bodies, particularly  with respect
to the many very small municipalities  that have been created  in most countries.
22.  As noted above, careful  attention  has to be paid to the design and implementation  of the intergovemmental
fiscal  transfer. that  seem likely to remain  prominent  feaure  of the fiscal landscape  in most countries  for years to
come.  Caution  is even more necessary with respect  to borrmin  by subnational  goverments.  A number of
countries in transition  have granted virtually unlimited bonowing powers to local governments  without taldng
adequately into account the macroeconomic  necessity of monitoring and controlling  such bonrwing.  As yet,
however, the relatively  undeveloped  state of financial  institutions  in most countries makes abuse of the borrowing
power more a potential  than a real problem.
23.  The same is not true of the potential  misuse  of 'locallv owned" state assets, unfortunately,  since  in every
country such misuse  is already visible.  Such local assets may represent a windfall - at least in those cases where
they are not accompanied  by centml  policies  (e.g. rent or price control)  that turn them into a liability. But  they may- 5-
also often  be misused,  whether  they are privadzed  or not.  A local heating plant that is privatized,  for example,  but
remains a (local) wratural  monopoly obviously raises regulatory  problems: who deals with these problems, and
how? What  should be done with the proceeds  of asst  sales?  Under  what (very limited) circumstances  should such
proceeds be used to finance current local expeitur  ?  If an asset is not privatzed, but is used to geneote on-
going revenues for the local govemment  (and perhp  some forign  partnr,  with the municipality  using its
ownership  of land or assets as its contribution  to equity), the temptation  to sustain and sttengthen any monopoly
position  is obviously  again a problem, as is that of regulation. Even more damaging is the high pwbability that
more  speculative  ventuu  - examples  include  tourist  lodge  and  bakeries - are likely  to fail. Equally damaging  may
be the dissipation  of scare  local managerial  skills on trying to squeewz  money  out of such entrepreneurial  gambits
rather than focusing  on tho more essenal  task of trying to provide local public services efficiently.
24.  A special  problem arises with reap' t to the prices cbrged  by those local public  enterprises  to be retained
in tho public sector. In the past, central governments  in the socialist  countries used low and fixed prices (including
rents and other urban user fees) and wage controls, as part of their distributional  tool kit.  The now governments
in these  countries ar  now being  asked, in a reformenvironmet,  to get the prices ight and to use tax policies and
targeted  gubsidies  instead. There  are two important  dimensions  in the transition  economies:  First, changes  in public
sector prices L.rugc  ) clearly  need to be coordinated  with  wage reform  on the one hand and with  more general
price reforms on the other hand, in order to avoid undue  impact  on income  and major distributional  shifts (as well
as on profits and hence government  revenue). Second, central government  price mandates  -prices were typically
centrally  administered  - need to be devolved to the subnational  level.
25.  Finally, in somn  countries,  (Russia,  China, and  others)  price reform  and other structural  shifts  wiU  continue
to bave effects  on the tax base  and its distribution  across  regions.  Coal and energy  price changes, for example  imply
potentially  large shifts  in the vadous tax bases,  both  vtilbin  a tier of government  in the tax bases of differet  regions
within a country (e.g. a gain in value added in a primary-product  producing  area after price libealization and a
corresponding  loss in the consuming  jurisdiction)  and botwoe levels of government  depending  on how taxes  have
been assignec or shared.  Such shifts must be taken into account when designing the intergovemmental  fiscal
system:  they may  well  constrain  the reform of intergovernmental  relations,  eliminating  options  that might  be feasible
in other countries. At the very least, greater  flexibility  is needed than in countries where economic  structures  are
more fixed. Intergovernmental  fiscal  reform  clearly  must be viewed  as an ongoing  Rrocss  in countries  in trnsition.
Oreanization  of the Paper
26.  This paper addresses  these issues of intergovenmental finance in transitional  economies. It argues that
a broader framework  than is customary  is needed to analyze  decentralization  and intergovernmental  fiscal  issues in
such economies. This framework  must incorporato  such elements  as the likelihood  of continuing  structural  changes
in the economy and continuing  political shifts, t4e need to undertake intergovernmental  reforms while coping
simultaneously  with stabilization  pressures and the increased  importance  of the social safety net, the likelihood  of
continued (local)  public ownership on a significant scale, the financial implications  of such ownership and its
possible conflicts  with the overall  privation  objective, and continued vestiges of price and wage controls and
other rigidities. A comprehensive  and atcurate analysis of decentralization  must take these elements  into account.
27.  The analysis in this paper is based on detailed recent studies of local and intergovernmental  finance in
Hungary,  Poland, Russia, Romania,  and China, and on less detailed  information  for the Czech and Slovak  Federal
Republic  (CSFR  - especially  the Czech Repub!ic),  Bulgaria,  and Vietnam. Salient  characteristics  of the local and
intergovernmental  system in each of these countriesa'  are presented in the main text for illustrative purposes.
21See also the following  working  papers: Bird  and Wallich, 'Financing Local  Government  in Hungary,  No. 869,
March 1992; Bahl and Wallich, 'Intergovenmental Finance in China," No. 863, February 1992; and Wallich,
Christine, 'Fiscal Decentralization:  lnteraovernmental  Finance in Rus&iia' Additional  source materials  are cited
in the bibliography  at the end of the paper.-6-
Although  the  principal  focus  of Ae disussion  is on the cental ad  at  Europon countria (especially  Hungary,
Poland,  and  Romnuia),  similar  tndencis and  problems  are  visible  in all th- countries  mtioned  and may  well  aWso
be manifest  in the  other  repubics  of the  former  Soviet  Union  and fonne Yugoslavia,  as well  as in similar  countries
elsewhore.  Komai  (in Tho Socialist  System)  list  26 'soclist'  countes in 1987. If we add to this lt  the 15
republics  of the  formr Soviet  Union  nd the  S of fonner  Yugodavia  (and  deduct  the  now-vanihd East  Grmany).
therm  would appear to be at least  43 countries  which  only  fiv  yar  ago had more  or les  'Socialist'  syms.  By
1992,  howevor,  is probably  fair  to say all but two of theme  counto  (Cub  nd North  Korea)  ar  now  in momo
'trnsitional  stage,  mo  tot  mom  or all of the daslymi  of this paper ould be applicable.  This paper  thaefore
represents  eeially  an intetim  report  on what is suro  to pmve an on-going  and important  problem  in all the
trnsitonal ecoomies.
28.  The  paper  is organized  as follows:  Sectin II reviews  r number  of geea  ius  with  respect  to the  roform
of governmental  structure  that  have  arisen  in the  transitional  economic.  This  ection  elabomates  many  of the  points
made  above  about  the importance  of thd changig context  within  which  questions  of local governmnt roles,
responsibilities,  and finances  are being  deided. Section  77 then  ouldines  briefly  what  appeau  to be the  apprpriate
role  of subnational  government  ,  xuch  countries,  with special  attention  to its expediture responsibilities.  The
remaiLder  of the  paper  then  discusses  the  issues  relating  to each  of the posible methods  of financing  subnational
government  in transitiotal  economies:  user  chages (Section  IV), subational  taxes  (Section  V), intrgovermental
transfers  (Section  VI),  subnational  borrowing  (Secdon  VII), and the use of subuational  govemment  asset (Section
29.  The matix below summarizes  some of the salient  feaour  found  acros the tramition socialist  eonaomies.
|  ern~kagmeotal  Fiwa  Reltion  in Trmtansn Ecnm2os
r  Salient  Cbarteristics
Political/Overall  Structura Reform  Context
*  Intergovemnmental  finances  reforms are taking  place in a context of golitical decentralization.
*  Govemnment  reorganization  is also taking  place throughout  the trnsition and socialist economies,
and striving for 'local autonomy', many countries appear to be eliminating  the 'middle tier' of
government  in their constitutional  reforms.
*  Intergovermnental  finances  reforms are taking  place in context  of overalU  sbinking role of
*  Intergovernmental  finances  refonns are taking  place in context of a changing  role of government.
*  Intergovernmental  finances  reforms are being undertaken simultaneously  with overU national In
reforms.
Stabilization
*  Intergovernmental  finances  reforms  are taling place in context of macroeconomic  instability  and
inflation, a weak fiscal NOsitiOn  of federal/centrd govenment, and a shrinking  revenue base at
national level.-7  -
Box ... (contnud)
|*  AMakimi ond  overall  mco  concerns  domiate the agenda so dt  intergovernmentali  finacial
reform needs to take place in tdis strne  contoxt,  but cae  needs to be takn  to prevent the
stabiliduaion  objoctive  from fully domnting  the redign  of th  inegovermumtsl  fian  regim.
|  Stabilizuon concr  lead th  center to deal with budgey  stin  by  pushing the deficit down',
and  hoping  the subiational level can do the cutting.
E  In some cas,  the center has shifted (potentialy large and open-endad
responsibiliti-s  for 'social welfare  down to local level in an attempt  to balamco  its budget.
*  Expenditure autonomy' is enshuined  in legislation,  but not really effective:  there are still centra
norms and mandate in placo, and  transfer dependance  also impedes  autonomy.
*  Subsidies  reprent  a major item in the subnational  budgets due in part to central prioe setting on
public sector prices.
*  Use ot 'norms'  to define  how a service  should be provided  ;imits  expenditure  autonomy.
*  Cental  'm4a'  on wages, and other expenditures  limits expenditure  autonomy  and continue  to
be importanL
Tax Assi  e  and Iafm
*  Attempts  to make the subnational  sector 'independent' are desired  by the subnational  level md the
center. center wants each tub to sit or. its own bottom", to assig  taxes and be done with it, and to
reduce 'transfor dependance'; This is generally  not possible, because the tax instruments  are not
sufficient,  and user charges  not yet at a level to contribute  significantly  to cost recovery.
*  Subnational  goverments want to shake off contral  control, and be masters in their own house, and
see appeal in the apparent  autonomy  that 'transfer independence"  provides.
*  Tax assignments  typically  under-fimd  local sector: low-yielding  revenue sources are assigned  or
those which will bear fruit only in the very long term (property tax).
|  *  There is a genea  absence  of concrete empirical  estimat  of 'correspondence'  of tax and
expenditure  assignments  and need for trasfers  and legislation  on intergoveimmental  finances
relations  is typically  developed  with no quantitative  assessment  of its implications. :  *  Generd absence of 'formula"- based  transfers; they remain negotiated  in aggregate  volume  and by f  individual  localities.
General  absence of transparency  in allocation  of investment  grants/capital  financing.-8-
Box ....  (continued)
Privatization  and OwnaR
|  *  Major continued  role of subnational  govenments in ownership  ventures at a timo when
centr/national priorities sQupoxt  privatztin  This relates to the inadequat revenue bau  given to
localities  and their continued financial  dependence  on  nterprises  and tranfers  for rovenue sources.
|  *  Potetlly  significant  negaive consequec  for the budget of pnvatizaon  (in some cowutres)  as
enterpnso  social expenditures  go 'on budget,' and newly pnvatzed enterprises  become hader  to
tax.  Subnational  governments  may not want to lot go of this rliable  fine=.ing source.
*  How to use the saitlry  revenues  from pnvatzation (debt repaymet,  nvestment finance, current
expenditures). How to take advantage  of the asset stock held by local governments.
|  orurinD
*  In most tansition and socialist  economies,  there is generous legal access of subnational
governments  to unlimited  borrowing, someimes even foreign  borrowing.
Extrabudetav  I?unds|
*  Extabudgetay  funds continue  to play a major role, complicating  budgetary  tansparncy  and
macro-stabilization.
Institud2  Famework
*  In may  transition  economies,  the instit>tional  arrngements needed for diaogue on
intergovenmental issues is missing, even though  the need for such dialogue is, as noted above,
greatr  than in makdet  economies.
Tax Administration
*  'Inverted. administative systems  in many countres where the local administion  offices may
have greater loyalties  to local government  than to central administratve systems.-9-
H. DECENTRALIZATION  IN PROCESS:  TRENDS  AND THEMES
A T;me of Trmnsforation
30.  Perhaps  th  most iniportant  thing  to remmber about the procems  of political  and fiscal  decentralization  now
engaging  the countries  under review  is how very r  it is.  Apat from China, which  took the first tentative  steps
in this direction  in 1979, the subationl  sytems now emeging in the transitional  economies  ar  of very recent
origin, as indcated by the dates of some of the relevant basic laws:
Poland  - L  Self-Governmet Act, 1990
Hungy  - Local Self-Goveamet  Act, 1990
RomWnia  - Local Govenment Act, 1991
Bulgar  - Lcal  Self-Govemmnt and Local Administraion Act, 1991
Rusan  Fderation - Law on the Budgetary  Rights of Local Self-Govamnet,  1991.
In most cases, additional  important  legislation  came even later - e.g. to set out subnationl revenue sources (such
as Poland's 1991  Act on Taxes and lA  Fees) -and in many  countries is stiU to com  (e.g. with rspect  to the
precise ownership  and control of some importa  local assets). Key elements  of the legal framework  needed for
efficient  local goverent  are stiU missing  in most countries.
31.  Moreover, once  the basi  ucue  of local govemment  was established,  local elections  still had to be held,
new local governments  established,  and a myriad of importan administraive  details determined.  In Romania, for
example, the first local elections  woer not held until February 1992 and the new mayoa did not take office until
April 1M.  In the Russian Federation,  the first local elections  wore held in November 1990, and in Hungary  in
April 1991. Even  after a year or two's experience, as in Hungary, Bulgaria  and the Czech  Republic, some mayors
and other local officids, partiularly  in the smaller communities,  still bave littlo idea of what their real powers,
re  sibilities,  and limitations  art.  Nor are matr  much beuter  at the central  government  level where, in most
countries, no one really seems to be in charge of dcenrliatiadon,  with the result that some key issus  appear to
have beon decided (or left undecided)  more by accident  than design, parcularly  issues concerning  the intercton
of the new local governments  with such other  lements of the transitional  reforms as privatition,  tax reform,
financial  reform, preo reform, subsidy  reform, and budgetary  reform. Tbis neglect is now causing trouble in an
number  of countries  not  just for the local governient sector but also, to varying  degrees, for the success  of all these
ambitious  reform plans.
The End of Central Plannina: Filling The Abhorred Vacuum
32.  Unless  more  systematic  attention  is paid to these problems  in the near future, muas  are Ilkely  to get worse
rather than better. Up to now, many  of the potential  difficulties  have  been kept in check largely  by the continuance,
de facto if not always  de jure, of the refonn  m  under which subnational  govenments received most of
their funds from central govemment  budgetary  transfen which wore basically  allocated  on the basis of negotiation
and bargaining. In this process, the centnl government  always  has the upper hand, controlling  as it does not only
the total amount  of such transfers, but also who gets them, and when.  When combined  with the continued  central
control in most countries  of such critical  determinants  of local outlays  as wage structures, enterprise prices, and so
-4In Bulgaria for example, laws passed eady in the reform process only spocified that local governments  are
responsible  for 'local matters.  This vagueness  in the law allowed  local authorities  to claim all or no responsibility
on convenience. This deficiency  is now being corrected, and Bulgara is now in the process of preparing a series
of new Acts covering  territorial  division, local self-government  and administraton, and finance to replace  the 1991
Act.- 10-
on, and the ingrained  habit of local depndence on centmal  guidance, the persistence  of this system bas played an
important  role in preventing  local expenditures  from exacerbating  the genlly  tenuous  fiscal  situation  of the central
government.
33.  But this situation  is unstable  and will not long persit  in the absence  of strong central political control.Y
Already, many countries are finding  that the combination  of th  manifesdy  strong desire for local political  control
and the unbalaced  mdate  - virully  unfettered 'local autonomy', but a totally inadeque  fiscal base - logally
bestowed  on the new local govenments is causing  trouble. In the Czech Republic,  for example, central  autodities
are properly concened about the national implications  of both local povemment busines  activities and local
borrowing  as weUl  as the fragmentation  of the national  education  system. In Hungary, whore  local gover_nN  can
spend their budgets, most of which come from national transfers, any way they want, simiar  problems are
emerging.  And in Russia, which is with the CSFR the only fonmlly  "federa  transitional  country, separtist
tendencies  fueled  in part by fiscal pressures  and imbalances  are raising funamntal  political  problems.
34.  The CSFR, of course, has already decided  to split into two sparate republics, effective  in 1993.  Even
more dramatic, although  of course largely motivated  by forces stronger than those discssed  here, is the cse  of
former Yugoslavia. These two are by no means the only countrie  in central or eastern Europe to be etmically
heterogeneous. It may weU  be tat  in the end  the only way such countries will be able to hold together in a
democratic  fashion will be by reconstituting  themsdves as vey  "loon"  fedrations - like Switzerland  or Canada,
in which the subnational  units (cantons  or provinces,  respectively)  are also 'sovereign  states in some important
respects. In these circumstances,  central-ational  negotiations  become as much or more  exercises in diplomacy
as in the design  and implementation  of efficient  and equitable  govermental structuresAY  In contrast, the discussion
in the present  paper assumes, as does the legal framework  in every country considered  here except Russia (and the
soon-to-vanish CSFR),  that the transition  countries are organized essentily  as unitary states, and that the essential
role of local governments  is to ensure the efficient  provision  of local public  sevices and to act, where it is efficient
to do so, as agents of the centrl  government.
35.  At present, in most of the countnes under review, those local officials who are not simply waiting more
or less  passively,  either for orders  to come down from above as they have for decades  or, more hopefuUy,  for their
future to be unveiled for them, have  understandably  been using their eaergies primarly to attempt  to wheedle  more
money  out of the central government. In Romania,  for example,  where the entire 1992 trnsfer  budget was spent
by the middle  of the year - largely  on centrally-mandated  subsidies  to enterprises  - it is not suprising that Bucharest
city officials were to be found  two or three times a week at the Ministry  of Finance trying to secure more fumds.
Other local officials, forhtnate  enough to possess clear tide to significant  assets, have been selling them off and
using the proceeds for current expenditures  (as in some towns in the Czech  Republic)  or trying to use their assets
as equity  in joint ventures with foreign  investors  (as in other towns in both Hungary and Romania).
36.  On the whole, however, there is as yet little eidence  at the local level of wide deviations  from desired
national  standards  in the provision  of essential  services, other than that resulting from the general fiscal penury
afflicting  all these  countries. Similarly,  perhaps  partly reflecting  the relatively  undeveloped  financial  sector, there
is also no evidence  of either significant  budgetary  deficits at the local level or of excessive (or often, any) local
borrowing. As it gets harder to squeeze muoney  out of the center, however, and as it gets more difficult to get easy
finance  from seUing  off assets, subnational  governments  in the transition  economies  are going to find it increasingly
tempting  to move in both these ditions.
-China, where such control largely  remains  in place, is of course an exception  to this genemalization,  although  even
there many of the problems  discussed  in this paper are manifest.
-I'For  analysis relevant to such federai states, see Shah, *Perspectives  on the Design of Intergovernmental  Fiscal
Relatiers," Worling Paper No. 726, 1991,  and Bird, Federal  Finance  in Comprative Petpective (Toronto, 1986).- 11 -
37.  With respect to education,  for example, the finacial  incentives  in the preent  Hungarian  systom may in
the future, unless  changes  are made, lead to larger towns  with  seondary  schools  being unwilling  to accept  stdents
from smaller  towns  without  such  schools.  whe  completely  unconditionalnature  of intergovenmemtal  fiscal  tansfers
in Hungary  make it very difficult  to penaliz such actions. Simily,  national education  standards  have vanished
in the Czech  Republic  but have not as yet been replaced  by either guidelines  or nrles: totalitarian  education  was
undoubtedly  an  vil, but it is not obvious that anachy is better.  For the fist  time in decades theim  is clearly a
possibility  that wide variations in the quality  of education  will eerge  depending  on the ficl  resources  available
to the municipality  in which a studkt  lives. Similarly  wide vartions  may equally anse in health,  in so-al welfare
expenditure,  and in other aue  of local govenint  activity  as the power of the center to command  vaniss.  This
outcome  is unlikely  to be caosiderd desirable  by most citizens.
38.  It  is one thing for  local expaoditure  choices to reflect the wishe  of local officials who have been
democratically  elected and who wa spending  funds secured from the citim  who elected them.  But it is quite
another  when sovices with substantial  juisdictional spillovers  are underprovided  in poor areas  owing  solely to lack
of fiscal resources, or when trasfer  monies  provided  by taxpayers as a whole for specific  national piposes  are
misspent  by local officials responsive  only to their own local electors.  Yet both of these outcomes  are all too
probable over time, given the virtusally  unrestricted 'local  autonomy'  conferred by  some of  the new local
government  laws (e.g. in Hungay).  For much the same  easo,  the almost unrestrained  borrowing authority
bestowed  on new and untried local authorities  by some of these laws carries with it the potential  of eventud fiscal
disaster.
39.  As yet, the subnational  system  is too now in most countries for most of the bad things that might  happen
to have occurred. But ther  aro enough signs  to be worrying, and it is critical to use this time of transformation
and reform to continue to develop the local govemmont  stuct  in a more positive direction in a number of
important  respects. It is, for example, important  to carify exactly  what is, and is not, meant by local autonomy
and to flesh out more clearly the role envisged for local govenunents. It is also important to develop  adequate
institutions  at the centrl  level to support the many  new, and often  small, local govenunents  that have been  created.
Moreover,  the role and nature  of institutions  inrmediate betwee the central government  and the local govemments
has also tuned out to be both a critical  issuo  in many countries,  and an impoant  differentiating  factor from  country
to country. Thes  questions  are discussed  furdtr  in the balance  of this section.
Political  Decentralization
40.  The reform  of local and intergovernmental  finance  is taing  place in the context  of political  decentralization
and in particular a strong commitment  to decentrliation  of certain responsibilities  and revenue  to self-governing
local administrations 1 z.  In reaction  to decades  of over-talized  public administration  (and  related party control),
most Eastern and Central European countries are gngaging  in a process of extensive  decentralization,  gradually
reducing  the role of government  in genera and the powers  of central govemment  institutions,  and especially  their
planning  and control apparatus, in particular.
41.  In line with  this tendency,  autonomy  and control  over 'local matters, and accountability  for them,  is being
increasingly  devolved  to the newly-elected  local governments.  The centrl  government  wants 'each tub to sit on its
own bottom', to assign  taxes and be done with it, and to reduce transfer dependance'. Local governments  want
to shake off central control and be masters in their own house, and see appeal in the apparent autonomy  that
'transfer independnce'  provides.  For those  and other reasons,  the principle  of  localautonomy is now  enshrined
-'In Bulgaria however, the pace of the former exceeds  (and precedes) the latter.  There is a risk at present of
increasing fragmentation  in the number of self-governing  units in Bulgaria because of the perception of local
governments  that 'self-governing status  will lead to greater budgetary transfen  from the center.  In order to
counteract  this trend, it is important  that aspirations  for local autonomy  be tempered  by specifying  a threshold  for
self-financing/own  source icvenue mobilization.- 12 -
in the legislation  of most transitional  countries. As a rle,  this legislation  affims d  liation,  local financial
autonomy  and the administraive 'independence' of the uunadonal level from cental  control.  The language
differs, but the geonel  intent is clearly to free subnational govenments  from the  4ead  hand'  of centralized control
and to let local democracy  flounish.
42.  These  political  reforms are paralleled  by dcentaliton  of fiscal  responsibilities.  Some  form  of subnational
govemment  stucture had existed  in most of the transition  economies mder  the socialtst  regime. However, the fiscal
system  of this regime  was essenidaly 'unitary,'  with the sub-national  level being little more than an edmin
unit or 'departmet'  of the center, with no indepe;dnt  fiscal or legisltive responsibility. Kornai (I992,  op cit)
sets out the former  socialisS  system  in considerable  detail. It is revealing  that this lengthy  study hardly refers to the
existence  of subnational  state administrations,  noting only that they are tightly cntrolled  in al  respects by the
central  bureaucrcy.  In effect, local govenents  were basically  udeconcentrated'  nits (or branch offices)  of the
central govermment  and had little or no financial  autonomy. This was true even of those countries such as the
USSR, and Czechoslovalia  which were formally  called 'federations'.  It was also true in the Russian  Federation,
despite the fact that Russia's 31 autonomous  republics  and national regions wero said to be 'autonomous' and to
have  independent  budgetary  rights. Policy-making  was  hence  very controlled  and centrHzed  and local government
had  virtually  no independent  tax or expenditure  powes  - part of a larger picture in which  the budget itself  was seen
only as the handmaiden  of the Plan.
43.  Reorganizing  Governuent.  Now, however, virtually every transitional country is to varying degrees
decentralizing,  deconcentrating,  and delegadng  functions  and responsibilities.Y  Decentalization has many  merits,
both in political  and economic terms. It has, for example, the potential of improving the efficiency of local
government  by subjecting  its actions to the scrutiny of the local electorate. Autonomy  over local decision-making
and expenditures  also frees local governments  from the heavy hand of centrd control.  As yet, however,  these
benefits  have not been attained for two quite distinct reasons: the persistence  of the old ways and certain flaws in
the new dispensation.
44.  In Romsani, for example,  there are at least three important  reasons  why local autonomy  has little meaning
in reality as yet.  First, although  the Public Finance  Law clearly says that every local government  is supposed  to
have budgetary  autonomy,  it also gives power to the central govment  to change local budgetary allocations.9'
Moreover, as noted above, the habit of deference  to centrl  commands, even if no  longer legally binding (or
enforceable)  still persists in many areas.  Secondly,  at the present tibm local govermnments  in Romania  actually
deliver very few services themselves. Instead, their basic role is to contract with reaies autonomies  (local public
enterprises)  for the delivery  of most local public  services. These 2ngj,  like al enterprises  in pre-reform  Romania,
were of course just another part of the public sector under the previous regime.  Under a  1990 Law on  the
Restucturing of State-owned  Economic Units, these enterprises  are now financially  independent. Although  they
are legally  responsible  to a board comprised  of me4bers of the relevant local government, they appear to be acting
both more independently  and at the same time more in response  to the many cental  controls and  egulations  to
WDeconcentration  refers to dispersion  of responsibilities  within  the central government  structure  from the center to
regional  *branch  offices', and differs from 'delegation' in which  local government  may execute  certain functions
on behalf  of the central government  (and be accountable  to it for their performance), and 'decentralization', in
which  full decision  making and implementation  authority  is transferred  to local govenmment,  which is accountable
only to its own constituents.
2'Art. 51 of the Public Finance Law states that 'the distribution  of the revenues  and expenditures  or categories  of
local budgets ... is established  by the decision  bodies  of each county [district]  and of the city Bucharest.'  But  Art.
22 of the same law states explicitly that the central government  has  decisive power in the formation of local
budgets. Each year, local budgets are submitted to the Ministry of fmance no later than July 1. The Ministry  of
Finance  examines  the draft budgets  and has ten days in which  to "ask for the necessary modifications'  in order to
establish  budget balance. Most importantly, 'in case of divergence  the (central] Govemment is to decide'.- 13 -
which they are stil  subject thn  at  the behest of local govemments.  Finally, as in most of the transitional
economies,  Romania  has created  a large number  of small,  poor  local goverments with almost no resourc0s  of thoir
own.  Autonomy'  does not mean the same tbing to a small, poor rural commune  as it does to a large,  rich city.
45.  Lcal  institutions  are more  developed  in countnes such as Hungry,  but these three problems  - conflicting
legal interoptations, tangled rmlations  with enterprises, and considerable diversity in the capability of  local
govemments - exist almost everywhere, and cast some doubt on the real significance of  local autonomy.'
Moreover, even where such implementation  problems  do not exist, the fiudamental  problem with th  way local
autonomy  is being approache  in the  transition oconomies  is that such  autonomy is  not moeningfil  if it is not
accompanied  by capacity, and it is not desirable  unless  it is accompanied  by responsibility.
46.  To make  local autonomy  menjrtef,  local govements  need adequato  locally-controiled  revenues.  Not
only must decisions  about the provision  of government  services with local benefits  be made by local governments,
but such goverments must have the resources to carry out such decisions.  As developed further below, local
expenditure  discretion  is stil limited  in imponant  ways: some such limitations  may be good; others clearly are not.
Moreover, the fimdamntal inadequacy  in most couttries of the local revenue  base (see later discussion),  and the
resulting  continued  dependance  of local finance  on ad hoc transfers  means that revenue capacity  is also inadequate.
Greater expenditure  discretion  in those expenditures  fiuly assigned to the subnational  level and greater flexibility
for sub-national  govemrments  to raise their own revenues  seem  needed in most countries.  Such revenue flexibility
and autonomy  is a crucial step to maling local govemment  more accountable  to local residents, and to improving
the efficiency  with which local public  services are delivered.
47.  One meaning  of local autonomy  is thus that local governts  should  be able to raise and spend  revenues
from their own revenue  sources  in any way they wish - subject  to cenain limitaions on the revenue  bases to which
they  have access (see below). Since local governments  are responsible  to local taxpayers  for what they do with  the
funds they raise, in  principle it is neither necessary nor desirable for  the central government to tell local
govemments  what they can do with their own money.  If those who pay for local services financed from local
revenues, the local taxpayers (and voters), are unhappy with what their locally-elected  authorities do with their
money,  they may dismiss them.
48.  On the other hand, if the centml govemment  is unhappy  with uwht some local government  does with the
money raised from local taxpayers, its unhappiess  may be unfortunate from some perspectives, but it is
unavoidable.  What  local autonomy  means  is precisely  that there is nothing  that  the central  government  can or should
do to alleviate  any such distress it may feel  - barring extreme  cases such as corruption  or when other national  laws
are breached.
49.  Local autonomy  emphatically  does not mean,  however, that  local authorities  should  be able to do whatever
they  want with  other people's money  - that is, with taxes  paid by other than local residents. Truu local democracy  -
presumably  the ultimate reason  why 'local autonomy' is considered  desirable - means *responsible'  democracy,
which in turn requires full and explicit  political  accountabilitv  to the source  of local government  resources  for what
is done with those resources.  Local autonomy  in this sense is thus not only consistent  with, but also requires, that
two important  conditions  be satisfied:
1.  The access of local authorities to taxes that may be *exported-  to non-residents should be
severely  restricted.
2.  Subnational  governments  should as a rule be accountable  to central government  (that is, to
taxpayers  in general) for the use made of central government  transfers.
Acceptance  of these conditions,  as is necessary  if efficient resource  use is to be achieved, has strong implications
both for the design of the local tax system  and for the design of transfer systems,  as developed  below.- 14 -
50.  Th'e  eenal  economic  role of subntional governient is to provide  to local residents  those public  services
for which they arm  willing to pay.  As already noted, local govemnmets  must be accountable  to their citizens for
the actions they undertske  to the extent  those citizens  finance those actions. Similarly, local governments  mst  be
accountable  to the central govemment  to the extent they are in effect acting as 'agents'  and are financed by
transfers.  Accountabilitv  in this sense is the public  sector equivalent  of the 'bottom line' in the private sector.
51.  Such accountability  clearly requir  thst subeational  governments  should, whenover  possible, choa  for
the services they  provide, and, where  charging  is impracticable,  they should finance  such services from taxes bomne
by local residents,  except to the extent  that the contral  government  is, for reasons  discussed  later, willing  to pay for
them.  Public soctor activities are unlikely to be provided officiently unless the lines of responsbiity  and
accountability  are cleady established  along these lines.
52.  On the one hand, then, local govemnments  need to be given access  to adequate  resources  to do the job with
which they are entrsted.  On the other, they  must be held responsible  to those who provide  these  resoure  - local
residents  or central goverments, as the case may be - for what they do with them.
53.  In principle, local govemments  should therefore not only have access to those revenue souces that they
are best equipped to exploit - such as residential  proprty  taxes and user charges for local services - but they
should also be both encouraged  and permitted to exploit these sources as fuUy  as possible, subject to certain
limitations.  Unless local governments  are given some degree of freedom  with respect to local revenues, including
the freedom to make mistakes  for which  they are accountable  to their constituents,  the development  of responsible
and responsive  local govemment  in the trnsition economies  is likely to remain  an unaainable mirage. On the other
han;, if local governmcats  are given cate  blauche to spend  o-ter people's money,  the alocationa,  distuibutional,
and maccc  consequences  will almost certainly  be undesirable.
54.  There are of course dangers  in permitting  local governments  even  limited  freedom. One danger in the eyes
of some is thst they will not utilize  fully all the revenue sources open to them, thus allowing  the level and quality
of public services in some areas to deteriorate  below the standard considered  desirable.  But this is not a real
problem. If the savice in question  is reaUy  one of national importance  (e.g. reseach) or one in which there is a
strong national interest in maintaining  standards  (e.g. poverty alleviation),  it should be nationally funded  at least
in part and its achievement  monitored  correspondingly. If it is not a matter of national interest, why should the
national government  be concemed? If the local electors do not like what their local govenment does, or does not
do, they can 'throw the rscals  out'  at the next election.  As noted above, the freedom  to make mistakes, and to
bear the consequences  of one's mistakes, is an important  component  of local autonomy.
55.  Another danger, more salient from an economic perspective, is that local governments  may attempt to
extract revenues from sources for which they  are not accountable,  thus obviating  the basic  efficiency  argument  for
their existence.  To counter this inevitable  tndency,  central govenments should in principle deny or limit access
to taxes that fall mainly on nonresidents  such as most naual  resoure  revenues,  pr-retail  stage sales taxes and,
to some extent, nonresidential  real property taxes.
56.  Another  way to counter  this problem  to some  extent may be to establish  a uniform set of tax bases for local
governments  (perhaps  different for different  categories  such as big cities, small towns, and rual  areas - although
this may not be politically  acceptable  in all countries), with a limited amount  of rate flexibility  being permitted in
order to provide room for local effort while restraining  unproductive  competition  and unwarranted  exploitation.
It is especially  important  to provide  adequate  flexibility  to exploit good local tax bases to avoid creating a situation
in which the only flexibility  available  veal governments  in their struggle to cope with budgetary  prssu  is by
exploiting  such economically  undesiable sources  of revenue  as local business  taxes or, even  worse, local business
enterprises. As emphasized  later, the business  of government  is not business,  and enterprising  municipalities  should
not be encouraged  to develop  local enterprises  in order to secure the revenue  they need to function.- 1S  -
Tho Size and Scope  of Government: How Many  Levels?
57.  In the pmroform period, virtully  all the countries under review had a multi-tier  organizion,  with the
central level implemeaing its control over the local level throuh  an  of government.  The  central
goverment  wa responsible  for the  overall  plan  and budget,  and the intenrmdiate  level,  variously  called  'Oblast
(in the Russian Fedation);  *Judet  (Romania);  County Council (Hunguy),  and *Voivodu  in Poland, was the
administrative,  control  d surveillance  agency  tough  which o  cer  effected  conol  and implemented
policy.w  This middle  tier ovemw tho expenditur  of local governts  and wa  the  chnol  for centil  fical
flows  to the  localities.  Substatvoly,  however,  noe  of the countries  discsed  her  was  organized,  from  a fiscal
perspective,  u  a federaton.  Although  the Russian  Federotin gv  nomial  autnomy  to its 31 'auftomous  (or
national)  regions, okmup and republics, these  sb-ntioad  gove  too wero nither  fiscally idependent nor
able to determin their own expenditur and tax policies. At the other extrme  in some ropects is China, a unitary
country  with a vey  decentralized  inison.
58.  At present, only Russia and Czechodova  have a thre  tier  fml  systm  of govemment,  comprising
the federal govemment, republics, and regions - and t  Czech and Sloak  Fedeal  Republic, as it is formally
called, is scheduled  to septo  shortly into its two componet pua.  All the other countries discussed  here have
a uitarv  system  of government. A first look at the lol  stucture suggests  that Poland, Hungary, and Romania
have a two-tier level of government  (central  and local), Rumds,  China and Bulgaia  a three-tier  struture  (central,
provinces/county/regional  and  local),  and  Vietnam a  four-tier  level  of  goverment  (czatml,  provincial,
municipal/district  and comneighborhood)  a  shown  in Table 1.  In fact, however, matters  ae  not so simple
anywhere. Romania,  for instance, has two  tier  of local govemmt  (the old judets and municipalities):  all of the
area of a judet is divided into  unicipalities,  but in principle each type of local government  is independent  of the
other. In Hungary, on the other  hand, whilo  the old counties  still exist, they really have no functions,  so that there
are m effect only two lovels of government,  cental and locaL On the oter  nd, in Budapest  (as in tho citie  of
the Czech  Republic)  there are *subcity (distict, or ward)  councils  and goverments with elected  councils  and their
own budgets  and assets, so that  thoe local  level of govenmnt  itsf  ha  two tiers - as indeed  it does in the largely
unrefonned stucture of Vietnam. In Bulgai,  the municipalities  ar  the basic unit of self-government,  but they
have contiguous  bordes  and therefore both urban and  ural.  The municipality  itslf  has an elected Council  and
Mayor, but urban settlents  within the municipaity also hav  an elected Mayor (no Council) with delegated
executive  power, from the municipality  (ie. county). This lower level is therefore  a deconcentratd level of local
govemment.
59.  As a  rule the  middle tier  of goveiunt  cotinue  to aist  in  vestigial form in most tansitional
countries, but it is struggling both for a  role and for legidmacy.  Most coundries  seem to want to shed this
intermediat tier, associated  with the former  control  economy,  as if to put their past behind  them. In some countries
the role of the interdiat  tier is now limited largely to overseeing the constitudonality  and legality of local
govemment  oprations.  lI  others,  its role has become one of coornanting cental  government  policy at the
regic *al  level. In most, however, there are few quesdons  more in flux than the present  and futre  role, if any, of'
intermediate  lvels  of government.
60.  In HAomgm,  for example,  ther  are now 8 regions, 19  counties, and 3070 localities. The regions,  headed
by  a  central official called the  Commissioner  of  the Republic, have two functions: (1) information and
dissemination,  which involves collecting data on local govenmet  activities and providing information  to local
govenments to facilitat  the implementation  of national policies; and (2) to ensure that local government  actions
(e.g. on taxes)  are constitutional. The functions  of the 19 counties, formerly  the main teritorial control instrument
of the state, have also been severly  restricted. counties  retain some minor fee revenues  and are supposed  to be
L' These  are, strictly  spealdng,  decentralized  branches  of the central  govenmment  administration,  not an indpendent
tier.  There are 88 oblasts in Russia; 9 oblasts  in Bulgaria; 19 County Councils in Hungary; 49 Voivodships  in
Polp.nd;  and 41 Judets in Romania.- 16  -
responsible for functons  of an intuAunsdicional natur  that servo swvral  localies.  In contrast, the local
govemnments  (almost twice the  number of  the  former 1563 local councils) have considerable expenditure
responsibilities,  the right to spend  national transfes and shared ta  a  they  so  fit, and amost unlimited  power
to borrow, own and dispose  of property, and to manag, establish, or sel public eaterpises.
Table 1
Trends in  cr  t  Governmnt Orgnization
country  UnitayFdal  # of Tiern  Em  N of Tiers (preet)
___________  _______________  (pro-rform  )  Structm
Hungary  Unitary  3: central/county/  Unitary  2: cental/local
local
Poland  Unitar  2: cenral/local  Unitary  2: voivodship8/
Ronania  Unitary  3: central/regional//  Unitary  2: central/local
local  _  _  _
Bulgaria  Unitary  3: central/regional/  Unitary  3: central/oblass
local  (regions)  obahina
(municipalities)
CSFR  Federl  3: central/state/  2 countries  2: republics/local
local
Russia  Federal  4: central/oblast/  Fderad  3: federal/oblast/
myons/vi-t  ge  rayons
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  Soviet_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
China  Unitary  3: centrl/province/  Unitary  3: central/
local  province/
local




61.  T,he  stuation in Romania  is quite different. Although  the 41 judets continue to exist, there are now two
completely  different  administrative  structures  in each  judet  The first, headed  by an appointed  prefect, is essentally
the deconcentated territorial  admnistaton  of the state.  The seoond, haded  by the elected president of the judet
council, is the locl  govenment at the judet level of local gov  ere,  which is responsible  for  works of regional
interest but which  has no hieruchial authority  over the 2,948 other local governmentsU.
L'Me situation  where a local govemment  jurisdiction  coincides  territorially  with a deconcentrated  echelon  of the
central government  administaon  can be found in other countries. T.he  Romanians  have basically  borrowed  the
French local administtion  system  as it emaerged  from the 1982  decentralization  reform, at least as far as the roles
of the departmt  (judrte)  and the communes  (comune  si orase) are concerned. (They did not copy the truly new
feature  which that reform brought about, nmely  the creation of the region as an additional  intermediate  layer of- 17 -
62.  In EgJg,  the 49 vovoidahips  ane  esetaly  deoncetred  public  service inmdiaes  for cti  central
expenditures  (mostly  in hlth  and socal welfa),  although  other central expenditures  are camed out locally by
line ministries.  All local government  functions  ar  caried out directly  by the 2383 gjina  governmons. Prest
plans, however, ate for a new iermediat  tier of local govenmet  (probably  about 300 units called  powiats)
to be put in place in  1993.  Similarly, in the CzechRepublic,  whoe  there are at preseat over 5000 local
govebmts,  there ar  also 7 regions and 75 districts  e_nally  left over ftom the preious  regime, and plans are
being considered  for creating anything  from 3 to 20 to 7S "second-fierm  local govamenats.
63.  Finally, in tIe Russn  EfSop,  a sligbtly  different  paten  is emerging, with the obast level tddng on
a laorg  role and emerging  as an iwpota  unit in its own right.  ndeed, if the fiSecal  reforms at the subnational
level proposed in  macmst  logislation  are implemted,  the Russin  Federtion will have decentlid  expenditure
responsibilities  and to a lesser degre,  rvenues,  to the oblst  level and will take on the character of a tme federal
state.
Size of Goveme  Units: Efficiey-and  Other CMgM.
64.  Although  the initial  reaction against the previous  intemediate  govemments  as udesrable  reminders  of
the old regime  is  dendable,  so is the obvious  concern  in many countries  to put something  more acceptable  in
their place.  As shown in Table 2, most of the east European  countries have created a large number  of small, and
probably  not viable,  local government  units. In Hungary, for example,  the averago  population  of local goverments
(excluding  Budapest)  is only less than 3,000.  In Romani*,  half the population  lives in local governnowt  units with
a population  of less than 4.000, such units accout  for 90% of all local governments, and the average population
of all local govenments is only 7,500.  Poand's  locad  govenms  ar  smilarly fragmented, with an average
population  of only about 16,000.  The Czech  Republic,  a compact  country  with a little more than 10 million  people,
has  over 5000 local govermments.  In Bulgaria  there are 3,984 elected local govemet  units (settlemnts) with
the average  population  of 1500. At the more aggregate  level, there are 273 municipalities  with the averge  size of
around 30,000.
65.  Such extensive iixm  on  may be good for  getting govemment close to the people, but it also
substantiaUy  complicates  intergovernm tal relations - it is, for example,  imWposible  for the central govemment  to
maintain  direct bilateal relations  with so many units -,  reduces  the political  ~roice  of local government  as a whole,
and in many cases yields localities  that are sunply too small to provide efficiently  all the public services demanded
from them. At the very least, even if it is decided not to  reate a formal intermediate  tier of government, some
mechanism  for coordination  and consultation  is likely to prove necessary. Possible  models abound in the world,
e.g. the 'municipal federations that exist in many of the Nordic  countries, under which localities orgaize  on a
voluntary  basis to provide  cerin  local services,  or the Nordic secondary  commun-e, county-like  bodies  with  their
own elected officials  responsible  for providing  services of an inteijurisdictional  nature.
local (regional)  government). Similar situations  exist in other countries, for instance,  in Germany  (Bavaria)  where
the landkroise  are both  local govemments  (gebietskorperwhaften)  and the lowest  echelon  of the State  administration.- 18-
Table 2
Deloizationu  Scale  and Sie  of Govenmenw
Country  of units of local governumet  Average Size
Hungary  3070 municipalities  2,834
Poland  2383 gnas  16,000
Ronuia  2940 urban and rural mniucipa4itie  7,S00
41 judeta  S37,804
Bulgaia  273 municipalties  30,000
CSFR  2843 cides in the Slovak  Republic  1,867*
5500  cities in the Czech  Republic
Russia  2000 rayons  125,000
88 oblast  2,840,909
China  30 provincs  33 millon
Vietnam  44 provincs  1.47 mon
Note:* For the CSFR as a whole.
Sum,orting  Subnaional Government: The Ihstutional Setting for Subntioinsl Govemmentisl  Reform
66.  The lack of an approie  contral  govnnt  strucr  to moitor  and support  tho new local govanmts
is a common  problem  in central and eastern Europe. In Poland, Hungary, and Vietnam  for example, thDre  exists
no institution  or designated  person  in cbare  of the deentlion  of the localities  and the Ministty  of Finance
still plays a lead role in the budgetary  function  and other fiscal issues at the local level.  In Russia the formation
and implementation  of fiscal polcy is done by the centrl  government  and three Parliamntay  commisons.  The
budget is submitted  to the Parliament  for approval, the collection  of revenue  is done by the State Tax Service, and
expenditure  authorization  is  dr  the control of the MOF.  In Bulgaria, the Ministry  of Regional Development,
Housing Polcy  and Construction is responsible for  formulating the policy on  terrtoral  division and local
administrative  functions  and guiding  the reform  progam whilo  the MiniAry  of Finance  retains  primy  control  over
the linked  issues  of local govrment  finance  and budgeting. In Romania  the formulation  of decentalization  policy
and implementation  of local government  reform  is tife  resnsibility  of tho Department  of Local  Governmet Affairs
of the Office of the Prime Minisr  and the Deparmt  of Tax Administationand Local Budget Management  of
the Ministry of Finance and Economy.  Simildy,  in the Czech Republic, both the Ministry  of Finance and the
Ministry  of Economic  Policy and Development  are involved  in shaping the intergovernmental  finance system.
67.  Despite  (or perhaps  becue  of) the involvement  of a number  of central  govenment institutions  in a number
of countries, quite a lot that should  be done sem  to be going undone. Among  the tasks for which responsibility
must be clearly establied  are MomitOlinl  and  ssg  subnationd  fnms  both in total and individually. This
task might be located in the Ministry  of Finance, in a special  local govemment  department, or it might even be
given semi-independent  status with some local goverment  involvement  (like the US Advisory Commission  on
Intergovernmental  Relations  or the similar body in Australia). There ae  pros and cons of each possible location
that need to be considered  carefully. But what is beyond dispute is the need to ensure that the central authonties
have  a better underanding  of both  the existing  situation  and the likely effects of any proposed  changes than  is true
at present.- 19 -
68.  In addition,  reular and dogiled  fingaial da should  be maintained  on subutional  govenments.  Ideally,
this requires;
(1)  the establishme of uniform  financial  reporting  (and budgetng)  systms - perhaps  with
different  degre  of complexity  for different  categories  of local governments;  and
(2) the desigaion of an agency  responible  for coUecting  and procesng then data  in a timely
fahion (which  wiU  probably,  in a larg  and complex  country,  requie use of some sampling
thniques  as well  as occasional  census  exercises  to provide  the  needed frtame).
The  first of these  quiem  ts in tun requirm  the  development  of such  systeum  and, much  more  difficult,  their
implementation,  which will geally  require subsatial  trining  and folow-up efforts.  Developing  such
'infrastricture'  is neither  quick  nor  cheap,  but  it is esential  if substantial  ad  important  public  sector  activities  are
to b  decentlized  - for whatever  rsrn  - without  losing sight of what is going  on in these importat pua  of the
public sector.  Implementation  of this  recomendation  may rqui  additional  centnl govem  ntot
institutions  (1) to develop  and maintain  the  reporting  systems,  (2) to tran and support  local  govenment  officials,
(3) to develop  independent  auditing  procedures  for local  administrations  and their  rovenueoeaning  entexprises,  and
(4) to run the stical  side  of the opation  - with  the  latter  being  a  main  input  into  the work  of the instituion
referred to in the first recommendation  above.
69.  Additional  training  efforts are clearly  needed to uagade the technical  canacity  of subnational overnments
to carry  out efficiently  and effectively  the expendituro  functions  for which they are now responsible  and others  with
which  they may be entusted  in the future, whether  in exercise  of 'local autonomy or as delegated  agencies  of the
central goverment  In some insance.  (e.g. education)  the neary  support should probably como from the
relevant central minisy,  while in other instane  (e.g. road and waterworks)  it may come fom the ministry,
regional  agencies, universities,  private  sources, or some mixture of the preceding. In view of the heterogeneous
nature  of both the services that are (or may be) decenalized and of most countries, it is unlikely  the same  solution
will be appropria  in aU coass,  but it is clealy a high-pority  item to work out in detil  exactly who is going to
support  the new lood role in each functionl area and how that support is going to be delivered. Each functional
area - including the budgeting and  financi  rporting  discussed earier  - has different needs, problems, and
possibilities,  and will likely have to be treated  diffetly.
70.  Finally, an especially  high-priority  task for the needed  central unit monitoring  local finance is to analy
and evaluate  intermovernmental  fiscal  transfers. As indicated  later in this paper, there  are many questions  that  must
be raised about the objectives, the design, and the effects of such transfers.  There is also much to be said for
encouraging much more informed and open discussion of these matters than is common in many countries,
especially  when the whole process is as novel  as it is in the transitional  economies. Regular  publication  of data will
of course help, but one cannot rely solely on an interested  party - the central govermment  - to carry out, and
certainly  not to publish, all the analysis that is really needed  in any country in which intergovemmental  financial
issues are important,  whether in political or economic  terms, or both.  For this reason and others, there is much
to be said for establishing as soon as possible in most countries one or more smal  non-govermnental  research
institutes  focusing  on local government  problems.
The Changin  Role of Government:  From Ownership  to Service - Provision
71.  Decentralization  and intergovernmental  fiscal  reforms are taking  place in the context  of a major  change in
the role of goverment  in the trasitional economies.  Ia the past, governments  at both the national  and subnational
levels have been involved in almost every aspect  of economic  activity. The state owned all enterprises, from the
steel plant on the 'commanding heights' of the economy  to the local laundry.  The state organized production,
allocated  labor, planned exports, and so on.  The first stage of decentralization  in some countries began in the
1970's, when the ownership of some smaller industrial  units and the retail sector were transferred  to subnational-20  -
govemments. By the late 1980's, local goverments in countries such as China owned a substantial  patt of the
economy  - light industry, and some manufactuning.
72.  More rect  reforms aim to decentralie owneip  to tho privat  sector. The trnusition  is still far from
completo. Although  all the east European  countries  are committed  to privatzing stlte assets, to liberaliang prices,
and to withdrwing from the role of the state as direct pducer  and prvider  of ecoomic goods, many produetive
assets - indudrial assets, agriculturl  and urban lad,  the housing stock, commrcial  property - remain in
govenmment  hands, somedmes local, sometimes  national.
73.  While  everything is in flux in most countries,  as a nle  at the local level the satus  quo contasb  starkly
with the role local govemments  generally  play in maurkt  ec4onmies.  In the lIser,  local govenmments  provide  basic
urban inftucur  and local public services (sometime through local public enterprs)  and often act as local
administrators  of nationa policies in such area  a  education,  health, and social sevices.  In the former socialist
pattern, on the other hand, enterprises owned by local govenments had their investments  financed  from local
budget', and local budgets in tum derived revenues  from Otheir eantepriss.  C 
were close, and the distinction  between  enterpris functions  and government  functions  often  murky. Lcaities  often
asked enterprises  to construct and finance  such facilities  as roads and schools, clinics and  even sports stadia and
clubs; 'donations' to the budget for one-off outlays  were also com  rm Jt made little difference  whether such
outlays  were directly  undertaken  by the enterprise  or via the more circuitous route of profit transfer, and funding
via the government  budget: the burden on the enterprise  and the not budgetary  position  was the same. All this has
now changed, or is in the process of change.
74.  Until recently, for  example, most local government revenue from  enterprises came from  'profi:
remittances'.  As a result of reforms to the national tax system, and especialy  of the enterprise tax system,
however, these remittances  have largely been replaced by taxes on  *thei  enterpriseeW. Somo countries still
provide explicitly  for such 'ownership' rights to enterprise taxes: in Romana,  for example, local governments
(iudets  and municipalities)  have the right to both profits and dividends  taxes levied (by the central government)  on
their public  enterprises. In Poland, prior to the racet  tax reform, both profits and dividend  taxes similaly went
to the 'founding' sbnatidonal  government,  and in  addition  these  govemnments  (vovoidshipsand  gmina) got specified
shares of the similar taxes levied on state enterprises  which had significant activities in their territories.  This
process  was so complicated  that the Polish tax administration  spent almost as much time allocating  enteTprise  taxes
among  jurisdictions  as it did collecting  them.
75.  Even where more modern  systems  of tax adminitraton have been adopted, as in Hungary, there is still
a strong  tendency  for local governments  to feel  they  have a primary  claim on the tax revenues  generated  within their
jurisdiction.  This 'source entitlement approach  to the allocation  of fiscal revenues is of course familiar  in such
contexts  as international  taxation  and the taxation  of natural  resources. But it is seldom  so visible at the local level
as it is in some of the transition  economies,  in part because  of the obvious gross inequities  that would  result from
allowing  local governments  to keep large shares  of the revenues  levied on firms producing for a national  or world
market. Of courmse,  exactly the same problem  arises, or wil arise, in the transition  economies,  as noted below.
76.  Ownershig  versus Service Provision.  The fundamental  change in the role of subnational  governments
represents  a major challenge  which  has as yet not been fully  realized in most countries in trasition.  The key role
of local governments  is no longer as o  but as saervi  viders and reguators. The wrenching  reforms most
countries are undertakdng  in order to achieve macroeconomic  stabilization  and to compress  the state budget may
easily  produce perverse effects at the local level.  As noted below, some central govermments,  for example,  have
shifted additional expenditure responsibilities  downwards  in the hopes of improving their budgetary position.
Revenue  assignments  and/or transfers  to local governments  are generally  tightly  budgeted for the same reason.  The
Uy  See Tanzi, Fiscal Reforms in Socialist  Economies  in Transition,  IMF, 1991,  for a full discussion  of the national
tax reforms that are in process in most countries.- 21 -
result is inevitably  that local govenments ar  sorely  tempted  to rely on entises  for continued  budgetary  oudlays,
and consequantly  to protect  locally-owned  enterprises  to ensure  their  profitability.  Unless  a workable  framwork
for intergovernmentsl  finance  is put in place, budgetary  stringency  is thus likely  to create  additional  hurdles  to
disassociating  local  govenments  from thir enterps.
77.  T'he  IQ-S4t  Oda facing  both local and centra govements are also very difrent  from the past.
'Adm  trativo  inteventiods', such  as the detailed  regulation  of prices,  the administation  of waiting  lists for
housing,  and the  allocadon  of land  and mtria  supplies  are no longer  qriropriate. Instead,  what  is now  needed
is to develop  and implement  an entirely  now  regulatory  strctur  to provide tho  conditions  within which the market
can do its job e.g. reulation to avoid  monopoly,  prevent  food  adulteration,  curtail  financa fraud,  and  so on. In
this  vein,  one  essential  task  of the  national  goverment  will  be to set up an adequate  and clear  legal  framework  not
only for the private  sector  but also for the deces.alized  local  public  sector. Local govermmnts  face their  own
unfamiliar  regulatory  task,  particularly  with respect to land  use, enviromental problems, and retail trade.
78.  Not  only  is the  role  of govemment  changing,  but  its mo  is changing.  Intergovernmental  fiscal  reforms  are
taking place in the context of an overall shriniing role of government, with all thstresss  that a smaller pie
imposes on decision-makers. As shown in Table 3, the size of govenmment  was much larger in the transition
economies  than in mulaet economies.  In many cases, reforms have alrdy  had a major influence  on the overall
"size' of the govanment sector, although  much more some than in other.  In China, for example,  the government
budget declined  from 40% of GDP in 1979  to Ims than 20S of GDP in 1989;  in Hungary, the similar  decline  was
from almost 70% of GNP to about 60%. examples. In Ru via, the geneal budget was over 60% of GDP in the
late '80s; the target  for 1992  is only  35%.
79.  Although  the figures are not always  clear, on the whole it appears plausible that the shrinling of the
national level has been generally  pamrlled by a shrinkdng  of the  subnational  level of government:  in Hungary, for
instance,  subnational  expenditure  fell from 14.3% of GDP in 1988  to only 10.4% in 1991. Predicting  future trends
is difficult becus  of the changing  nature of the intergovernmental  system  in most of these countries.
80.  On one hand, as already mentioned, central govenuments  continue to shift important  expenditure  items
'downstairs' in an attompt  to balance the central budget. It is not clear if the final result of this process will be
reduced  total expenditures,  increased  central trasfers,  or increased  local taxes  - although  some combination  of the
first and second  possibilities  seems most likely in most countres.  On the other hand, as a rule public  enterpnses
continue to provide a number of basic local public services: they support the construction and maintenance  of
housing,  keep kindergates  and pre-schools,  and so on.  Larger entrpses  may even have their own hospitals,
retail outlets, and other non-production  facilities. As privatization  reforms impinge  increasingly  on the enterprise
sector, pressurs  to replace  some of these activities  by local budgetary  outlays  will undoubtedly  be strong.
81.  Thus, at  the  same time that localities may be reducing expenditres  by  shedding unnecessary  and
unproductive  subsidies  (for example,  to housing)  as part of the economic  tranition to a market economy,  they may
have to take on some expenditures  previously caied  out by enterprise. Whether such enterprise functions  will
accrue to national  or subnational  budgets is hard to predict: it is equally difficult  to predict the net change, in the
short term,  in  the size of  the local government sector.  In Russia, as  one  example, the  non-production
responsibilities  of enterpnses are, virtually across the board, likely to be taken on by the subnational  sector, thus
substantially  increasing  its expenditure  responsibilities. Indeed, such a transfer is de facto already taking place
owing to the financial  difficulties  of many enterprises. Unfortunately,  no one has either quantified  the dimensions
of this problem or envisaged any workable solution for it.  In principle, however, the shift in expenditure
responsibilities  from enterprises  to local govemment  should  be matched,  at least to some extent,  by a corresponding
change in the revenue  base of the local govemment. Otherwise, the budgetary  consequences  of privatization  are
likely to be very negative.  But as a mle, that revenue base is already inadequate  for the tasks demanded  of it, as
discussed  below.- 22 -
Table 3
Reform  and the Size of the Goveommt Sector
(Expenditue as % of GDP)
Country  Exp  Sub-nationl  Sub-nio  Total Exp. as  Sub-national  Sub-national
as % of  Exp. as %  Exp.u%  % GDP  Exp. a%  Exp.u  % of
GDP  of GDP  of total  of GDP  Totia Exp.
PrE-1989  Post-1989
Hungary  62.7'  14.3'  25.4'  57.4  10.4  18.1
Poland  49.7  14.7  35.3  40.1  4.00'  I0
Romania  45.1T  3.64  11  24.67  6  10.8'
Bulgaina  55.2  N.A.  N.A.  43.0  25.0  23.0
CSFR  58.46  20.5  34.5  60.1  20.2'  34.3'
Russia*  1.0'  20.7  13U  16.0 1L/  41.0'r  17.0  43.0
China*  271r-  14.3  53.0  22.8  N.A.  N.A.
Vietnam  11.3  3.4  31.0  12.3'2  3.9  33.0
Notes:  (Seo end of paper).
82.  In the past, goverments m the socalis countties  employed  fixed  prncs (including  rents, and other urban
user fees) and wage controls, as essential  elements  in thOeir  dstbuti  tool kit.  Now, however, as part of the
reforms currently  under way, the tansitional  economics  a  required ind  to 'get the pices  right  and to use tax
policies and targeted  subsidies  instead.  As a rule, replacing  conmr  price subsidies by targeted sbidies  (with
a much smaler budgetary  impact)  will require  the development  of new infmaion  and twcng  systems.W Some
observers  think  that the targeting  problem  will  be relatively  eay in the transion economies  because  of the existence
of a large 'control'  data bas  in such countries. This hope is probably  naive, howevr,  given (1) the flaws  in that
data base (e.g. in Poland  several  million  people  exist *off the books  a  far as officialdom  is concemed;  in Hungary
and especially  Romania,  thern  e important  low-income  ethnic  groups Ohat  ar  smilarly  lusive);  (2) the dependence
of official  information  on a local control  system  that is diintgatng  apidly, if it has not already disappeaed; and
(3) the increasing  gmwth of the euphemistically-labelled  'infornmal  sector.'
83.  Indeed,  since the breakown of cenal  planning,  ctrl  governmet  in most countries  have surprisngly
little information  even about the activities  of local goverments. Only in a few countries (e.g. Hungary, Poland)
do local governments  now appear to provide detailed financing reports to the conter. Reporting of data on
extrabudgetary  funds and borrowing  is also deficiejti
84.  Public sector pricing is likely to be one of the last areas to be reformed  in most countries. While  national
price reforms have liberalized  most private  sector prices, 1 at the subnatioual  level governments  are having  a much
harder time adjusting prces  for public sevioces,  even for prvate  goods provided by the public sector, such as
housing  rents (and such ancillary  services as water and heating) and transport fares.  Adjusting these  prices is of
I'  For useful discussions  of some of these  problems,  see the following  papers presented  at the recent World Bank
Conference  on 'Public Expenditures  and the Poor: Incidence  and Targeting': Milanovic,  'Distributional  Incidence
of Cash and In-Kind Transfers  in Eastern Europe and Russia;' and Jarvis and Micklewright,  'The Targeting  of
Family Allowance  in Hungary.'
-LPhere  has been  much discussion  about the 'big bang' vs gradual approach  to price reform, but even in countries
as committed  to gradualism  as China there has been major  price liberalization.- 23 -
course essential  both for efficiency  ard  to enhce  local rvenues.  Doing  so, however, implies major changes in
the cost of living and in welfiae, so tat  changing  such  public  sctor  prie  will entail major, and undoubtdly very
unpo  ar, distributional  shifts  if not pro)pey coordinated  with other refoms. Such shifts, if too wrenching,  or too
quick, could upet  the filo  democcies  tat  havo only  just emergod  in most countries.
85.  At the  -m tm  that fiscal  i-a  is going on, national tax  ytems  are also undegoing major
changes. Major naionl  tax reforms  havo been initiate in almwt every country  in a  effort both to make their tax
sytm  more compiblo wit  thos  of a market ecnomy  and to pwvide a soeu  source of revenues to finace
essential  ste  budgetary  outlays il the face of prvation.  While there are considerable  variations  of dotil from
country  to country, as a rule tax reform involves:  (i) the replaeint  of profit remittances  to govemment  as owner
with corprt  income tuation  (CIT) to the govement  a  tax colloctor, (ii) the introduction  of a value-ddd  tax
(VAT) to replac  the classical socialist *tuover  tax", which is bet  described as consisting of thousands of
commodity-specific  rates, or wedges  betwoe adminisratively-st rtail  and wholesale  prices; (iii) the introduction
of personal  mcome  taxes (PMl)  -wage controls  woe the 'mplicit tax' in tho pre-form  era there wore  also payroll
taxes, which are geneally retained; (iv) the itroduction of propety  and land tati01on  i  rdimentary  form; and
(v) the elimination  of a number  of ts  aimed  basicaly at regulating nterprise  behavior  (such as the excess wage
tax, wage bonus tax, excem profits tax).2I
86.  As theso national level taxes ar  being revamped, the system of local fimucing is smultnewously  being
changed,  both intentionally  and to some extent  uintendonally.  In Hungay,  for example, the VAT and PIT were
introduced  in 1990,  the year the Local  Self-Government  Act was passed. In Russia, tho CIT  was introduced  in 199,1,
and the VAT in 1992,  the sam- year that  the redsign of the intergovrnl  fiscal system  was to be implemented.
In Romania,  prepartions are underway for the ino  t  of the VAT in 1993,  and of a global personal income
tax in 1994,  with initial local govemment  reforms  having taken place already in 1991. In the Czech  Republic,  the
VAT is also scheduled  to come into offect in 1993, dieo -m  year in which a now system of intergovenmental
finance is supposed  to be put in place.  In Bulgara, the curret  VAT implnion  date is July 1, 1993MI.  In
all of these cases, there appears to have been almost no consideation in the basic national tax reform of the fiscal
needs of the local governments,  even though it is clear that, given the fundamental  inadequacy  of the revenues
specifically  assigned to local governments  in most countries (see below), thes  govemments  are likely to be
dependent  on some form of 'tax shaing'  in some form for yeas  to come.
87.  As these  press  become manfest, further  reforms are assigning  to, or sharing with, local governments
taxes  whose design  is new, whose operation  is untestd,  and whose  administration  is inevitably  weak, as discussed
later.  Moreover, even though  the national level reforms are ofte  intended  to be 'revenue neutral', there is little
basis for revenue  estimation,  and  hence little certity  as to expected  yields. The potential  volatility  of taxes  shared
or assigned to the subnational sector is compounded  by these countries' overall economic cycicalityll.  The
difficulty  of ensuring corresponden=c  between  the expenditure  responsibilities  of the local goverments under the
new systems, and their assigned  revenue  base or share, is self-evident.
I'For fuller discussion,  see Tanzi, Fiscal Policies  in Economies  in Transitin
1 In  Bulgaria a  comprehensive tax  reform under preparation compnses draft profits  tax  law,  VAT,  tax
administration,  territorial division, and excises.
J2See  D. Go, 'Revenue Uncertainty  in the Transition,' CECPE, RPO# 27118, forthcoming,  1992.-24-
Stabtization: Mem  Macoeconomic Context  for D  ion
88.  The economic  reform progms  in the trasitioal  economies  have had to addre  both  and
libsaip- n  concerus. Integovenmntal  fiscal roforms are tWring  place in the  context of  a  w *k overall
nacroeconomic  position  and often  a weak cntral  govemnmnt  fiscal  postion.  The move to prvate epr  p
has  contributed  to a more vital economy,  but has  accenuad  tho  problem  of a shriking  rovenue  base at the national
level, as many of the smaller new private enterprises  elude the grasp of tde tax net and ptesnt  major challenges
to compliance  and tax adminisa  . The filing state-owned  entpise  sctor no longer prvitdes th  revenue  base
of earlier days.  The tax refoms  dencribed  above are undoubtdly deirable  for maket  effici  ency,  but unt
experience  with the new system  is gained, reven  shortfalls  seem  all too likely.  The expediture side of the budget
continues  to be burdened  by heavy outlays  for both  consumer  and producer  suidies,  as well as often  generous  cash
benefit program  and now and sometimes large outlays to  support failing enteprises  and  to restucture  or
recapitalize  banks.
89.  In Hungry,  the consolidated  deficit of the general gove_nxt  reaed  4.3 % of GDP, with inflation  of
32  %, in 1990,  tho year tho new system  of local self-government  was introduced.  In the Rusasia  Federation  the fiscal
deficit is variously  measured as either 15% or 30% of GDP in 19912W,  and a likely deficit of over 10% of GDP
is expected  for 1992;  inflation is soaring. In Romaia,  the mesurd  budget deficit has been rather small, but an
inflation  zate  of 161%  in 1991 reflects  an unstable  macro-economy,  and suggest that the fiscal  accounts  understate
the deficit: the central  bank carres out heavy qasi-fiscal opeaons,  and the banking system  finances  expenditures
that are fiscal in nature. Only in China, with its gradual economic  reform (and continued  tight political  control),
is there rough budgetary  balance  and comparatively  moderate  increass  in the prce  level (See Table 4).
90.  For these  reasons, stab  and overal  o  acro-eco  ic concoms often domiate  the national  agenda.
Reducing  fiscal iwn%aances  - both those at the center, and those potentially  emaging  at the subnational  level, is
invariably a fimdamal  rquiemt  of the adjustrnt  progrm  to  which most transtional counties  have
agreed.  The  curlm  t stuation provides a shp  contst  with  public fic  in the pro-rform penod, when the
uaitary  fiscal  system  imposed  close  adherence  to the Plan  in the implementationand  execution  of the budget,  which,
together with stict  controls over the  financs  of enterprses  helped  sure broad balance in public sector
finances.A' In paticular, under the old rgim,  the finaces of subnadonal  govemment had few macroeconomic
consequences.  Revenue  sharing served only as an administrative  device  to simplify  a system of central resource
allocation.  Expenditures  were guided by planning  norms.  The result ws  tat  in an accounting  seam at least the
budgets  of the suboational  governments  were always  in balance, with  any necessary  adjustments  being made  simply
by accounting  tmnsfers.
'Ihe  difficulty  in measring  the Russian deficit relates inter aLia  to the tretent  of the Union expenditure
responsibilities  taken  over by the Russian  Federation  beginning  in November,  1991,  following  the dissolution  of the
USSR. The higher number cited rofers to a  'notional' deficit, which assumes that Russia had financed  Union
expenditures  for the full year.
2"As discussed in the present section, ther  are clearly potential  macroeconomic  problems that may arise from
suhnational  finance. Nonetheless,  it is important  to note that subnational  governments  cannot on their own cause
such problems  since  they cannot 'print money (unless  the central  govenmet  lets them do so e.g. through  locally-
controlled  banks): in the end, it is invariably  the validation  of subnational  deficits by central governments  that is
the proximate  cause of national deficits and the ills that so often ensue.  In this, as in -any  other ways, national
govenments ultimately  get the local governme  they deserve.
V  Of course, one should not exaggerate  the robustness  of the budget in pre-rform  times, since  there were clearly
many fiscally  unsustainable  elements  from a long-term  poerpective  in most countries.-25  -
Table 4
M  nmi  Indicators
Country  Deficit  as a  Subnational  laflation  Current Account  M3 growth
% of  Deficit  as a  (1991r  Balance as  %  (1991-2)
GDP (1990)  9  of GDP  of GDP  (1990)
Hunguy  -4.3  -.4  32.0  +1.0  l.  29.3
Poland  -2.4  N.A.  249.0  +4.8  45.0
Romania  +0.9  +.3  161.1  -12.4  100.8
Bulgaia  -13.0  _/  -.8  334.0  -2.7  N.A.
CSFR  -2.0 I/  +.0  54.0  +2.7  26.7
Russia  -20.6  N.A.  382.0  -7.2 I/  75.6 I/
China  -1.8  N.A.  5.3  +3.7  26.7
Vietnam  -4.1  N.A.  36.4 2/  -2.0  19.6
Source: Recent  Economic  Indicators,  IMF.
1.  For 1991; 2.  Average inflation for 1990. The end of period inflation for 1990 =  67.2%; 3. For 1M.
4.  For Bulgaria  a more meaningful  measure  is the cash deficit (net of foreign interest arreanrs)  which  was 8.5  %.
0  Most receat year after price libmlization.
91.  Shiftina Ex&enditure  Responsibilities  sDownstairs".  Current stabilization  concoens  have led the central
government  to view fiscal decentaization as an opportunity  to reduce centra expenditures. This is being done in
two ways: First, by  spinning  off  expdiiture  rsponsibilities  to the subnational  level, thereby reducing  its own
deficit, and second, as an opportunity  to reduce fiscal tnsfs,  purpordly  to make local governts  more
"idependent,  but with the welcom  side offect of reducing  centl  outlays. In paricular,  a number of countries
are trmsfernng icresing  responsibility  for social expenditures  and the social safety net to local govemnt.  In
Hungry,  for example, the responsibility  for "welfari  expeditures was tansferred to the localities. In Russia,
the contral  government  trmnsfered  social expenditurs equivalent  to some 6  % of GDP  M992)  to the local level by
this means, with the objective of  "pushing the deficit downa, presmably  in  the hope that the subnaional
govemnents would  perform the politically  painfiul utting required - even though the demand for these services
is  likely to  grow with the  worning  conomic situation. More  rcnly,  responsibility for  key national,
interurisdictional  investments (e.g. in transport)-  has al8o  been transferred  to the subuational  sector.
92.  Even some of the extensive  asset tansfers to local govenmments  that have taken place in most countries
appear to have been partly motivated  by budgetay concerns. Some of tho 'assets'  transferred - notably  housing
and some entepises  - a  really liabilities  given the heavy burden  of maintenance  and operation  of these  units and
the fact that  rental  income (last  adjusted  in the Russian  Federation  in 1928!)  does not cover even  a small  part of thes
costs.
93.  Reducing  Untersovemmental  Tansfers.  The fiscal difficulties  at the national level have also led some
Finance Ministries  to focus on reducing  intergovernmental  transfers  as one way out.  Transfers have been seen as
the ,compressible  dimnion"  of the federal  budget. The principle  of "budgetay independence"  mentioned  above
has  been interpreted  to mean that  subnational  governmets should  be financialy  self-sufficient,  which  in turn implies
that  direct transfers  should  be reduced  and even eliminated.  In reality, however,  in most of the transition  economies
central  transfer to local goverment sector are very large, reflecting  both  the rudimentary  tax base available  to local
govemnments  and the center's reluctance  - again to avoid fiscal  vulnerability  - to part with any of the  major tax-26-
bases  and to assign  them to the sublationdl  level. As a nle,  however, the amount  and distribution  of those  trasfrs
is determined  each year on a discretionary  basis in accordance  with central fiscal exigencies.
94.  While  such budgeta  flexibility  is clearly  desiable from the cental govenment's short nn  view, it is
a mistake  to view t  fers as a completey  *comprusble' poion  of the national budget, as appears  to be the case
in countries  such as Hungary  and Romania. Many  of the soevices  provided  by  ubational  goverments, particularly
in view of the 'pas-down'  phenomennn  already discused, contitute estia  expeditues  for political  stability
or for futre  ecomic  deveopmt  There  is no way that th  mny  small  local govements  that have  been crated
in most countries  con finace  the provision  of thoeo  servce  at an adequate  level out of their own rsouc.  Even
from a short-nm dtbilizaton  prspective, an undefunded subnaltional  sctor  in the curmt  environment  is all too
likely  to result  in a sitution  in which  the only  way local governme  can cope  with budgetary  presre  is by using
economically  undesiable sources of revenue  sucha  profits derived from the exploitation  of incomeming  assets
transferred  to them and from diret  public  ownership  of local busine  . At the same time, local governments'
open-ended  expediture responibility for 'social asuistmce'  is liklUy  to  sult in emorgency  recurrec  to the ceral
govnent  for additional funds, or simply the unnal  accrual of aruas  tough  short-term borowing.
Arrears have been a problem  in China in the recent past and are cuntly  a major problem  in Russia. One way
or another, intergove  n  transfers  are thus likely  to be an important  component  of the central budget  for years
to come in most transitional  countries.
95.  Deficit Control . Placing  limits on the subnadonal  deficits is of course an obvious  way in which centml
governments  can ensure that the subnational  sector does not give  ise to additional  or unexpected  m  nomic
pressures. Such limits are in place in Russia and China, for example.  In an overall framework of hard budget
constraints, such provisions  may make sense, but this is unlikely  to be true when budget constraints  are still "soft*
in other sectors, notably the aeteprise sector.
96.  The combination  of controls and soft constants  may give rise to perverse outcomes.W  In response to
the apparent surplus  in overall local budgets, for example, Russia  has, as alrady  mentioned,  sought to squeeze  the
subnational  sector by tranferring expenditures  downwards, re-adjusting  tax shares and minimizing  traDfers.W
Since local governments  by law cmnot mn deficits, however, nor for the time being can they borow  even for
liquidity  reasons,  there is almost by definition  a 'surplus' at least sufficient  to meet the *cash  on hand  requiements
of monthly  local outlays. Reduced  revenue shares  or transfers can never eliminate  this surplus: on the contrary,
since  the system  canot  be in deficit,  such measures  will only lead to measued expenditures  far below  normal levels
and increasing  cumulative  arrears.
97.  Budgetarn  Autonomys. Although  local govenmunts in most transitional  countries (1ruland,  Hungary,
Czechoslovakia,  Bulgaria  and Romania,  for example)  have thoir  own budgets, quite separte from the state budget,
this nominal independence  by no means implies the absence  of central controls.  In Romania, local budgets are
subject to the central govemment's implicit approvaW.  The central govemment  has the final say, especially if
k'For examples  of dysfunctional  incentives  for economic  liberalization  as a result of fiscal  d  lion  policies
in earlier Chines  experience, see e.g. Wong, 'Fiscal Reform  and Local  utrialization,  Modern Clina  April
1992, and *Central-Local  Relations  in an Era of Fisal  becline,-  China Ouarterlv, December 1991.
WThe  budget  surplus, meured  on th  report  csh basis" for the subnational  sector amounted to 1.2% of GDP
in the first quarter  of 1992. See Walich et al;  Intergovernmental  Finance  in the Russian  Federations; forthcoming,
1992
W(According  to both  the Law  on Local  Adm  ion  and the Law  on Public  Finances  the  authority  that  approves
local budgets is the municipal  council  for municipal  budgets,  and the district  (judet) council for the district  budget.
Budgets  have to be balanced  by law. The role of the prefect, as reprevntstive of the State, is to ascertain,  ex-post,
that local govemments abide by this legal requirment.  Ihere  is a disguised  direct control of local goverment-27 -
the budget  i  unbwaed.  In conbt,  in Russia  sc  budgetry approval is implicit in the system  of negotiated  tax
sharing  and transfers,  whose levels  ar  conditional  on an approved  level of expenditues.  On the other hand, China
and Vietnam slill have a unfiedbud,  in which  central  and subnational  plans and accounts  ae  jointly presented.
In China the local budget must be approvod by the provincial goverment,  and the budget of the provincial
government  must be approved  by the cewr.
98.  More generally,  even  though  the local  govermts  have been given  autonomy  in  pnnciple, in practice  they
lack it in my  areas  The lalc of tnsparency  or claity of laws further e  rbat  the problem.  e rel  degree
of expenditure  autonomy  of localies  is often limited. In China, for example,  local gove_nts  have little formal
or legal independence  with rospect  to etheor  local taxes  or the level and compoition of expenditu.  In almost all
the countri  under  eview, ce  expenditur noms  and  enl  spending  and wage mndats  continue  to Carry
weight in many u.  Tndee, in Roumaia  thes  facton stil weigh so heavily that thero  is hrdly  any real local
expenditure  discreton as yet.  In the Czch  Republic  and Hungry,  on the other hand, ther  appears  to be much
looser  control  on the expenditure ide. On the oter  and, the lack of  veue  atnmyis  seere  w  eveywhore. The
center usually stipulates caps  on local taxes  and in some cas  even spocifies  the tax rates and tax base.
99.  Tax Administration  as a Sowce of Vuleabil  . Fiscal d  talion,  and the political  decentrlization
that accompanies  it in this now environment  ha  left some cOentl governments  c  -o  caly  vulnerble  for
another important eson  To ensure macroconomic stabiliation, the feded  goverment  must be able to contain
its budgetary  deficits, which  means  relying  on its own  budgetary  revenues. In some tansition economies,  however,
tax adminition  is decenulized,  that is, aubnaional governments  collect revenues on behalf  of the center, and
transfer  them upwards 'we Table S).PI In Russi,  in the CSPR, in China, and Vietnam, all revenues other than
customs  and trad  taxi  ar  collected  by local a  ons.  As the experience  of the former USSR  (and the
former  Yugoslavia)  suggstb, delegation  of collection  responsibility,  with its potential  for non-compmiance,  or worse,
reliance  on contibutions from member  publics,  are only  vible  means  of fincing  the centrl  govermment  so long
as central political control reman  strg  (as in China and Vietnam). The potential  withholding  of tax revenues
from the fedeal budget threatens  Russia  today;  even in China  non-compliant  loCal  administrtn,  and the revenue
contracing'  system this gave rise to, have been the source of  m_cnomically  cyclical  federal revenues. 2-'
expenditure  magent  because  all expenditur involving  the use of centrl  govenment resources  requres the ex-
ante approval  of the Miistry  of Finances' local trsury  office, and, since fiscal tnsfers  represent  up to 90  % of
local resources, the Govemment, legal arrangements  notwithstanding,  continues to actually  exert a close to total
control.
3  Strictly sealing,  the tax  dministrations  am doconconat  arms of the federal or central administration. De
facto, however, tax officials may have strong  ties and loyalties  to the local governments  which often  provide their
housing and fringe benefits: ther  is conideablo  evidence in some countries (e.g. Russia) that local tax offices
respond  to local policy.
Uv  See Szapary  and Blejer, 'The Evolving  Role  of Fiscal Policy  in Centally Planed  Economies  under Reform:  The
Case of China,- IMF Woring  Paper 407, 1989;  and Bah and Wallich, "Intergovenmental Finance in China".
World Bank WoDkng  PaPr  Series No.863, 1992.- 28 -
Table  5
Tax Admunistraton in Trulstion  Soci;at  E3c9;lp
Country  "Inverted  Centmalzed
Hungary  x
Poland  xi
Romania  x2 
Bulgaria  x2  l
CSFR  x
Russia  XI
China  x  l
Vietnam  x
Notes:
1. In Poland, all national domesic taxes, and some local taxes and fes  are colUected  by treauy  offices  and then
transferred  to state and local budgets.  Other local taxes  and fees are paid directly to Gmias.
2.  In Romania  and Bulgaia,  the local goverments do not have their own administrton.  All local taxes are
collected  by local branches of the MOF.
3.  The State Tax Service is in the proce  of centalifzing.
100.  liDcations  for The Lonuer Tern Intergovemmenbl  Svstom Although  intergovernmental  fiscal reform
is necessuily takig  place in this strned  macroconomic context  and hence  inevitably  reflects changing  short-term
fiscal needs and psures,  care must be taken to prevent the stabilition  objective from fully dominating  the
redesign of the intergovemmental  finances megime. A major challenge facing the trmnsitional  economies  is to
develop  an intergovernmental  fiscal system  which is an optimal  combination  of mles ad  di  - one dbt wiU
be both flexible  enough to be compatible  with macroeconomc stabdilization  and the major structural  shifts which
are taking  place in the economy,  and at the sam time provide  a stable framework  for the effective  operion  of both
central and sub-national  govemments  in the lcnger termL
101.  One solution  along these  lines that  has been  adopted  in some market  economies,  for example,  pivots  around
a system  of intergovernmental  transfers  in which  the totl  is flexible  with cbanging macreconomic circumstnces -
for example, some  percengta of total central  taxe - while the distribution  of this total  among  diffent  subnational
govemments  is Oformula-driven",  with the amount received by different localities depending  on such factors as
potential  "fiscal capacity' and assessed need.  This approach  repreents a compromise,  in which the center gives
up some degree of control  over its  revenue but also insulate  itself from ad hoc and  possibly escalating demands
from localities,  while localities  avoid discretionary  cutbacks  in local trasfers  to meet stabilizaion objectives,  with
all the expenditure dislocations that this implies.  In most of the countries under review, thus regularizing the overall
size and distribution  of the tanmsfer,  like strengthening  local finances  by broadening  the local tax base to improve
local tax yields, represent high-priority  reforms. This point is developed further below.- 29 -
m. WHO DOES  WHAT? THE ASSIGNMENT  OF EXPENDlTURES
The Efficieno Cae  for Deeentized  Local Gt.
102.  Whilo local governmmnts  may have some effect on stabilization  policy and some role in distributive
policyLW,  their mn-or  economic  role is clealy with respect to the alocation of resources. From an efficiency  point
of view, the basic rulo of expenditure  asignment is to assign each function  to the lowest level of government
consistent  with its efficient  performance. So long as thm  are local variations  in tses  and costs, there are clearly
efficiency  gains from carrying  out public sector  activities  in as decenraized a fashion as possible - and these gains
are larger the lower the price elasticity  of domad  for these services.
103.  In principle, therefore, the only services that should be provided centrally - or,  in some instances,
regionally - are:
*  serviees for which there either are, or are for overching  political reasons
presumed  to be, no significant  differences  in demands  in different  localides  (e.g.
national  defense;  public health);
*  services  with  substantid 'spillovers  betwoen  jurisdictions  that  cannot be handled  in some
other way such as by contracting,  or by grant design (e.g. interlocal tmnsportation;  air
and water quality); and
smervices  for which the additional costs of local adminisraon  are sufficiently high to
outweigh  its advantages  (e.g. administration  of income taxes).
Apart from the last of these  three cases, even  these soervics  can often  be delivered  most efficiently  at the local level,
although  they  may well  be financed  in whole  or part by central  transfers. In short, in principle,  moat  public  services
should be delivered  at the local level, with local decision-makers  deciding  what services are provided, to whom,
and in what quantity  and quality. To put this the other way, the only services  that should be provided  centrally  are
those for which there are no differences  in demands  in different  localites, where there are substantil 'spillovers
between  jurisdictions that cannot be handled in some other way, or those for which the additional  costs of local
administration  are sufficiently  higher to outweigh  its advantages.
Expenditure  Assinment in Practice
104.  As noted earlier, under the previous socialist  regime, since local governments  basically  acted as units of
the centrlized administration,  local expenditures  were included  in the unified budget of the central govemment.
There was no question as to who did what. the central govenment did everything, sometimes directly and
sometimes  through its local administrative  units.  Under the new local government  laws in most of the countries
under  review, however,  specific  expenditures  have been  assigned  to the local level of government  as shown  in Table
6.  In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, for example, local goverments  have detailed expenditure
responsibilities  in  the area of education (primary and  kindergarten), transportation (local or urban streets),
environment  (garbage  collection,  disposal,  industrial  waste),  housing  and related services, and health and welfare.
In Russia, on the other hand, there is no legal definition  of expenditure  assignments  at the local level, except  for
WSince  local governments  are governments  as well as service agencies, they are inevitably interested in the
distributive  as well  as the allocative  effects  of their  policies. Income  redistribution  at the local level may be swverely
limited by the openness of the local economy, but if a goverment  is not concenied with distribution,  it is not a
government  at all but simply a service agency.  Nonetheless,  within-jurisdiction  distribution  is ignored here as
unimportant  relative to the importance  of setting up the basic mles of the local finance game so that each local
govemment  is fully accountable  for its actions.- 30  -
Table 6
Expenditure Assignment to Subnational Authortiei_
Hungary  Poland  Romnia  CSFR  China  Vietnam  Bulgara  Russia
Defence  No local  No  No  No  No  No  No  Military bousing
responsibility
Justicetatemal  Enforcement of  No  Public  No  No  Secwity of security  rights  of national  security  is  farmingesas





Foreign Econotnic  No  No
Relations
Education  Ptimary and  Kindergarten  None  Partid  All schools  A  Several special
secondary only  and pre-  tesponsibility in  primary througb  expeadisues  vocatiol
including day care  elmentafy  the Czecb  university level.  (epil  and  schools.  Wages,
and high schools  chools only  Republic  Local  current) of  operation
governmenta  pnimary and  contmction  and
cover all salaries,  econdary  maintenance of al
mainten nceof  schools.  Sone  primary and
school fciliies,  kindergartens.  seondary  chools.
adminitration  and  Some technicd  Local enterprises
scholarhips  and vocational  build  ome
schools  facilities
Culture and parks  Supponting  Over-lapping  Cultural activities  No  Some museums
cultural activities  responsibility  such as cinemas  with oblast




facilities And  al
othcr culural
facilities.,I  01  i  i,,i i  jsi  ti'31ti  .1*111i
_ G  0  q8t1  .
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ii  _  _  _  _  _  _  _X_  _  _  _  __Q  -_1  t
1  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ii_  _  _  _
^:i  L_  12  10t  1i <~~~~~~~~~I
a  IaX,1 
_  __  __  _  _  _  __  _  __
l  X  -- 32 -
Hungary  Poland  Romania  CSFR  China  Vietnam  Bulgau  Ruoo
Libannes  Partial  No (book  No  No  Lal  iaui  Speci  ibaqy
peogmbliy  purchase  aevicca  at tde thimh  the  eblM  levde  an budgs of the  mm  l  ibay
Miniiry of  ices  at he
OdhnC  )  isyo lve-ld.
Poke  ccs  No  - -- Sofia  has  a  Road  (rafic)
With  die
Wiliti;  ed_er
Sanitation  Garbae  collection  Ownerhip  and  Rcflu  colection  Pat of garbage garage  clection)  Provision  of  colgcticurat  both cold water  at  oebb  and rayou __________________  ~~~~~~all  levels 
levels.
Sewge  Garbage  coLection  Owneri  ad  Sewage  Gar  Moat  of the and  eleme  pwviaoaof  colhecti  clectioG and  epetcioa clekanig  ewage  evceo  i  wm  b  ln  die  e  _pendluSt  doe
se_mea  rayon level  and
some op_Son
ezpendiuresat  the
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~village  levd
Public  utiies  (ps.  Water  Supply  me  Ditict  Wdcar  spply  Subsdi  to electricity,  and  war)  snanaeet  and  ligh  heating  and  iDn_uctn.  hmboJs  (nt rmuenance of  wtder  cep_e)  at the -________________  public  cemteries _ 
. yon  lev- 33  -
_________________  Hungary  _  Poand  Roasua  CSFR  Chn  VKtnam  Bum  Russ
Housing  Housing  Sha  Haiwng  No  Builliqg  _  Ma  a  of  Maie  e  is de mgement  eqpibilty  evices  _h  ea_  oq  of
pasurs  sa  te  evof
OdIu2ScI  govammsern  r
Pq.tY  e  _efi
Fuming.  bousing.
building  sl  Cqita
subvdifrin foe  expenditures  axr
re"ade  iacdeunls
_  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  -.  athesalse  oed.
Price  and ohw subsidies  Rest subsdin  Rem  Eer  Dict  subsidies  Ysn  Mas Danc  t  For  .eels, Muss
uWies  to  to agrullual  I dmug.  tnot  nd
huehold  cooetive,  sadyto  food sac  a
nd pb  and  sbidies to  _me-lge  bw  bred,  alk and
transport  eutpst  t  srvie  within  afinas  a_  tedi ,ubsidies  e  ot  bIvolved  unicipaities.  nyon  level. Also
in tde  Hatig  vabg  dy  remt  sbdies
poducfioof  isce 1992.
lbcal ubric
Socil  Welfae  Social  care  Voivodship  Welfare  Homles  Part  obist ffciies  sch as  r  obilitis  expeu  for  disebled  ad  oVeammt old  e  an  ede  who s-  o  ad  o  yand handicapped  chids,  rayon kvel hames  ophanagcs,  die  n  nt  of
disbled  dec.  pwrgan  tanded
byupperlevd
New Public enterprie  Can  esablih  new  Can  ablih  Can  ablih  Cm establish  Can  etablis  aw  Can  Can  esablish  Capacity  to ivest (productive  secto)  domestic  joint  new  domesi  ne  m  domestic  domneacjoint  estblis  ne  domestic  il  joist Vema;nts
vente  joint ventu  dometic  jowt vewn  vesra  nw  joist ventos  (pSOpewea
joint  domestic  of privatization
ventures  joint  proced  if ryo
Al th  ayon  lee
ths aso  IincIud
10  percentofany
subordination- 34 -
Hungary  Poland  Romania  CSFR  China  Viem  Bulgaria  Russ
Environmant  Proection of tae  Envimeat  Measue  to  RexOsibl  for nvkionent  prtction  Outlays.  iwmrne aNd  el
wehabiritate  the  environmental
envkoseit  pblems,  e.g.
pri  rvation  of
_  _  _  _  _  _  ~~~~~~~foca
State-owned  Enterpriss  Major local  Local  Loca  Major local  Major  ownerhip  Local  -*Gmup  C- ownerhip  ownership  ownership  ownerhip  esponsibities of  ownership  enterses  e.g. responsibilities  reponibilities  reqnibiliti  rsponsibilities  lght and heay  respotibi  local  light es  indusries.  lities  inuy,  housg
Prvide  subsidies  condruction  an
to cderprise  for  food  indury.
technia  Rayon
upgding  d  ronibility
building  of  exis  only if dhe
temaporary  eepid  is
warbousel  transftrd  to the
loal klvel
Nftes:
i  Jo Victnam,  local  governmentc  are  responsible  for al of th  abov activiti  f  ey  s  fi  uderthrdit  diction.  at, each  klve  ofgovem  tis reponibl  for thaa activiie which  fals und their juisdiction.  / '-' implies  no infonnstion. 3  'No' implis no applicable  to ubaniol  governments.35 -
social  progrms (which  account  for a major  pat of expenditure).  In effect,  tradition  and inrtda have  eablished
expenditur  ssignmets  i  Rusia which  i  many  cases roughly  correpond to  best practice (benfit) areas.
Unformnatly,  pehps  owing  in part  to the  lack  of legal  clarity  in ths area, it  appears  tht thes pincipleare being
inreasngly  violated in the courn of the on-going  chages  in the ietgovemntal  finance system.
105.  Although  in some  ways  it is not typical,  Romuiia  provides  an intereng  example  of some  of the things
that  are  going  on in tho  a  of expenditur  assigment  in tho  tnsitioatl  conomies.  At first glance,  for  example,
the  new  local  govomment  law appeas to asign local  govenments  exclqsive  technical  and financial  responsibility
for many  more  fimetions  (e.g. policing)  than  those  that  are actually  exercised. In fact,  however,  this  asgnment
is only  on condition  tht national  laws  or '[centrall  govemment  decisions'  do not specify  otherwise.  That  is, in
practice,  local  govenments  do only  what  the  centraI  authorities  wat  them  to do. The  main  financa responsibilities
so far actually  asumd  by local goverm  ts in Romania  are basically  for vaious mor  activities  in social
assistance,  municipal  service,  cultwre  and  arts,  public  investment,  and maintenance.  A A rogars local  transportation
and  district  heating,  local govemments  simply  serve  as conduit  C3r  the channelling  ok  coetral  government  subsidies
to the public  service  enterprises  (regie  autonome)  delivering  there  two services. Witth  the gradual  elimnation  of
consumer  subsidies  (to be completed  in 1993)  and the  tnusfer of legal  ownersip of these  entetprises  to the local
govemments  (to be completed  in 1992)  the  situation  may  change,  though  it is far from  clear  how, finacially, the
local  goverments  will  handle  the  problems  stemming  from  the  now  responsibilities.
106.  Romana  is thus unusual  in the extent  to which  some  important  expenditures  usually  considered  to have
strong 'local benefit' characteristies  are still at the centrl level.  In particular,  and in contrast  to most other
transitional  countries,  education  and health  remain  the sole reponsibility  of the contrhl  govemment  in Romania,
reportedly  to ensue a minimum  standard  in the provision  of these  important  services. Recently, however,
increasing  financial  pressure  on the  central  govenmmnt  has led  to the  proposal  for some  of these  expenditures  be
delegated  to localities.  As  is not  uncommon  in the  transition  economies  -though  highly  unusual  in western  countries
- both public  scurity and fire  protection  ar  also provided  throughout  Romania  by local  branches  of a central
Ministry.
107.  Overlapping  responsibilities  between  the  center  and localities  with  respect  to culture  and social  assisance,
on the  other  hand,  are  common  to  y  countries.  For  example,  local  museums  are  often  financed  by local  budgets
and national  museums  financed  by the central  govemment  budget;  but books  for both  local  and national  libraries
are purchased  by the Ministry  of Culture.  Similarly,  both local  and centra governments  fund  programs  related  to
children.  Such'  *xtdit  h  -h-ring  '-i..,  with  diffeent  levels  of govnmt  responsible  for  different  subfunctions
of particular  expenditure  activities,  or with more than one level of government  playing  an important  role in
financing,  regulating,  and providing  particular  services-is  a common  characteristic  of multi-tiered  governmental
structures:  it may sometimes  be efficient,  but it almost  always  obscures  the key question  of precisely  who is
responsible,  and  accountable,  for what.
Local  Public  Enterpriso  Ownership
108.  Romaia also provides  an extreme  instance  of a problem  found to varying  degrees  in most of the
transitional  countries:  the  importance  and  complexity  of the  tnangular  relations  between  the  new  local  governments,
the  public  enterprises  providing  local  services,  and the centrl govenunenLt  In some  ways,  it is not too much  of
a caricature  to characteriz  the local  government  system  now functioning  in Romania  as amounting  to little  more
in fiscal  terms  than  a conduit  between  centrd government  and these  enterprises  (or relies autonomies,  as they  are
called  in Romania).  If one asks: 'What do local  governments  per so  do in Romania?',  the  answer  at the present
time  is: Not much.' Excluding  the rngj  local  govermnment  expenditures  appear  to consist  of littlo  more  in most
cases  than minor  outlays  on social  assistance,  cultur, and gener  administrative  expenditures.  Most  service
delivery  activities  have  been  hived  off to the  various  mge.  leaving  the local  government  as a place  that  does  little
more  than  collect  dog licenses  and register  marriages.  These  may  be essential  activities,  but they  do not require
a large  revenue  base  -and indeed  in many  instances  would  best  be financed  by fees  and  charges  (as  discussed  later).- 36 -
109.  In principle, of course, thern is nothing necesarily wrong with having local govenments that do not
themselves  deliver  out of thei own resours  many services  to local reidens,  just as there is nothing  wrong with
having  local govenments deliver  nationally-finaced  and naonay-detmned  semvices  to local residents  (see lator
discussion)  or with  having most local sevice activities  caried out by local public enterises  with septo  budgets
and managemmats.  All these  systems  can be found  in one country  or another and may work perfectly satifctorily.
Indeed, given the extrm  degreo  of cenhalizion  characteizing the trsitional  economies  in the past, the present
system in Romania,  one of the Ist  of theso countries to reject the old system, may be not only acceptable  but
desirable.
110.  Nonetess,  it is critical to the financial  health of both the local govomments  and local public  enterprises
that the precise elionship  between  the two should be set out clealy.  At present, in a number of countries tha
lines distinguishing  activities that should be performd  by local gov  _ents, local public enterprise,  and
commercial  enterps  are undesirably  confused. Unless  these questions  arm  disentangled,  senous problems  may
occur both in setting up properly functioning  local governments  and local public enterprise  and with respect to
privatization  more generally. A few examples  from field  work in several countries illustra  the point:
In some areas, local governments are responsible for certain activities (e.g.  parks); in others, local
enterprises;
Some activities  (e.g.bakeries) are commercial  in some areas; others are nru as adjuncts to local public
enteprises;
It is also  important  to clarify  the relationships  between  differant  public  enterprises  e.g. at regional  and local
levels  as well as betwen enterpriss and governments,  especially  when an enterpnse is located  in one area
and serves  other areas as well.
:11.  On the whole, municipal  enterprises  should  be confinod  to traditional  local public  service activities  (water
and sewer, heating [traditional  in eastn  Europe, at least], tansit,  perhps  solid waste collection  and disposal).
All essentially  commacal activities  now conducted  by such  enteprises such as bakeries, laundries,  and construction
companies  should  be sold off as soon  as possible. Finally, in some  instances  certain activities  (e.g. parks)  for which
there seems  no appaent rationale  for adoptig  the enterpnse form of organiation should probably  be folded back
into the local government  proper.
112.  Where it is decided to organize  some local public  service in the form of a public enterprise, any subsidy
paid from generad  local government  revenues  should  be set on an ex ante basis to establish  the hard  budeet constraint
needed for efficient  operation. Moreover, such enterprises  should be subject to all normal tax laws (central  and
local), and in general they should be run like commercial  enterprises e.g.  setting prices and terms of services -
although  presunably within a natioally-esblished  regulatory framwork  (which as yet does not exist in most
countries). At present, local authorities  essentially  have either  no guidance  in setting enterprise  prices, or too much
guidance  in the sense that these  prices are still being set by centrd authorities.
113.  The budgets  of local public enterprises  should also  not be consolidated  with local government  budgets  per
se: only  any explicit  subsidy  and any profits  transfer  should appear  in the goverment  budget.  Of course, enterprise
budgets should be annexed to the local budget and submitted - not for approval but for information  - to the
appropriate  cental agency, as noted earlier.  Mhe  numerous somewhat  anomalous  decentralized  institutions  found
in many  transitional  economies  (e.g. Hlouses of Culture)  should  either be organized  as enterprises  and treated  like
other enterprises  or, if they  are to be treated  as component  parts of local govenments, consolidated  with  other local
expenditures  and revenues.
114.  It is especially  important,  both for good govemnment  and for good business, that  local governments  should
get out of commercial  business  activities  as soon  as possible. The business  of local government  is not business,  and
the sooner local governments  begin to concentrate  on their central task of providing as efficiently  as possible  the-37  -
local public servi&as  their inhabitats  desir  the better it will be for both busine  and the local inhabitants.
Although intentions in this respect are cleady good in most countries, there does not apper  to be adquate
recognition of the danger of d  lintion  becoming an obstacle to the privaizton  process, as is already
happening  to some extent in Hungary, Bulgaria,  Russia, and pehas  elswwhere  (see later discussion).
115.  As  emphasized earlier,  countries tat  decentalize  subntal  expditure  responsibilities to  local
govemnmts that either do not have access to adequate local tax sources, or that are not capable (technically  or
politically)  of admnting  thos  taxes to which  they have  access, run this risk, especially  when sver  fiscd crises
reduce  central  tanse  to local governmnts.  Whln the major  source  of governmnt rvenue  has traditionally  been,
and is still to a lar  extent, entrrse,  the temptation  for local govenmes  to extract  more revenue from those
enterprise in thdir  control can be overwhelming  - and will invariably  be most unforunate from an efficiency  point
of view.
Provision  of Social  Services: Shiftina  the Safety Net 'Downstairs'
116.  Most public  enterprises  are engaged  in providmg  such 'hard  services  as water, electricity,  and transport.
In addition,  however,  particularly  close attention  needs to be paid to the role of local governments  in te  transition
countries  in delivering  and financing  services in at least three important 'people'  areas - social assistance,  health,
and educadon.
117.  First, while the present role of municipalities  with respect to socid assi  varies from country to
country, being qmute  restricted  in Romania, for example, but much broader  in Hungary, this are  is all too likely
to become  a major  problem  in all countries  in the future  as a result of two  unpleasant  but likely developments  - the
weakening  of the naonal  cacity  to minin  ociad  protection  at the present level and the growing  need for such
assistance  as a result of economic  restuctunng.  Even if the need for this bottom layer of the social safety net
becomes  greater, however,  it is far from obvious  that  the municipal  level - while it may be the appropriate  executing
agency - should be responsible  for financins such assistance.  In many western countries, for example, it was
precisely  the unsusamably  heavy load  on municipal  welfare  systems  resuldng  from the interwar  depression  that lead
to social  welfare becoming  mainly  a national, rather than a local, responsibility. It is thus ironic, and potentially
dangerous, that  so many transitional  countries seem to be moving  in the opposite  direction  just as the need for such
services is rising sharply as part of the adjustment  process.
118.  Second, health and education are already controlled in large part at  the local level in a number of
transitional  countries. Experience  in many countries around the world shows that people are willing to pay local
taxes to have their children educated. Hence,  carrying out some education  at the local level is one instance  in
which a  devolution  of expenditure responsibility  may, at least in principle, be matched by  a  corresponding
devolution  of financial  responsibility. On the other hand, there are also strong  reasons for central  involvement  both
in ensuring adequate  investment  in human capital throughout  the country, regardless of local fiscal capacity, and
to some extent in financing  a higher level of such expenditure  than localities  would be likely to do on their own
(See also the later discussion  of trsfers).
Exnenditure  Assinmment  in Princiglo
119.  . In the long run, a desirable assignmet  of expenditures to local govermments  in many transitional
economies  might be something  along the lines shown in Table 7, perhaps with the  local'  share being further
divided  between  different tiers  of local government  along  benefit  area  lines. As Table 7 indicates,  there  are only
a very few functions  - national defense, purely local services - that should be clearly assigned to one level of
government  or the other.  Most expenditure functions  are likely to be shared between  levels of government,  as
indicated to some extent by the breakdowns shown for a  few of the functions in the table: similar detailed
subfunctional  categories  could of course be set out for e.g. health and tansport.- 38-
120.  It is also importa  to  unstand  that Table 6 refer  to the level of govenumW dt  a paticular
service. Who finM  it is a diffent  quesin.  Moover,  ther  is no prsmption  that any or all of thee  ser
must be  Qgrducd  by public  setor agencies,  although  it is atuud  that the public  sector  ust indeed to some extent
be responsble  for thoe  pgMjg  of such services if anything  clos  to the opbtal  mnmt  is to ' a provided.  Wbat
matters to people in what servces ar  provded, not who provides  thm.  Ilded,  may  'public sector' services  ar
ae-tually  caried  out by non-governmet  ntities in diffrent  comtries.
TABLE 7
A Possible  Ex=<diWur  Amsin=
Local  Center
National  Museums  X
Local Musem  X
Community  centers  X
Social  Assistance  X  X
Municipal  Services  X





Primary Schools  X
Secondary  Schools  X
Higher Education  x
Protection:
Local Police  X
Fire Protection  X
National  Police  x
National  Defense  X
121. To iUustate, aternatives to direct public  production  by genal-pose  local goverments that may be found
in one country  or another include:
*  Various  forms of contracting  with prvate firms e.g. compeotive  bidding  for time-limited  franchise (often
with the local govenment contiuing to own the assets, but turing  to prvate sector firms - or possibly
cooperatives  of former public sector workes  - to manap  them);
*  Establishing  standards  for required  sevice and leaving it up to consmers to select private vendors  and to
purchase the required  level of service;
*  Issuing  vouchers to (some or aUl)  citizens and allowing  them to purchase the required service from any
authorized  supplier,
*  Contracting with  other  government units  (e.g.  disticts,  other  municipalities, enterprises, central
goverment)  to provide  the serice;- 39 -
*  Producig some seres,  whilo  purchang othm fiom  other  govenment  agcies  or pnvat firms;
*  Estabishing  on a voluntary  basis limited  (Oneighhorhood)  govenmnts employing  user charges  (and
posbly limited  tax powers)  to gsneate rveaue;
*  Eblisbing  limited-purpos  ind  dent  govmentl  unts cverng mom  thn one  general-pose  local
govemn  (spca  disict)  finnced by bnefiay  chag  of onemo or another,
*  Establshing specia tax (imprve_t)  ars  within a given g  -puros  loca governt  to provide
services  to areas  which  are willing  to pay for thm
122. Of course,  the mer  possibility  of such  varied  augr  nme  to provide  particular  savica  does  not imply
either  that these  arangments will be easier  to manage  tha  a mr  conventional  organizaton  of public  sector
activities  or that they  will yield  officient  and equitable  semce delivery. Noeltb  s, one of the more  striking
omissions  in the  on-going  discussion  of local  govemment  in the  tranti  eonomis  is the fidure to keep  straight
the  cntical  distinctions  between  who  owns  what,  who  Daynfor  what,  and who  4  whatL  Contrary  to the  meage
many  countries  in transition  sem  to have absorbed  from their prior expenence,  namely,  that  ownership- is
eveything,  in the  pubhic  sector  who  owns  an asset  does  not necessrily  determine  who  regules the  use  of the  asset,
who  opoaes it, or who  finances  it -and these  fa  ar,  as a nle, much  morm  important  in determining  both  what
is done,  and what  the fiscal  and other  implications  are, than  is ownership  alone.
123.  A striidng feature of local government finances in most trnsitional  eonmomies  is the prolifeation of
extrabudgetary  funds (EBFs). In Hungary, in additiin to the lag  national-level  EBFs for social security,  housing
and  solidaritya, thee  are a  large number of off-uidget accounts at the local level to which oarmaioe  finds
devolved. Such  'inherited emarndg'  is also  a promint  faotur in th  CSPR. In Russ,  the right  to set up these
fnds  was accompanied  by the assgnment  of a number  of non-tax rvenu  sou  to local governments.  Bulgaria
and China  so permit  such  funds to be st  up, and in the latter thoy conatitute  an important  parallel budget at the
subnational  level.
124.  The geness of theso extabudgtay  funds is complex.  In par  they rep  t  an attempt to escape the
"control mehanism?  of tho cantrl  govenment.  Insmuch  as local budgets in some countries are not really
autonomous  and remain subject to smutiny  from above, EBFs ovade this scruy  on the expenditure  side.  Ia
countries  whoe  the loca  govenmments  ae  transfer- dependent,  and whr  transfers are allocated  not by formula
but by bargaining  and negotiaton, puttig  rnsourcea  off-budget  into EBFs  is a means  of concealig the true resource
base of the locality  from the center. Some local  governmmats  themslves claim dtt  oxtrabudgetary  funds  reduce the
uncertainties  of the budgetary  process. Moreover,  to tho oxtent  the rvenue  system  remains  basically  unitary - that
is, the tax base  and tax rate of most, if not all, taxes  are defined  by the center, with revenues  allocated  to the local
level, EBFs  may provide the only window for any local revenue  initiative.  Lastly, in countries such as Russia and
China, whero  local governments  must share any revenues  they coUlct with  higher level govemments,  EBFs, being
off-budget,  are not thus shared, a fact which gives them considerable  added attraction  from a local point  of view.
125.  On the other  hand, such funds present serious problem  for effective budgetary magement  at  the
macroeconomic  level. They also reduce the tanwparency  of budgetary  operations  and complicate  assesment of the
impact of fiscal policy. In practice, extrabudgetay funds function as parallel accounting  systems which, for all
intents  and purposes,  basicaly constitute  full paradll budgets  not subjoet  to the strictures  of conventional  budgetary
procedures. In addition to being a clearly inefficient  budgetary  practice that permits public  sector operations  not
legally  approved  through the proper channels,  the loss of control  and information  asing  from the presence  of such
multiple budgets is bound to undermine the ability of the  government to use  fiscal policy as an efficient
macroeconomic  instrument.  Without  discussing  the specific  merits  of each EBF, as a geneal rule legitimate  revenue-40-
sources  should  be fully  incorpoated  into  thoe  reulr  budget  to provide  full  accountability  of fiscal  opaions,  and
if this is not possble, full  information  about  the sours  and use of extrabudgetay  funds  at sub-national  levels
should  be proWvided  to the centrd fiscal  authorities.
IV. FINANCING  LOCAL  PUBLUC  SERVICES  THROUGH  USER  CHARGES
126.  Th prvious sction noted  that  in most  trational  cownomie  many  local  public  sector  activities  ar  caried
out through  public  etaps.  Such  terpis  ar  coma.,  for example,  in trort,  in houng,  in garba
collection,  in watr and sewap, in electricity,  and  a  on. Evae  with  prvatiuzato!a,  my  sch entrprises  ae likely
to continue  to exist  in most  countrias.  The  quesdon  of how  local  public  entepris  arm  to be fiaced  is therefore
of critical  importane  to the  health  of the  local  public  sector.  The  answer  suggested  by the  benefit  approach  to local
government  finnce  outlined  earier is tht  as a genal  rule, such enterpises should be self-financing,  that is, they
should  be paid for by those who rceive  the services  they provide. To put this another way, the first rule of local
financo  should be:  Wherever possible, charge.'  For efficiency,  chages  should be levied on those who receive
the benefits: the direct recipients, whether businese  or 'thingas (real property) should thorefore be charged.V
127.  Although the ultimate incidence of such charges is of no  more interest in principle thn  the ultimate
incidence  of the price of cheese, studies in difforet  countri  have shown that the distributive conseqm c  of
charging  for local public services is not necessrily regressive.  In any case, attempting  to rectify fundamental
distributional  problems  through inefficiently  pricing scarce local resources  is almost always a bad idea, resulting
in little if any equity  being purchased  at a high  price in efficiency  terns.  As noted earlier, however,  particular  care
will need to be tken  in adjusting  local public  service  prices (including  rents) in the transitional  economies  because
of the important  role such prices played in offecting  distribution  policy under the old regime.
128.  While user charges are most likely to be viewed by hard-pressed local officials  as a potential  additional
source of revenue,  their main economic  value is actually  to gmoto  economic-efficienv by providing  demand
information  to public sector suppliers  and by ensuring that what the local public sector supplies  is valued at least
at (marginal)  cost by citizns.  This  efficiency  objective  is particularly  importat  at the local governmnt level since
the main  economic  rationale  for local govemment  in the first plac is, as noted earlier, to improve  efficiency. There
is thus a presumption  that, whenever  possible,  local public services should be charged for rather than given away
(unless, of course, they are pure local public  goods or the explicit intention  is redistributive).
129.  For example, when local govemments  provide  services though  local public enterprises  such as water,
power, gas, and public transit, these services should generally  be charged for at prices that will recover the cost
of providing  the service from the uses  or buyers of the service either i;mmdiately or over time.2  The price of
water should reflect the cost of piping it to the homes (or standpipe)  as well as the cost of mantaining the pipes,
treating  the water, and so on. Bus fare should cover the cost of purchasing buses and maintaining  and operating
them. In principle, such prices should be set at the competitive  private level, with no tax or subsidy element
included  - except  when doing so is the most efficient  way of achieving  public policy goals (and even then, as noted
earlier, it is best if the tax-subsidy  element  is accounted  for separately).
130.  Unfortunately,  in most countries  much less  use is made  of charging  at the local level than seems  desirable,
and many of the charges that are levied  are poorly-designed  from an efficiency point of view.  Weak accounting
IZ'I view of the substantial importance  of locally-provided  intermediate  goods to business, some limited local
taxation  of business may thus be warranted,  but, as emphasized  elsewhere, it is important  to constrin  the ability
of local governments  to *export' tax burdens  to non-residents.
-there  are, of course, many well-known  qualifications  to this statement,  but it is sufficiently  accurate  for present
purposes.-41-
systems  that do not clearly identify  costs is one reason for the prevalet  under-pricing  of these semces.  Another
rason  is the historical  hangover  of the previous  distributional  role of such prices. And a third is the simple  political
difficulty that newly-elected  local goverments have inposing  subsmtnt  increases n srvce  prces on those
who have just electe  them.
131.  Lca  governments  also obtain revenue  from  *som&o  fes  uch as licens  fes  (mariage, busine,  dog)
and various small  charges levied  essenially for performig  specific services - reg  ng this or providing  a copy
of that  - for identfiable individuals. In effect, such  fes  costitueost  imbement  from the private  to the public
sector. indeed,  in some budgetary systems, such cost twcoveries are neted  out and only net (of recovenes)
expenditures  sowd  Chargig people for something  they are required  by law to do may not always  be sensible
- for example,  if the benofit  of (say) regisation  is general and the cost is specific -but on the whole  there is soldom
much harm, or much revenue, in thus reovering the cost of providiog the service in question.
132.  Another  category  of charge revenue  encompasses  what may be called *wgafic benefit  taxes (or chures).'
Such revenues are distinct from service fees and publie enterpise  pries  becau  they do not arise from the
provision or sale of a specific good or service to an identifiable  private individual.  Unlike 'prices'  which are
voluntarily  paid - although  like 'fee's  which are paid for services that may be required by law - taxes  reptesent
compulsory  contrbutions to local revenues.  Nonetheless,  specific  benefit taxes are (at least in theory) related  in
some  way to benefits  received  by the taxpayer. In contast to such genel  benefit  taxes as fuel taxes levied  on road
users as a class or local taxes in general viewed as a price paid for local collective  goods (see below) - specific
benefit  taxes relate to the specific benefits  supposedly  received by specific taxpayers.
133.  For example, if as a result of a new road, better street lights or a new sewer system, property values
increase, or busine  sales dse, a 'benefit levy' might be introduced. This could tame  several different  forms; (a)
a 'special as  nt';  (b) a 'land  value increment  tax'; (c) an 'improvement  tax'; and (d) a 'supplenentary tax',
etc.  Most such chargs  are imposed  either on the assessed  value of real property or on some charateristic of that
property - its aea,  its frontage, its location.  A common benefit-related  charge is the development  charge (or
'beterment  tax')  - a  lump-sum charge designed to recover the cost of  infiastructr  developmet  from
beneficiaries. Thus, those whose land is near newly-installed  stet  lighting  would be charged to help pay for the
cost of the iation.  A development  charge may cover only ono project-for  example, a neighborhood  road
paving  scheme or the construction  of a sewage canal-or it may cover the full development  of a new area.  Such
a method  of financing  may be not only efficient  but equitable, since those who benefit from development  pay for
its cost.  Two paricularly successful  systems  of development  charges are land readjustment  in East Asia and the
'valoriation  systm'  in Latin America. While such shemes are most obviously  useful in rapidly-growing  uban
areas, there may nonetheless  be some role for them in at least some cities in the transitional  economies.
134.  In any case, the importance  of charging  for public  services  in these  various ways is, as emphasized  earlier,
much greater  than the relatively  small amounts  of money  most countries can or do collect from such levies. To the
extent that a local government  is viewed primarily  as a provider of services, as it should be, and the benefits of
those services can be attributed  specifically  to individual  citizens, properties, or busneses,  the appropriate  policy
is clearly to charge the correct (roughly, marginal cost) price.  Only thus will the correct amounts and types of
service be provided to the right people, that is, those willing to pay for them.  Correct pricing in this way helps
public officials  make sensible  judgements  as to how to match  scarce resources  with rising demand. When the true
cost (and the related  user charge)  rises so high that demand  falls, the costs of the service exceed its benefits  in the
opinion  of the public. The signal is quick and clear.  A decision  is then needed as to whetier to:  (a) increase  the
price and serve fewer people; (b) cut back on the cost and standard  of service to keep it affordable;  or (c) subsidize
the service  from general  revenues.  In the absence  of such price-generated  demand  information,  supply  decisions  can
only be made by bureaucratic  rather than market-oriented  processes.-42-
V. THE CHOICE  OF SUBNATIONAL  TAXES
13S.  I  es  asil  p  upose of loal ta  xs  to fineo  locally-provided  collective  public  goods for  local  reiden
If such goods a  tuly  'public in te  ss  of accnung  equally  to all rsiden  of the jurisdiction, Mn  if
edisribution to ote  tha  natna  standards  is not  aim of local public  policy,  ad  if admiisrative (ad
compliac) cost am left  out of accm , tho  be  ource of local  mven  migh prahp  be an equal  per cap  levy
suck  theo  2LU,  which  aWs  hs  dke  vitu  of beg  economially  nautrl or officiet in the sense  of giving
to no exces  buni
136.  At loest an  ounty,  Huny,  aclly  has introdced a form of local  poll tax, called  eo  ta
In view of the high propot  of publi  housing  in Hungay - a proportin  dth will undoubtedly  deli  but  is lbly
to remai  sigficant  - an argumt  c  indeed be  o for levying aome  form of local poll tax an public hosing
tents.W  Altough tis  tax  my prove  mor difficult  to administer  in Hungary's  i  ney  mobile  socie  than
sem  to be geneally  u_ lim  h a tax, while  it is n  r liely  to yield  nuch rven,  may  thusbavo  a minor
role  to play  in local  finc  From  this  persctvo,  however,  it would  be prefble  if te  rate of such  a tax  wo
set locally rathe  imposd  unifoimly by n  al legiooas  in Hunguy. Although  such differuatal local
poll toxes  are eay  to ovade  by movig,  tis  pobiliy  may be viowed - creaing a not undesiable check on their
rates. Of course,  ven  those who do not floe  may be had  to tax: the low  officincy costs of th, poll tx  m  likely
to be purhasd  at the expns  of high admiittve  _d compliance  costs.
137.  More  fundamtlly,  thoa is good  n to beive  tat  in many  coa  some  local renidets - porty-
owners,  people  with  school  ag  cbildn,  or whoever  -benfit more  thanors  frm  the  provision  of local  public
goods. That  is, while  thee may  be no ron  to levy  cfic benefit  taxs thre may  be good  rson  for some  local
residents to pay  m  than otrs
138.  If, for example,  the deand  for local public  goods is incom  laadic,  a benefit  cas  can be made for a loal
income tx  - or, more feasibly  pehap  given the high adminative  costa  of separate  local icome  t  , a local
surhage  on the cental income t&  If the enoymet  of such goods is amocied  wi  consuptin  (rahe  than
reddence), a benefit  cas  can dmilady be made for a  oxl  tax an consumption,  which would in practice almost
cerinly  have to take the form of a rotil  sales tax.  And finally, if the benfits  of local public goods ar  enjoyed
in proportion to  the value of real property there  is obviously a cas  for a local propety tax.
139.  Under-flmdnd. .md.EimJIy  D  _tdm?  In practice, th  fisca sitaton  ficing most central govermnt
in transitional  count  is such tht  vitually no major revenues we ceded to subsional  govenments.  Many
couns  - esily  those  ith a stonmg  regional tradition suck as Rsia  and the formor republics- aig  the
tax revenues (other than the coporate  tax) from locally owned enterprs  to the local government, givUg them
strong  cntlisntc  incetives  to protect  ad  maitai  the monopoly  position  of ter  entepis.  Thi  is likely to
have  cosequences for futre  economic  growth,  especially  where localities  arn swcessuy  'protctiniat.  In mny
of the countrie  surveyed, the strong financial  interest of local government  in locally owned enterpris  rm  .
This is a holdover  from the old fiscal  system  under which  enterpnse profits  accrued to the level of govemnt  that
owned them (i.e. profits of locally  owned entuprises weA to the local govenment; profits (and later, taxes) of
centrally owned entprises  went to the central government; and provincial govemments received the profit of
their  enteises).
tt  is of course asumed  that any desired general income support is provided  primarly through national sources:
as argued earlier, local goverments should  not misprice  their servces for distributive  reasons.
&Such  a surcharge  is, for example,  proposed  in Bird and Wallich, 3Financing  Local  Govemment  in Hungary.  a and
in Wallich,  Fiscal Decentralization:Interovernmental  Finance in the Rusian  Federatio.'  See also the lter
discussion  in this section.- 43 -
140.  Of all the countries surveyed, only Hungary  and Russia give subnational  governments  as large share of
certain non-enterprise  revenues.  In Hungary, local governments  get a share of the personal income tax (PMI -
initially 100%, then 50%, now 25%.  In Russia, subnational  governments  get some 20% of VAT, 100% of PIT
and 60% of the corporate  profits. More generally,  in most of the former USSR republics  -the present CIS - the
personal income tax is assigned  to the subnational  level, a holdover of the old Union days in which the PIT was
a "local  tax'  assigned  to the oblast level and passed  through to rayons/cities. Generally, subnationai  govermments
in transition  economies  are under-funded,  and overly transfer  dependent (See Tables 8 and 9).
141.  The only  2tentiallv (but not preseatly) significant tax these countries have assigned directly to local
governments  is usually the 29z  txJu,  as in Hungary,  Bulgaria, Poland, Romania,  and Russia. In Romania,  for
example, the property tax is levied on all privately owned real estate. The tax rates are differentiated  and, in an
undesirable  carry-over from the old rgime,  varied  with the 'social characteristics' of the property owners: 1% on
the value of the property in the urban area owned  by workers and employees  of commercial  societies; 1.S% on the
value  of property  owned  by individualbusiness  like  independent  professionals,  self-employed  individuals,  and family
associations  of ro more than ten employees;  a lower rate of 0.7S% is levied in rural areas.  The taxable  value of
property is reportedly  based on inranco  assesmnents,  sales contracts  and construction  costs  and appears  as a rule
to be grossly  underestimated. Moreover,  all buildings  owned  by public institutions  are exempted  from this tax and,
in another featue seemingly  guaranteed  to keep  the yield of this tax low in a country  privatizing  its housing  stock,
all houses  and apartments bought  by individuals  from the state are exempted for ten years.  Even apart from this
serious structual defect, the difficult and costly task of updating  property valuations (and keeping them current)
means that while this tax may become an important source of local revenues in the long run, it would appear
mistaken  to rely on it for substantial  revenue in the near future.
142.  Matters are not much better in Hungary, where the property tax is levied at a more uniform rate - 3 % of
"corrected  sales value' (which  usualy means  about 25% of market  value)  - or, alternatively,  at a flat rate  per square
meter.  As a rle,  the only information  local governments  seem to have in practice on which  to base such taxes is
the area - and even  with respect to area the exemptions  specified  in the law (and  carried over from the old system)
ensure, as in Romania, that not much revenue is likely to be collected from this source for some years.3"
Substantial  national assistance in developing  an adequate  valuation base seems necessary if the property tax is to
become  an important  component  of Hungarian local finance.
143.  Another tax granted to local governments  in some countries has been the old tax on individual  business.
essentially  an income tax on small private enterprises. This tax has been assigned  to localities  in Romania, for
example,  on the grounds that it is easier for them than for the central government  to check  and collect such a tax.
With increasing  privatization  in urban and rural areas, it might  appear that  considerable  revenue  might be expected
from this tax.  In fact, however,even in cases where, as in some larger cities, there are already computerized
systems  of information  on tax bases, tax rates, exemptions,  population  and family  structures,  it is by no means  clear
that it will be easy to keep these  data bases up to date, as economic  activity moves increasingly  out of the direct
control of the govemment.  For small communes  in rual  areas, family visits by tax collectors  are now the most
common  way to collect direct taxes  in many transitional  countries. Again, however,  it is unclear how much weight
this system  - which  grew up under and was long  supported  by the totalitarian  regime - will be able to sustain  in the
more democratic,  and less controlled, circumstances  now prevailing. In any case, with the growth of the private,
and especially  the informal, economy,  the level of evasion  with respect to local taxes seems  more likely  to rise than
to fall over the next few years.  In reality, experience  throughout  the world suggests  that the only kind of business
taxes  local governments  can collect efficiently  are low-rate  and relatively crude levies.
L There is little to be said for using area as a basis for urban property taxes. The case in different  in rural areas,
however,  where taxes such as that in Romania  - a differentiated  rate ranging from 35 lei to 400 lei per hectare,
depending  on ferlity  and location - may make sense, provided the present fixed per hectare levies are adjusted
annually  (or more often) in accordance  with  an approprate price index.  Unfortunately,  those who have received
land under the land reform are exempt from land taxes for 8 yean  in Romania, thus severely weakening this
potential  source of local revenue.- 44 -
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144.  Just such a tax ha  been creted  in Hungay in the local tax on busnor.  Unfortuately, this is
a bad tax.  Although the pesnt  low rate (3 per mill) on business tumover is not likely to do much ecomiic
damage, such a cumlative busuie  tax of course poduces precisely  the s-  kind of tax cascading an Hugary
has tied  to eliminate  at the naiooal level by adopting  a VAT.  This problem will become more srious  if, a  is
lky,  the increaing prsu  on local finace  leads to inea  in tax rates in the future.  Moreover, a  premuly
designed  (with the explicit exclusion  of retil  sleo  fiom the tax base) this tax encoraes  both tax exporting  and
local attaemts to maipuate  the tax sysmI  for incentive  reasons.  Tax exporting is of cours  the antitheis of
aional local finance,  and local fisca ;entives  to production  have a dml  record tumghou  the world, so nehr
of thes  features  of the tumover tax is desirable.
145.  Another bd  tax that has apped  in a  umber of countries is some form of local Ourist.  Touit
establihmt  (inluding  second  homs  and cotta)  should of couse  be suvi*act  to geneal  local bunes  and
property taxes. And of coumes  should be chaged fully for the costs they im  on the envinmet  ad  on local
public  services. But  tde  seem no reason to encourage  fiscal irsponsibility  by maling it especia y aractive  for
local govemments  to imprse taxes on noresidm:  as a nle,  they need to be restrained from such actions, not
encouragedl.
146.  Another possible local govenment tax, in contrast,  deserves more atenion  than it seem  to have so far
received  in most trsnsitional  economies:  the taxation of motor vehcls.  At present, it appers  that only about 7 %
of vehicles  in Hungary, for inance,  ar  subject to the relatively  small and not particularly  well-desiged *duties
levied  by local gover_ments.,  Many counties similaly have widepd  exemptions  from their exing  vehicle
taxes e.g exempting  not only aU vehicles used by public institutions  finnced by the state but those used by war
veteran and so on. None of these exemptions,  of cours,  mo.m any sene given the basic benefit  rtinalo  of this
tax.  As vehicle  ownersip  beomes  more widespread vebicle  taxes (tedesigned  to be less vulneable to inflation
and perhap  more in line with  envirnmeta  needs)  might in timo become  an important  revenue source for at least
the larger localities. In principle, ul vehicles should be subjwcted  to taxes designed to some extent to offset the
social costs attributable to vehicles.  While such taxes should probably be dosignd  and imposed uniformly
thrughout  the nation to avoid obvious administatve problems,  there is no reson  why these revenues  should not
be assigned  in whole or in part to the local governts  in which the vehicles  ar  registered.
147.  Although  both vehicle taxes and espocially  the property tax clearly have significant long-term revenue
potentid, particularly  in larger urban areas, on the whole the local tax packge  bestowed  on local governts  in
most transitional  economies  leaves much to be desied.  Often, for example, local tax rates and tax bae  are
estblished in central govemment  tax law, and at most a range of rates is provided  within which local govenmts
can choose.  Many of the taxes thus established  have rates fixed in nominal cunmcy,  thus making them highly
vulnerable  to erosion through  inflation. Others are minor nuisance  levies  which  may weU  yield less in revenue  than
they cost to colect.  None pi .ides  an adeque  fihcd foundation  for an active and viable local goverment
WIt  has been argued that tounsm taxes (krtaxeon  or taxes de tournse)  should be seen more as a globalized  user
charge than a fiscal levy.  Resorts with annually  widely fluctuating  populations  have to assume expenditure,  both
for operations  and capital investment,  of a type and amount  that cannot  and should  not be recovered from the (often
few) permanent  residents but from the acual beneficiaries  of these services. If not, the unavoidable  consequence
is that resort areas turn to the central government  with a demand  for increased  fiscal resource transfers  and that at
the end tourism  activities  get, in one way or another, subsidized  by the central  govenment as, for instance,  happens
in Turkey.
ain  Romania,  in another undesirable  hangover  from the old regime, initialy, some motor vehicle taxes  (levied  at
flat  ates, by type of vehicle) went to the central govenment, depending on the nature of the taxpayer.  Since
August 1992,  these  now go to municipalities  (individually  owned cas)  or to disticts (cars owned by corporations).-46 -
148.  In moms  counries  (me  Table  5) at preen, all the  ceal  govenumt ta  ar  collected  by a  _  dJj
tax  Although  sich dual  loyalties  can  obviously  caon problems,  it soem unlikluy  that bhvig locl
taxes  collected  by local  governzmnt  will  help  mtters muck  in the  r  fture,  given  te  sevee so  of trid
tax  adui_nor.  In Vietnam,  the  MOF  ha  eblished a Geeral Tax  Deatm_t  to ovetsee  the  aciVitie of a11
provincil tx d_etmu.  in China  tha  amr  two  orguai-mn:  the  Tax  Bureu and  tie Fiac  Depatmn  which
have  sparae  d  _atmt  with detiled functio  at each  level  of city, county  and province. Rom  is ao  an
the  procos of crating two  orgatios  to hndlo fince  and tax admintaon  at the  local a woe  a  ntn
level. in Russia, tax admnitration it  responsibilityof  te  Stae Tax Semrice  (STS) which  hu an orgaional
sucur  at all throo lvela  of govem  t, and  is an saunomou  agecy  with  initial  rning.
149.  A  *uy  JItrx  miht  pehop  be dfnd  one (i) aseosd  by local gover  t,  (ii) At  rte  decided
by local gvota,  (iii) collected  by local govanins,  and (iv) with its poceeds  _auing  to local gov  bnts.
In the ral  woldd,  however,  many  taxes  possess  aoly one or two of  hes  charactstics.  In sm  cases, for
oxample,  a tax accros in whole  or in par to local  govemnts,  but its re  ae sot  by tho  ntionl  gpv  _nit,
which  also asoss  nd coUects  it. Insted of a local  tax, for many  puposes suh a tax might  be conidered  to
be really  a cental gvenint  grant  allocated  to local  gove_nnts  in prportan to the  amount  of natiOna  in)ome
tax colected  locally. On the otdr had,  what  looks  like a cntral tax and a rlated tafr  proa  m  reyaly
be a local  tax. Some  i  ovrl  trasfe,  for example,  in effect smply  rer  taxes  to the  regios in which
they  wero  collected  in the first  place. If the  local  govermet  detmn  the  tax  base  and rate and receives  all the
rvenues,  the only role th  cntal  goverment  plays is a  a collection agen:  it may even be rembud  for its
worc,  for ince,  by  beiong  allowed to reta  a sal  percentage of coUctions.  Proe  bly,  the cntrl
gover_it  ha  a comparve  advantae in tax collection,  and the local govenunet  has conacted  for its service
in this reopect. In this case, there  is no intergovenmntl  tranfer  at all, except  in tho narrowest accountng ss.
Characteristics  of a Goo  Loca Tax
150.  The following  are among  the chaacteristics that may be sought in an 'idedl  local tax:
[1  The  tax base should  be reltively immobile,  to allow locd authorities  soms  loony in vaying rates
without  losng most of their tax bas.
[21  The tax yield should be adequate to meet local needs and sufficiently buoyant  over timo (i.e.,  it
should expand at least as fast as expenditu).
[31  The tax yield should be rlaively  stable and predictable over time.
[41  It should not be posible  to expost  much, if any, of the  tax burden  to non-residit.
[51  The tax base should  be visible, to aesur  accountability.
[61  The tax should be perceived to be reasonably  fair by taxpayers.
[7  The tax  ould  be relatively easy to admns  efficiently and effectively.
Not everyone would agroe that all those charcteristics  are necessarily desirable - e.g.  is it unequivocally good that
local  govements  should be  insuladd  from  either  the  tax base  consequcs  of  their  tax  rate choices  or  from
inflation?  In  any  case,  it is unikcely that sufficient  taxes possesng  most  of the  c  _aestics  will be  md
available  for  locl  use.  In  fact,  as  already  noted,  the  so-cailed  "local* taxes  in most  trnstion  countries  are
controlled in varying degrees by cental  governmmets e.g.  with respect  to the deermintion  of  tax base, tax rates,
and/or tax  aminisa  Noneteless,  unless ther  is a significant degree of 122  freedom of choice with respect
to some or all of these matters - so that local govenments  can change  the level and conosidtion  of their rovenues -
it is not very maningful  to talk about *locl  autonomy. a-47 -
LAA  vt  Taxes
151.  How  doe te  pmprty tax  score  in the  tus?  In t  firs pace, a  experica  in a number  of cowies
ha sow  in nrcet yea,  theres often  wideopred  resistance  to the  poperty tax  whe too  muh  veue is sought
from  this soumc. One mum is prcisely becauu it is a very visble tax, for  vl  reaso.  First, ulie  the
incomn  tax, the  popery  tax is not deduct  at  ouce but generally  ba to be paid dicly  to the nundiciplity  by
txpaye  i  periodic  lump  vum  payments.  Taxpayeo  who  pay taxes  directly  to goveant  tend  to be mo  awar
of the  size  of thiir tax bill th  thos whos tke-hom pay is eduoed  by wedky or montly tax deductions.  Mm
need to make such penodic larg  paymint  ny  woU  add to th  accouiHtbty a  reposbility  of local
govemint,  but it alo gry  incrums the nmativity  of taxpayer.  to even  noinal  inces  in taxe.
152.  Seooodly,  the ineltcity  of the property  tax  ha a smilar effcL  Since  tho  bas  of this tax  doe not  u
a rule  mcra  autonacally over  time, the penodc nominal  incs  i  property  tax bills  needed to mintain
el  reoven  whe price levels  rie reqr  inad  tax  rat.  In tunn  of political  accountability,  tis  need  to
confront  the  people  with the  cost  of govenint  again  reprents  a vitu  of the property  tax;  agin,  however,  tho
downside  (from  the  local government's  point  of view  at least)  is the heightmed  visibility  of nominal  tax increases
and the  accompanying  political  resstance.
153.  Thirdly,  local  proprty taxes  of course  finance  such  municipal  servicae  as  ducadon,  roads,  and grbage
collection.  The  quantity  and  quality  of thee servicas  (or their  absnco) is thus readily  linked  to the  prperty tax.
When  potholes  devlop in their  eet, taxpayers  are  nd  daly  quick  to question  the taxes  that supposy
finance  stret  pir.  Once again, the very faor  that  makes the property tax a good source of local goverment
revenmu  in piciplmoa  it  ospecially  vulnerble to political  restance in ptce.
154.  Oter  problems result from prperty  tax administrton.  As a nle,  property is supposed  to be aaosed  an
the basis  of its  maret value,  usually  defined  a  the  prce struck  between  a willing buyer  and a willing  sller in
an  arm's length  trnsaction Exacdy  how  this is to be implemented  in countries  in which  private  propety is in the
procems  of beig established  in law for the  first time  in decade is not anirely clear. At the very  least, therw  is a
substantial  valuation  task required  before  much  fiscal  yield  can  realistically  be expected  from  propert taxs in most
transitional  economes.  Moreover,  even  in countres  with  well-developed  property  tax  systems,  discrepae  usually
aise beween  messed values  and  markt values  within  classes  of property,  between  classes  of property,  and across
unicipalities  for  both  political  and  technical  reasons.  Since  taxpayers  can  easily  compare  their  propeaty  taxes  wi=th
those  of  milar  pwperties  in their  neighborhood,  such  discrepancies  lead  both to spocific  asse  appeals  and
to general  parsr  for tax reief.
155.  In short worldwide  experience  suggests  that  there  are at least  thre substantial  constraints  on the use  of
propety taxes  for local finance:
*First,  although  the  administration  of the  tax  can  certainly  be improved  in the  tannsition  countries,
there  wil always  remain  sver  problems  in administering  it in a horizontally  equitable  fashion,
particularly  when  prices  are  changing  rapidly.
*Second,  the temptation  to the inevitably  rather fragilo  new local goverments to indlge in
politically  painless  but economically  inefficient  'tax exporting' means  that severe  constraints
should  be placed  on the  degree  to which  local  goverments  are permitted  to tax busineses  more
heavily  than  residential  taxpayers  if the  property  tax is to be an economically  desirable  sourc of
local  revenues.
wrhird,  both becausn  of its fults and its virtues,  heavy  reliance  by local  goverments  on the
property  tax  probably  ensures  that,  as is the  case  in most  countries  where  the  propefty  tax is the
main  local  tax, they  will  either  continue  to be heavily  dependent  on intergovenmntl grants  to
finance their activities,  or they will not carry out many actvities.- 48 -
156.  D  it these politicaland  adminisaive problem, the  promty taremains  a potaly  sigificntsourc
of revenue  for local  govemments  in trnsitional countries.  Moreover,  there ae  good reasons  for taxing  real
proprty  both a  a local tax and as a tax in genal.  A tax on rel  propety  may, for example, mao  good ose
as part of th  tax system  as a whole: although  relivoly  expensive  to adminiter,  such a ta  scores  quite woe in
terms of  both its efficiency and  its  equity aspects.  Moreover,  if loeved at  the local  level,  a pperty  tax can,  as
empized  above, seve  as a good men  of fnacing  local public goods - subject, however, to three imp_ont
provisos:
(1) An adequate  nationl fmwork  law is estblhed  (to prevent unwarranted  local manipulatio
of the bas  and rate suctu  and in particular  undue loading  of the tax burde  on nonsidmns).
(2) Loc  govermmnts ore  providod  sufficient  technical  upport to carry out their ed  of the
administrative  process (which  should probably  not include valuation).
(3) Local gov  remnts  are pemitted (within  the paramte  set out in the framework  law)  to vay
the tax rate anmually.  Such rate flexibility  is esetial  if the tax is to be adequately  responive to
local needs and decisions.
Unfortunately,  none of the proprty  taxes  recently  creed  in the trnsition  ecanmies  apper  to  atsfy  thes
critnia.
Own Subnational  Taxes versus Shared National  Taxes
157.  On the whole, if there is an obvious alternative  (or supplement)  to propety  tuaxs it is likely to be some
form of local income tax, probably levied as a supplement  to national income taxes.  The cas  for rdying on
property  tas,  especially  taxes  on residential  property,  as an importat soumr of local govemment  finance 
strong. Since, however,  property taxes  can only be pushed so far, if more local 'own-source' rvenue  is desired  -
- either to expand  the size of local activities  or to make local govemments  more self-reliant  - thr  is much to be
said for supplemtary  ('piggybacked') local income taxes.
158.  Of cours,  property taxes do not even come close to financing the needs of the subnational sector where
these have sgnificant  expenditue  responsbilities. Thus, in some countries, notably Russia - wher  the subational
sector fina  close  to 50% of public expenditur - access to major national taxes, probably the pernl  inconm
tax, will be needed.
159.  Like the property tax, such a tax, if appropriately  designed,  would  be visible and hence  in principle  stisfy
the criteria  of political  responsibility  and accountability. However, the fact  that income tax revenues  tend to grow
with less political fuss, while presumably good news for local officials, suggests that ineas  reliance on local
income taxes might be viewed with mixed feelings  by some.  On the other hand, since an income tax is usually
perceived  as more progressive than a property tax, it scores higher than the latter on equity  goWunds.
160.  The principal  argument  against  local  income  taxation  is  administratve.  Most of  the  other  arguments
sometmes raised against this proposal have no merit.  One such argument is that there is sometiing  inherny  *bad
in efficiency or equity terms about allowing local govemments direct access to the income tax.  Some local
governments,  for example, probably have no income tax base.  It might therefore be argued that it is somehow
unfair or inequitable  to let those local governmente  that have  such a base exploit  it.  But the logic of this agumet
is not apparent  (and  of course the basic  unequal  distribution  of local tax resources  is procisely  what the equalization
grants discussed  later are designed  to deal with).
161.  Similarly,  arguments that local income taxes reduce national fiscal flexibility  or induce inefficient  fiscd
competition  or inefficient  resource allocation  are at best incomplete  and in general misleading. The functions  local
govenments are supposed  to carry out are essential,  these  expenditures  have to be financed  somehow,  and the local- 49 -
income  tax approach  seems  more  likely than  most alternatives  to free the national government  from the responsibility
of financing  some such services  while still leaving  it a free had  to alter its own tax system  as it sees fit.
162.  Moreover, assuming  the  benefit' model of local government  postulated abovs is followed, such taxes
simply constitute  the price of local public  services and have no adverse effects on resource allocation or on fiscal
competition. On the contray,  their allocative  effects are desirable  as is any competition  they may induce among
local goveombt  in lower-cost provision  of desired public services (including  the intermediate  services entering
into production  functions).
163.  Whatever  merits swh arguments  may have, the prevalence  of plans for local  saresh  in national  income
tax revenues  in countries such as Hungary  and Russia  probably reflects more the influence  of the historical  patern
under which  the revenues  (like the expenditures)  of both levels  of government  wOer  unified than of economic  logic.
In Hungary  in 1991, for example, localities  received S0% of the revcnues  collected  from the personal income tax,
allocated  on the basis of residence.  These funds accounted  for about 13  % of total local revenues.
164.  An alteroative  to the Hungarian  sysem would be to allow local governments  to impose their own income
taxes in the form of a surcharge  on the national tax. 2'  This option has two unique advantages:
*It is likely  to lower the level of income  taxes  in Hungary  without exacerbating  the budget  deficit.
*It is also likely to induce more efficient  local expenditure  than would otherwise  be the case.
Such  advantages  do not come costlessly,  however. The major argument  against this approach is undoubtedly  that
it would  be relatively  costly administrtvely and in particular  would render the alredy  difficult task of efficiently
administering  the national tax system even more difficult.  Nonetieless, the prospct  of achieving both a more
efficient  (and democratic)  system  of local revenues  and expenditures  and a more efficient  (and lower)  level of total
expenditures  and taxes is sufficiently  atrctive  to suggest that this option deserves  careful consideration.
16S.  This  proposal  could be simply  implemented  in Hungary:  for example,  cut the national income  tax by SO%  -
the share going to local governments  in 1991 - and allow local goverments to impose  a flat-rate surcharge  on the
(remaining)  national income tax, to be collected  by the national govenment and remitted to the local government
in question. Local govemments  would thus continue  to have access to PIT revenues, but now they would have to
face local voters  and justify their local income  tax rates.  In all likelihood,  many local governments  would initially
choose  to levy lower taxes (surcharges  of less than 100  %).  The result would then be to lower both total taxes and
total expenditures,  since the total amoumt  local governments  have to spend would be lower to the extent they levy
less than a 100%  surtax.2y In order for local governments  to  justify levying  taxes as high as (or higher than) those
foregone  by the national  goverment, they would  presmably have to be able to demonstrate  to their voters that  they
are spending  the money  efficiently  and in a dsired  way. Suwh  a check on local spending  seems especially  desirable
in a situation like that in Hungary tcday in which central transfers are likely, for political reasons, to remain
basically  unconditional.
166.  Allowing  local govermments  to impose  such income  tax surcharges  has at least two major advantages:
IfSee  Bird and Wallich,'Financing  Local Government  in Hungary.'
M'Of  course, this  exposition  abstracts  from  the possibility  of local borrowing  as well as local exploitation  of business
enterprises. As noted elsewhere,  however, local borrowing  should in any case be tightly  regulated  and controlled,
and local recourse to business  enterprises  for revenue  purposes should be heavily restricted.e  so  -
(1) Local govermments  - at least the richer ones - will have  access to a broad tax base so that they
can more adequately  finance out of local resources the extensive range of services they are
supposed  to provide.
(2) Whether  taxes go up, down, or stay the sam,  the accountability  of local governtnts,  and
the efficiency  of their expenditurs, should icrease.
Assuming  the functions  local goveranmts are supposed  to carry out are essential, the local income tax approach
seems more likely ta  most altenatives to free the national  governmnt  from the responsibility  of financing  some
such serv-ces while sdll leaving it a free hand to alter its own tax system  as it sees fit.  The altenatve  of local
surchargus  on value-added  taxes or on enteprise  income taxes are much less desirable on both techmical  and
economic  grounds.
VI. THE DESIGN  OF IPTERGOVERNMENTAL  TRANSFERS
167.  Russia, China and Vietnam are  the  only  transitional countries with no  explicit arrangment  for
intergovemmental  transfers.  In all three countries, there exist  upwartd  transfers' from provinces to the cenul
government. In most other transitional  economies,  while transfers ar  generally  the most important  source  of local
government  revenue,  most  such intergovernmental  fiscal  flows  are basically  discretionary  and "negotiated in  natue.
The exception  is Hungary, whero  there is an explicit formula for the so.called normative grant."  A somowhat
similar  grant formula is currently  under consideration  in the Czech  Republic.  In Russia, where there is an ad hoc
intergovermental grant,  there is no evidence  that it is equalizing.
168.  In themselves,  transfers  are neither good  nor bad. what matte  from a policy  perspective  are their offelc
on the outcomes  of interest, such as allocativo  efficiency,  distibutional equity, and macroeconomic  stability. An
additional  essential element of an adequate  system of transfers from the point of view of both centrl  and local
govemments is  Sau!parm=xy  as when the transfer system is driven by  rules or  a  formula rther  than by
discretionary  political  decisions. It is clear from Table 9 that in most countries  subeational  govements  are highly
transfer-dependant.  On avenge, some 70% of revenues,  and often  more, comes  from trnsfers.  Generally  speaking,
the concept of grants for capital finance,  matching  grnts  and other standard approaches  are little known.
Closing the Fiscal Gan
169.  Intergovernmental  fiscal transfers  play several disit  roles in most countries.  In the first place, such
transfers generaly constitute  the principal  way to achieve  what is sometimes  called 'vertical fiscal ballance, that
is, ensure that the actual income and outlay of subnational  levels of govermment  are approximately  equal.  For
various reasons, both economic and politica,  central governments  usually have much greater revenue-ising
capacity  than do local governments. One way to transfer some of the revenues accruing  to the center to finance
the deficits of lower levels of government  is through intergovemmental  tansfers.  Of course, such fiscd *gaps'
may also  be closed, and vertical  fised balance  restored, by trsferring  revenue-raising  power  to local govermments,
by transferring  responsibility  for expenditures  to  the central  goverment, or by reducing  locd expenditures  or raising
local revenues.  In virtully  all countries, however, there invariably  remains  sufficient  mismatch  in the revenues
and expenditures  assigned  to different  levels of government  for an important 'balancing' role to be assigned to
intergovenmental fiscd transfers.
EqaBlization
170.  Equally important in determining  the role and design of transfers is what is called 'horizontal fiscal
balance"  or equaization. This  is a controversial  policy  objective  in many countries,  and the design  of such transfers
requires carefil thought. The basic  economic  case for such 'equalization' transfers shculd be understood  clearly.
On the one hand, such a trnmsfer  may be needed  to enable 'poorer'  local governments  - 'poorer'  in terms of their
capac;ty  to raise resources out of local taxes  imposed on local residents (and not in terms of how high the private- 51  -
Table 9
Stuc,ture of Subnational  Government  Finance
(recent  year)
_  _
Hungary  Poland  Romania  Czech R.  Slovak R.  China*  Vietnam  Bulgaria  Russia
Own Resources  18%  50%  25% 2I  9%  71%  15%  N.I.  4.4%  -
Sliared  Tax  13%  25%  0%  6%  4.7%  85%  N.J.  49.4%  95%
Total Local Resources  31%  75%  25%  15%  76%  100%  N.J.  53.8%  95%
Transfers  from Centrl  Government  68.5%  25%  75%  85%  24%  0%  N.J.  46.2%  5%
Souce  Mic.IBRD  documents. See biblio-gf-apu  -
Notes: 1I 51.4% as grants and 17.1% as Social  Security  Funds  transfers.;  2/ Expected  to decline  to 20% in 1992.;  '  For 1985. Also transfers  not separate
from aggregate  figures;  deemed  negligible.;  N.J.: No information.- 52 -
incomes  of those  residents  or the output of the locality  may  be) - to respond  adequately  to central  transfers  intended
to generate  the appropriate  level of public  goods (as discussed  below). On the other hand, an equalization  transfer
may be needed to enable govemments that are poor in the sense  just defined to provide an adequate 'minimum
bundle'  of local public services to citizns.  The argument in this case, similar to the familiar 'basic needs'
argument, is broadly that all citizens should be entitled  to some basic level of such services, regardless  of where
they happen to live.
171.  If horizontal fiscal balance is interpreted in the same 'gap-filling" sense as vertical fiscal balance,
equalization  implies that sufficient transfers are needed to equalize revenues (including transfers) and the actual
expenditures  of each local govermment. Such "fiscal dentistry" makes no sense, however.  Making up al  gaps
between  actual outlays  and actual own-source  revenues  for all local governments,  like equalizing  the actual  outlays
of local governments  in per capita terms (that is, raising  all to the level of the richest local govemment),  ignores
differences  in local preferences  for public and private  goods and thus vitiates  the basic economic  rationale  for local
govemment  in the first place. Moreover, such extreme  equalization  ignores local differences  in needs, in costs, and
in own revenue-raising  capacity. Finally, equalizing  actual outlays  clearly discourages both local revenue-raising
effort and local expenditure  restraint, since under this system  those with the highest expenditures  and the lowest
taxes would get the largest transfers.
172.  For these reasons, in all countries with formal systems of equalztion  transfers, the aim is either to
equalize  the capacitv  of local governments  to provide  a certain  level of public services or the actual performance
of this level of service by local governments. The performance  criterion, which adjusts the transfer received in
accordance  with  the need for the aided service (and  which  may  also allow for cost differentials)  is in principle  more
attractive to central governments  - or those concemed  primarily with the provision of certain services such as
education  or social  assistance  - since the level of service  to be funded  is determined  centrally  and the transfer  can
be made conditional  on the provision  of that level of service. Unfortunately,  this approach  suffers from the same
disincentive  effect on the revenue side as equalizing  actual outlays, since that goverment  which tries least again
gets most - unless  adjustment  is made for differential  fiscal capacity.
173.  In principle,  then, any sound design for equalization  transfers  pivots on some notion of revenue  canacity.
At one extreme, the aim might be to provide  each local government  with sufficient  funds (own-source  revenues  plus
transfers) to deliver a (centrally) predetermined  level of services.  Because such capacity-based  transfers are
generally  based on measures of ootential  revenue-raising  capacity  and not on actual revenues, no disincentive  to
fiscal effort is created by this approach. Differentials  in the cost of providing services may or may not be taken
into account.  Of course, transfers based solely on capacity measures do nothing to ensure that the recipient
govemrnments  will in fact use the funds they receive  as the centml govemnment  might wish - unless, as noted  above,
receipt  is conditioned  on performance  (and compliance  is monitored  in some way).
Fiscal Effort
174.  While the evidence  on the effects of transfers on local fiscal effort is far from clear in any country, there
is some empirical  evidence  that  transfers  often tend  to discourage  such effort. Nonetheless,  it is generally  not a good
idea to include  an exlici  fiscal  effort element  in a transfer  formula. Suppose,  for example, that a transfer  is made
directly  dependent on the relation of the effective  tax rate in the recipient municipality  to the average national
effective  tax rate.  One problem with this proposal is that the measurement  of fiscal effort is considerably  more
complex  than usually seems to be realized - even if, as suggested  earlier should be done, local govemments  are
largely restricted to non-exportable  taxes.  If, for instance, tax bases are sensitive to tax rates, then the usual
measures  overestimnte  capacity in low tax-rate  areas (and hence underestimate  the effort needed to increase tax
rates) because  the base will decline  if the rate is increased.
175.  More importantly,  putting too much weight on fiscal  effort in allocating grants unduly penalizes  poorer
areas, in which, by definition, a given percentage  increase in effort (as usually measured)  is more difficult to
achieve. The problem  giving  rise to the need for equalization  in the first  place is that  the capacity  (tax base)  of poor-53  -
areas is too low, not that their tax rates are too low.  Most fiscal effort measures inevitably reward the richer
recipient  governments,  which find such tests easier to meet. Imposing  such an additional  penalty on poor regions
in a transfer  program that almost invariably  falls far short of fully equalizing  fiscal capacity  seems hard to justify.
Matchino  Grants
176.  A final component  of many transfer systems  is what is called a matching  (conditional)  grant, in which  the
central governumt pays only part of the cost of crtain  expenditures  carried out by local governments. (At the
extreme, where the cental government  pays all the cost of work carried out by a local governmnt acting as its
agent, what is really happening  is of course simply  cgot  reimbursement.) Several  r-ionales for such transfers  may
be distinguished,  each with different  implications  for program design, as discussed  below.
177.  Matching  gants  in principle  have important  economic  and fiscal advantages  in terms of both allocative
efficiency  (spillovers)  and the efficient  use of scarce  centrl  govermnent  resources  to attain desired  levels  of certain
services. In addition,  while of coure rendering  local govemments  more  susceptible  to central  influence  and control,
matching grants may have the inportant political advantage of introducing an elemnent  of local involvement,
commitment, accountability,  and responsibility  for the aided activities.  Moreover, properly-designed  mathing
grants may contribute  to equalization  (horizontal  fiscal balance) and, like all other transfers, they help to resolve
any basic  fiscal  mismatch  (vertical  fiscal  balance)  problem. Such  grants may be particularly  important  with respect
to capital investment  projects (where they may substitute  for, or supplement,  subsidized  loans).
178.  The rationale  for matching  grants with  the strongest  basis  in the economic  literature  is that the benefits  from
the local activity  in question may spill over to other  jurisdictions, that is, provide benefits to localities  other than
those which decide  whbther to undetake the activity. Since such externl  benefits will not be taken into account
by any particular  local governmet  in deciding how to spend the funds at its disposal, in general too little such
externality-inteansive  activity  wil be undertaken  unless  the local government  receives a unit subsidy  just equal to the
value at the margin  of the spilover benefits.
179.  The correct matching  rate (m), or the proportion  of the total cost paid by the central government,  is thus
in principle set by  the size of the spillovets.  This rate may decline as the level of expenditure rises, if the
externalities  diminish. It may also vary across  localities  if there are reasons to expect  greater externalities  in some
places than in others or if there is reason to expect a higher local price elasticity of demand for the service in
question  in some a&ss as opposed  to others. Basicaly, however,  a matching  grant program designed  to encourage
the optimal  provision  of public  services would  be expected  to vary primarily  with the nature  of the activity, that  is,
depending  on the level of associated  extenalities.
180.  Since  no country  has  achieved  full equaeization  of local fiscal  capacities,  a uniform matching  level  offering,
in effect, the same  price  to different  local governments  wil discriminate  against poor regions.  Indeed,  even if
revenue  bases were fuUy  equalized,  thetr might  stdl be grounds  in terms of need or cost differentials  for including
an equalization  element  in matching  grant formulas. For example,  per capita grants for roads in sparsely  populated
and mountainous  regions should generally  be larger because  the per capita cost of achieving  any particular  standard
of road service will obviously be higher.
181.  A quite  different  rationale  for matching  grants may  arise from the existence  of a centml government  budget
constraint. If the central government  wishes to use its scarce budgetary resources to attain given standards  of
expenditure  on certain  services provided  by local governments,  it should pay only as much of the cost as is needed
to induce each local govermment  to provide that level of service.  With a grant of m percent of cost, the effective
price to the locality  is 1-m. To ensure maximum  total (local plus central)  expenditure  on the service in question,
given the size of the centml govermment  contribution,  the optima way to allocate a given total transfer  among
localities  will then be inversely to the price elasticity  of local demand for the service (assuming  no cross-price
elasticity  effects).- 54  -
182.  Matching  grants should as a rule be inversely  correlated to the income level of the recipient  govenmment.
The purpose of such transfers is essentially  to ens  that all local govermmnts, regardless  of their fiscal  capacity,
provide  a similar  level of certain  specified  public  services to their residents. The idea is simply to set the pQce of
the service (1-m) to each local goverment in such a way as to neutrlize  difference in capacity by varying  the
matching  rate (m).  Th  higher the income  elasticity,  the higher the matching  rate needed for low-income  recipients
(to offset the higher local expenditues on the aided sevice  in higher-inokom  areas), and the higher the price
elasticity, the lower the matching  rato needed to achieve a given level of total expenditures. In practice, there is
thus a case for varying matching  rates inversely  with income levels even when only the incenutive  offcts  (and not
the distributionad  effects) of matching  grants are considered.
183.  Unfortunaely, neither thoory nor available  empitical studies provide clear guidelines to determine  the
precise matching  rate appropriato  for particular  expenditure  progrms,  lot alone how those rates should be varied
in accordance  with the charcteristics of different  local governments. Nonetheles, a possible approach might be
to consider  the matching  rate for each progrnm  as having  two components. The basic  matching  rate for eah  service
would then reflect the degree of centrl  goverment  interest in the provision  of that service whether that interest
is motivated  by concem over spillovero,  the *merit  good  natre  of the activity,  or simply the desire to implement
some plan). This basic rate could then be increasod  inversely  to a uniformly  determined  measur  of capacity. Th
matching  rate faced  by any particular  locality  for any  particular  prgram  would  then be higher the greater  the degree
of central interest and the lower the (expected)  degree of local enthusiasm  (price-elasticity)  and ability (income-
elasticity)  to support that progrmL  Though data limitations  mtn  that such refinmets  are most unlikely to be
relevant in any transitional economy for many years, these principles should nonetheless be kept in mind in
developing  an intergovernmental  trasfer  system  - or any system  of subsidized  municipal  credit, where exactly  the
same considerations  are relevant.
Other Obiectives  of Transfers.
184.  In addition to the economic  ar  _ments  for transfers discussed  above, there are of course also  important
political  arguments  for transfers in all countries:
*  It may be necessay,  for example, to transfer some resources to jurisdictions that do not, strictly
speaidng, need them in  order to  make it  politically feaible  to  transfer needed amounts to  other
jurisdictions.
*  It may also be essential  to transfer resources simply in order to keep some economically  non-viable
loc,t govenmments  (eg.,  small riral governments)  alive for political  reasons - to salvage regional  pride,
to provide  jobs for local supportes, or for some other mason.
In both these cases, the main design problem is to minimie  any collateral damage to the presumed economic
objectives,  both by achieving  the political  ends in as cost-effective  a way as possible and by trying to ensure that
the design of such transfers  offsets the good features of other trasfers  as little as possible.
185.  In summary,  the main substantive  aim of a well-designed  transfer program is to 'get the prices right'  in
the sense of facing  local decision-makers  with the full consequences  of their actions.  The first step in getting  the
right incentives  from intergovemmental  transfers is, as argued ealier  in this paper, to establish the local public
finance  system  itself as much on a benefit  basis  as possible. Ideally, local own-source  revenues  should  come  entirely
from local taxpayers.  Local governments  should not have acces  to taxes that they can export to non-residents
(except  to the limited  extent such taxes  may offset the provision  of local public  goods that lower production  costs).5ss  -
A Caso for Conditionaliq?
186.  Given such a system, the next step is to tecogpi  that (in a non-fedral  systm)  local auorities  must
fundamntally be responsible  to the ceaml authorities  or, mor  accuatly,  to taxpyers at Inrge, when they are
spending  cental  funis.  Ther  is thus il  prnciple  little role for completely unconditiona trnfe  - except,
perhaps, to the extent that such "tnsfers  are not really tuane  at all but rather simply centm  ral 
for locally-executed  central prjocts  or else result from centrl  colloction  of local taxes  (for example,  because it
would  not be cost-effective  to set up separate  local tax adminisratons).  Since any other unconditional  transfen in
this system  are essentially motivated  by politics, the concern  these case  is primaily to limit the damage done
to policy outcomes  - for example,  trnsfer.  that simply finace  local deficits or that age entirely disretionay  in
naure are invariably  bad.
187.  On the other hand, transfers  intended  to encourage  "rending on a specific local service, whether because
it generates  exteanlities or because  it is more efficient  to a  - - 'he service locally, shutld genenrly require
some  local contribution  (matching)  and should  of course  be cono..Aonu  on the performance  of the service  in question
in accordance  with specified  standards.A' Both the detemination of the appropriate  matching  rates and the extent
of central  support and monitoring  of local performance  (see also the ealier discussion  of this subject)  require close
study  with respect to each substantive  area in which such grnuts (or their analytical  equivalent,  subsidized  loans)
are to be established.
188.  So far there appears to have been little considertion in the trasitional  economies  of what would appear
to be a strong case for some degree of conditionality  in centa  transfers. In Hung=v. for instance, which has by
far the best-developed  transfer system, the normatve gnat  has three important  charactiics.  In the first place,
the total to be distributed  to local govemments  through  this grant is  tirely discretionary. Secondly,  the fomula
for distributing  this total in turn contains  two components. The first conponent, which may be thought  of as the
equalizion  component  of the grnt,  is essenially an equal per capi  tranfr.  Tho secwod,  and  lager,  part of the
grant, however, is distibuted  basically in accordance  i  largely based on a  mease  of expecdituro  needs',
particularly  with respect to education. Finally,  the grant is completely  unconditional:  local govenments can spend
the money however  they see fit.
189.  In principle, there seems little rationda for bestowing  such large unconditional  grants on so many small
local  goverments.  As with some other featues of the Hungarin local govenment finance  system, it appears  that
the understandable  desire to  reject completely  the centrally-dominated  model  of past intergovemnmenal  rlations may
have  resulted  in, so to speak, throwing  out the baby  with the bathwater. The centrl  government  - that  is, taxpayers
in general - have a legitimate  interest in what is done with grants to local govemments. Moreover, the country as
a whole  also has a legitimate  concer  to ensure  that services such as education  and health  are available  throughout
the country  at least at minimum  standards. There is therofore  a strng  case for at least limited  conditionalit, for
instance, by requiring that the grant funds should be spent on  e.g.  education or hellthU' or requiring local
govemments  receiving such grants to provide services  of at least a specified  quality and level.
LNo matter how closely supervised,  the inherent  fungibility  of financial transfers means, of course, that there is
no guarantee  that conditional  tr usfers will not in whole or part simply replace locally-financed  expenditures  that
would  have been made in any ca  . On the other hand, the available  empirical  evidence  in a number  of countries
suggests that to at least some extent conditional  funds do indeed astickl, that is, result in an increase in total
spending  on the aided function.
Wlof  course, such legal requirements  are inevitably  to some extent only pro forma.  The fungibility  of money  and
the ability of local governments  to alter other expenditures  and taxes mean that requiring  a grant to be spent on a
particular  activity does not necessarily  imply that tota1  (centrally-finded plus locally-funded)  expenditure  on the
activity  has gone up proportionally. Indeed, in most cases it will not.- 56  -
190.  Compliance  with any such conditions  could be monitored,  as suggested  earlier, through requireme  for
uniform and timely local financial  reporting  and tirough periodic  national inspecdons  and audits of local facilities.
Although  tn the current situation  in Hungary  it is probably  politicaly inadvisable  to alter the present  unconditionality
in any important  way, at the very least the national govenment should make evely reasonable  effort to improve
local financial  reporting - for example, making the provision  of such reports a condition  for receiving  grants - as
well as attempting  to improve its information  basn on what is going on with respect to the provision  of local public
services.
Deterininnin  the Size of the Ora.
191.  Another  feature  of the normative  grant  that requires further consideration  is the determination  of the tot
size of the grant. At present, this determination  is in effect entirely  up to the central govemment. While  budgetay
flexibility  in this respect is obviously  desirable  from  the centrl  goverment's  short-run  point  of view, it is a mistake
to view cental transfers to local govements  as constituting  an entirely 'compressible' portion of the national
budget. On the contrary, many of the services  provided  by local govenmments  constituto  essential  inftucture  for
future development. Moreover, since it is unlikely that most of the small local governments  created in Hungary
can ever finance  the provision  of such services  at an adequate  level out of their own resources, either now or in the
foreseeable  future, centrl  grants to local governments  will remain an important, and largely non-compressible,
expenditure  item in the central  budget of Hungary, as of most transitional  countries.
192.  In these  circumstances,  there may be much to be said in favor of establishing  a formula-driven  total e.g.
as a specified  percentage of national revenues or of some particulr  national tax or taxes.  This procedure  has
subs  antial advantages  from the point of view of both centra and local budgeting.  Since the amount  of the local
transfer is determined,  the central govermment  is to some extent insulated  from pressure to increase it  support of
local govenments.  On the other  hand, local governments  can budget with much greater  certainty  when  they know
that the total level of central support wiU  vary with e.g. income tax coUlections  (distributed  in accordace with a
known formula)  than when they are totally at the mercy of discetionary contral policy.  Again, in the transition
scialist  economies,  the grants are typically  fixed  in an ad hoc way, both in aggregate  volume, and in terms of the
allocation across individual governent  units, which are negotiated and bargained between center and locals.
Hungary  is the only exception here: the grant volume  is detemined annuaUy  by MOF, but its allocation  is by a
complex  (some  might say overly complex)  formula. This complexity  can be explained  in part as a reaction  to the
imprecision  and bargaining  by which the previous  allocation  system worked: over-precision  is an attempt  to move
as far as possible  from this approach.
Distribution  of the Grant.
193.  However  these  two  points  - the unconditienalitof the grant and the determination  of its total  - are settled,
the distributive  formula  of the grant also needs  to be addressed. As noted above, at present there are two elements
in the present  Hungarian  formula: equalization  (per capita) and needs.  As agued above, a third essential  element
in any general grant formula is  to make some explicit allowance for  the revenue-raising capacity of local
governnents. That is, the basic formula  of the normative  grant should be altered to some version of the following
general formula:
Gt = eE 1 - tRl
where  G is the amount  of the grant, i refers to a particular  municipality,  E to some measure  of 'need'  (for example,
the present  normative  grant formula,  population,  or anything  else that seems appropriate),  e is an assumed  level of
expenditure  for each unit of measured  need, R is a measure  of revenue  capacity, and t is the assumed  rate at which
this capacity  is tapped (or taxed).
194.  Asuming for the  momentthat  the tota G to all i is equal to the prest  normative grmt and  t  the
'needs" measure  is that used in the present formula  - as noted earlier, both of these assumptions  can be changed- 57 -
in any desired way without  affecting the general argument! - the introduction  of the capacity  element has three
important  effects. First, it will shift grant funds from  high-capacity to "low-capacity recipients. Second,  it will
stimulate  all recipients,  regardless  of their estimated  capacity, to tax that  capacity  at the assumed  rate (for example,
the national average rate), because  if they do not do so, the gant  they receive will be reduced precisely by the
amount  they fall below the assumed  rate.  Finally, on the other hand, if any recipient chooses  to levy higher taxes
than those assumed  in the grant formula  it gets to keep all the extra revenues  - that is, it is not 'taxed  by having
its grant reduced.
Measuring Canacit  and Expenditure  Need.
195.  Clearly, the most critical element in this formulation  is the measurement  of capacity and need.  Such
calculations  are difficult in any circumstances  and perhaps particularly  difficult in the changing circumstances  of
the transitional  economies.  Nonetheless,  some relevant information  exists: for example, on collections  from the old
duties, on PIT liabilities, and on  the 'turnover'  basis for the business tax.  Moreover, there appear  to be
considerable  information  in some countries  - notably  Hungary  and the Czech  Republic  - on the basic characteristics
of the new local governments:  their population, its demographic  characteristics,  their economic  bases, and so on.
It should therefore  be possible to construct a number of estimates  of revenue  capacity (defined  so that the estimate
is not subject to local manipulation)W'  and expenditure  need in order to experiment  with variations of this formula
and to determine  whether the resulting  distribution  of the gant  makes sense in light of needs and the aims of the
new local finance  system.&
196.  In contrast  to the relatively  well-developed  Hungarian  grant system, in Ro  for example, the present
tmnsfers to local goverments are entirely discetdonary and negotiated.  The same is true of Russia, and most of
the former  union republics, now the CIS.  On the other hand, like the Hungarian case, this transfer  appeas  to be
lump-sum,  that is, it would  appear that local govermets  can spend it, once they get it, free of all conditions  and
constraints. In fact, however,  as under the old regime, the local branches of the Ministry  of Economy  and Finance
continue  to supervise  the implementation  of local budgets  closely  and to make sure that the targets specified  in local
budgets are  achieved.  Most of the transfer has in recent years been used to cover the losses incurred  by the regies
owing to the large heating and transportation  subsidies. In 1991, for example, these two subsidies accounted  for
more than 32 billion lei out of a total transfer of 65 billion lei.  By September  1993, however, these two subsidies
are supposed to be gradually phased out, folowing a 25% subidy  cut on May 1 1992, and similar cuts on
September  1,  1M,  May 1, 1993  and September  1 1993. Coreponding  to the cut in subsidies,  the cental trnsfer
to local govemments  will appatly  be cut proportionally,  although  that this would happen  was by no means clear
to some local govermment  officials.
197.  The basic  criticisms  that may be made of the present transfer system  in Romania  (and  other countries  as
well) are thus three.  First, it encourages  recipients  to be wasteful and lax - and thus run bigger deficits and get
bigger transfers.  Second, the system may of course also be criticized for its lack of transparency and for the
considerable  amount  of negotiation  that  may (at least potentially)  be hidden in it.  Third, even if these  defects were
corrected  - as they largely  have  been in Hungary  - it would  basically  deliver  funds derived from taxpayers  in general
tihe  same is true with respect to the expenditure  level per unit of measured  base: it may, for example,  be taken
as the average national level of expenditure on  the chosen item, or as some desired or  minimum level of
expenditure.
LwNote  that the estimates  of tax capacity required for implementing  a grant formula such as that suggested  in the
text are estimates  of the ability of localities  to raise revenue and not necessarily  estimates  of the ability of local
residents  to pay taxes. Both the wrichness'  of the locality  relative  to others  and its taxing  power  are critical  to such
calculations.
EFor preliminary  explorations  along these lines, see Bird and Wallich, 'Financing  Loal  Government  in Hungary.'- 58 -
to officials in particular localities  to spend  as they see fit, thus vitiating the essential  democmtic (and efficiency)
principle of accountability.
198.  In  eality,  of course,  the existing  Romaian systm  offers almost no room for local incentive  effects since
in fact  it is still the old central  control  system  in a slightly  different  guise. That is, instead  of unconditional  transfers
- set in some undetermined  but apparently  'gap-fllling  way - in fact up to now local govermnrets have (regardless
of what the law appeas  to say) acted as though  their expenditure too wern fixed (e.g. with respect to sali,
number  of employees,  levels  of services provided, and so on).  If the level and composition  of local expenditure
is, de facto, deUmined centrally,  it doss not matte  that the level and composition  of local revenues is similady
dete_rmie  there is no effective  local autonomy. As such autonomy  begins to become real, however, and tbho
is evidence that this is now happening  in at least some are  of Romania, the bad design  of the present tras
system  will become  increasingly  unsatisfactory.
199.  For this reason, it is important  that the future development  of tansfers in Romania  (and other trnsitional
economies)  should take  more explicitly  into account the basic  principles of a good transfer system.  For exaple,
the size of the total transfer to local govemments  from th  centrl  govemment  (the  Adistibutable  j2jgk)  might  be
set as a fixed  percentage  of totd central  taxes. This is desirable  to provide both  budgetary  stability  - to insulate  the
central  budget  to some extent  from local problems  and to provide  a *hard' budget constraint  for local governts  -
as well a  sufficient budgetary  flexibility over time to accommodate  the reasonable growth of local finances.
Moreover, experience  suggests  that it may be preferable to set the size of the *distributable  pool' with refernc
to all taxes rather than as a percetage  of a particular tax or taxes in order to avoid distorting central tax policy
decisions.
200.  In addition,  as suggeted above, the distibution fbEnulshould  in principle  be based  on some feasible,  and
acceptable,  measures  of a  aciy  nd necd  and the transfer  payments  should  be made conditional  on performance.
Although in the end the extent to which any transfers are  equalizing' in any country is inevitably essentially
political, it is critical to have an adequae  quatitative base in order both to be able to design such equalition
features propedly  (e.g. with respect to mathing grants) and especidly to assess their probable effect.  A critical
research need in most transitional  economies  is therefore to derive such measures of capacity and need and to
develop  a system for monitoring  performanc.  Close attention  must be paid to the supervision,  acounting,  and
monitoring  of trnsfers,  and associated  local expenditurs.  This  question  is also important  with relation  to both local
borrowing and any use of matching  funds e.g.  for investment purposes.  As noted earlier, a transfer fomula
properly designed in terms of needs, capacity, and performance  will also encourage local fiscal efforL  Finally,
although for political reasons, it may prove necessary to bas  distribution in part on derivation or to make the
transfers payments partly or wholly unconditional,  it is essential from the point of view of both efficiency (in
resource allocation)  and accountability  (in public sector decision-maling)  that these elements  be minimized.
VII. BORROWING
201.  In most transition  economies, a striking feature of subnational  finances  is the generous legal access of
subnational  governments  to unlimited  borowing,  sometmes even foreign borrowing.  In Hungary, the Local Self-
Government Act penrits  unresticted domestic borrowing (for current and capital expenditures) to aU local
governments. In the Russian  Fderation,  the law on Rights  of Local Self-Govenment  permits the same for oblast
and rayon level govemnments.  In Bulgara, the municipalities  can borrow from banks, and in addition, under the
existing  law they  have an unrestricted  right to issue  bonds. In Poland, borrowing  authority  is more limited: by law,
localities are not allowed to bonrow more than 59%  of current budgeted expenditures.  In Romamia, local
governments  can borrow in unrestricted  fashion, as an element  of their *autonomy",  provided they can prove their
creditworthiness  and amortization  capacity. In China, provincial  govemments  have until recently had unrestricted
access to foreimi  borrowing  through  provincially-owned  development  banks,; this access  has recently been  teduced
through a new law on foreign  exchange  management  and debt registration. Local govemments in China cannot59 -
borrow domestically,  however, at least directly, although  they do so indirectly  through enterprises  they own and
through local financial  intennediaries  which float bonds designated  for local government  projectsaL'.  In the CSFR,
the two republics  have restricted  access to borrowing  through  T-bills issued  on an agreed basis and amount by the
Federal Ministry  of Finance. By and large, however,  despite these  liberal provisions,  local government  borrowing
has so far not been significant,  as table 9 shows.
Eat Borrowing  Practices.
202.  In some countries, however, the heritage  of debt from the previous  regime has become  a problem. In the
pre-reform  situation, in which the national credit plan was designed  to finance investment  and other expenditures
called for in the Plan, to the extent that in the unified framework  of the Plan, local governments  required  loans,
borrowing  was not only permitted,  but indicated. Th  loans wero  made by one or another of the State Banks,  whose
lending  was wholly  plan-directed.  In Hungary, for example,  my  localities  borrowed under the credit pla  in the
pre-reform period, with each loan being guarnteed  by a higher-level authority. In the Slovak Republic the
ind_btedness  of the local (municipal)  government  to tho banking sector is espocially  high: some 30 municipaities
have been  able to pay neither  principal nor interest  on these loans. In Poland, it has been reported  that almost 900
geminas  (40% of all local governments)  are in debt, as a result of borrowing, mainly from banks, under the pre-
reform regime.
203.  The facilities  for borrowing  provided to local govenments in the post-reform  legislation  thus have roots
in the planning  period. In present  day circumstances,  however,  such generous  and virtually  uncircumscribed  access
by local govemments  to loan finance  seems out of place.  Such acces  is restricted  even in most western  countries
for several  reasons. First, the centrl  government  uses  debt finance  as a stabilization  tool, and it does not want local
govemments  acting  in such a way as to cAmntor  its policies. Second, local borrowing may in some cirumstances
crowd  out private  sector borrowing  which  may be more  economically  beneficial  to the country. Third, to the extent
central govenumnts wish to avoid local govemments  becoming bankrupt they in effect implicitly  guarantee  local
govenmuent  debt, so that local governmnt borrowing  becomes  a potentially  open (and destabilizing)  door to the
national  treasury.
Table 10
Subnational  Goverment  Borrowing
Country  Local Borrowing  Authority  Borrowing % of total
revenue  in recent years
Hungary  Yes (unlimited  in law)  some municipalities  have
past debts
Poland  Yes (limited  in law)  1.4%
Romania  Yee"  N.A.
Bulgaria  N.A.  N.A.
Czechoslovakia  Yes  significant  past debts
____  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  O  Utst  nding
Russia  Yes (unlimited  in law)f'  '
China  Nay  0
Vietiam  N.A.  N.A.
Notes: [/  Even though local govemments  in Romania  are pemitted  to borrow in principle, in reality ther  exists
no borrowing  -just arrsea  (non-payment  of bills); 21 This was suspended  in 1992; 3/  Sometimes  borrowing  takes
place through enterprises  (see text).
IL 1See 'China: Revenue Mobilization  and Tax Policy',  World Bank Country Report, Washington  DC, 1990, and
-China External Trade and Capital,  World Bank Country  Report, Washington,  DC, 1988.- 60 -
204.  For these  reasons in virtually  every developed  country  local government  access to capital markets  is strictly
controlled. Among the methods used to control local borrowing  are: (i) permitting borrowing  only for approved
capital  projects; (ii) requiring prior approval  of local taxpayers  for borrowing  above a certain  amount;  (iii) requiring
prior approval  of central authorities for borrowing;  (iv) restricting  the amount of debt to some percentage  of local
revenues;  and (v)  permitting  borrowing  only from a cental  mnunicipal  fund.'  All such restrictions  obviously  reduce
local autonomy. On the other hand, it is also common  to provide  some capital assistance to local governmnta, in
the form of matching  grants (as discussed  earlier)  or in the analytical  equivalent  of explicitly  or implicitly  subsidized
borrowing  conditions.
205.  The precarious  macroeconomic  situation  in many transitional  economies  malkes  the case for limiting  local
access to capital markets even stronger than usual.  Additional  reasons to be concerned with problems  that might
arise because  most of the new municipal  governments  have  no experience  with financing  and are in many instancs
not yet capable  of preparing and presenting  complete  and meaningful  projects.  Nor, for that matter, are most of
the financial institutions  in transitional  economies  capable of evaluating long-term risks or hantling long-tem
financial  instruments.
206.  Nevertheless,  to the extent that benefits  from some projects are enjoyed in the future, it seems  both fair
and efficient  that future residents share in the cost of financing  such projects. Borrowing  for local capital projects
may thus have a sound theoretical  base. Moreover, borrowing  may someedmes  be the only practical  way to finance
large capital outlays  without  huge, and undesirable,  variations  in local tax rates from year to year.  There is thus,
in principle, a strong  case for financing  capital projects  at the local level through debt finance.
Sources  of Borrowin .
207.  In the short term, however, there should probably be  imited or no  local borrowing in most such
economies for macroeconomic  reasons. In the longer run, however, some facilities for  limited sub-nadonal
borrowing  will be needed.  Long-term borrowing  by local governments  should be restricted to the financing  of
capital projects,  perhaps with regional goverments and large cities having a little wider discretion  in using debt
At all times, borrowing  from the central bank should  be prohibited.
208.  A common  view in some of the transitional  economies  appears to be that local governments  should be
tapping the financial  markets for capital funding, thus serving the dual aims of developing  capital markets and
financing  long-gestation  projects. However, only the very largest such govemments are ever likely to be able to
access financial  markets directly.  M.'oreover,  only in the U.S. are financial  markets the major source of debt
finance  for local governments.  Commercial  banks  are a more likely  source of funds in transitional  economies  - and
they  may  well reman the main source, as in Germany.  Bond  issues  might  come later, if ever, once markets  for such
financial  instruments  are developed,  and sub-national  governments  establish creditworthiness.
209.  For most local govermments,  however, the only  way to access capital markets may be through  some such
device  as municipal  development  banks, especially  if they are not set up by the central government,  but spring up
as cooperative  efforts of, for instance, groups of cities.  Such banks (or funds) could give technical  assistance  to
the individual  govermments  in this new field of borrowing,  would take up deposits from them and lend them the
necessary  amounts. Local govermments  should not, of course, receive subsidized credit through any such source
(except when the national government  explicitly  wishes to subsidize  particular types of municipal  investment,  for
reasons similar to those discussed earlier in conjunction  with matching  grants).  In view of the tangled relations
between  governments  and enterprises  discussed  elsewhere,  it is equally important  that such credit not be extended
indirectly  through  borrowing by goverrunent  enterprises.
210.  The history of special  MuniciRal  Develooment  Fundsa in other countries is in some respects not very
encouraging  (Columbia  is an exception). Few of these funds have developed a capacity  for sustained  (continued)-61-
assistance  to municipal  goverment  and investment  on the scale needed.9  Most have been undercapitalized.  As
a rule, they have tended to play a narrow and passive financing  role, applying  little technical  or financial  appraisal
to the schemes  they have funded, and offering little positive  assistance  to municipalities  other than capital finance.
Those  designed  to  provide  technical  assistance  have tended  to concentrato  skills  and resource on the direct execution
of capital works, which are handed over to municipalities  for operation  and debt service.  While this apprch  hs
added to the stock of urban infiastructure,  it does little to promote  the capacity  or commitment  of municipalities  to
operate or expand that infatructuo  effectively,  or to recover  costs. Too many municipal  development  fmdas  have
tolerated  substantil arars,  with poor repaymnet  records leading  to weak institutins and incentives  for localities
not to repay. For al  thm  reasons, are must be exercised  in sotting  up specid municipal financing  institutions  in
transitioald  economies.
VIII. PRIVAT[ZATION  AND OWNERSHIP
211.  A striking  feature  of the fiscal  landscape  in the transitional  economies  in the continued  significant  owne_  ip
role of subnational  govemments  at a tirm when center/national  priorities support privatization. One reason is of
course the transfer of assets to them in the process of 'decentrlization of ownership  described earlier.  Another
reason arises in some degree fom  the inadequate revenue base given localities and their continued financial
dependance  on enterprise revenues. If the privatization  process is to be completed,  getting  local govenments out
of business, and into the  business of government' is crucial.  In the course of this process, important  quetions
remain to be answered, relating to the use of the tmnsitory revenues from privatization, and how best to take
advantage  of the asset stock held by local governments.
Asset Transfers
212.  One of the most important  initial features  of fiscal denalizaton  has boen the transfer of asset to loca
governments. Local govenments are increasingly  becoming  owners  of enterprises,  housing, vacant  uban land and
retail establishments,  as these  assets are transferred  from the center.  In Hungary, the 'Act on Property  Trnsfer'
(1991)  gave local govemnments  ownership of the housing stock previously owned by the central governmmt. In
Romania, local governments  have been given all  fonnerly 'statew (centrally) owned properties  within their
territories,  ranging  from public  doman ptoperty (parks) to private  domain  propetty such as enterprises. In Russi
enterprises have long been owned by each level of government, and housing and land has been transferred  to
municipal  and rayon  level governments  beginning  in 1991. In China, decralization  of enterprise ownership  from
the state to provincial  and local ownership  was a key feature  of the overall decentalization of economic  decision
making,  and took  place as early  as the mid-1980's.  Housing  has  always  been a municipal  or enterprise  responsibility
(See  Table 10).
213.  Such  asset transfers  can be a mixed  blessing.  While  consistent  with  decentraliation and rhetoric  about local
autonomy, such transfers also fit with the center's aim of reducing its involvement  in the economy. Indeed, one
motivation  for transfers  of enterprises, land and public  housing, has likely been to avoid the fiscal burden  (such  as
subsidies,  maintenance  and repair) that ownership  responsibilities  carry.  Local  governments  wiU  thus  be fhced  with
these  major maintenance  and subsidy  burdens, unless  costs can be quickly recovered. Privatization  of the houwing
stock in particular is a priority (see discussion  below on timing  of sales) as is sale of locally-owned  enterprises.
42/  See Ktn Davey, 1990;  Municipal  Development  Funds and Intermediaries";  PPR Working Paper No 32; World
Bank- 62 -
Table 11
Privatization  Revenues:  Ownehip  and Disposition
Recent  Traosfers  of Ownrshp
Country  Housing  Reail Units  Domstic Industrial
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  E  nterprises
Hungary  Lal  Local  Centrl,  Local
Poland  Local.  LoAM  Central, Lca
Romania  _Al  _  _  caW_  CntUrl, Local
Bulgaria  Local I/  Locale  Centratl,  LoA
CSFR  Local  LOc  Cental, Local
Russia  Local,Enterprise  LoLcal
China  Local,Enterprise  Local, Central  Contl,  Local
Vietaln  Lcal,Enterprise  Local, Central  Centrl,  Local
Notes:  In  Bulgara only  Q-T1  t  of  th  tothlc  s ot local authoriies.  l  he r
85-90% is now privatey owned.; * almost exclusively  local.
Privatization  vs Entmreonoeudlism
214.  Unforuately,  in at least  some countries  just the opposite appa  to be taling place. There is conideble
evidence  that this process of proprty  transfer  is giving broader scope to thoe  enrpreneulal  ambitions  in the local
governments  as they use their now property rghts  to  activateo  idle property.  A womsomo patten  in vitually
all transition  economies  has been the involvement  of governments  at different  levels in joint economic  venure  i
purely private maket oriented activities.  Romania's  law puts it best, but is not exceptional:  * Local gove  m_U
are authorized  to  rerae, contrbute equity  and or take shares in commercial  enterprises  formed  with their  assets
belonging  to  or transferred  to their ownership,  including  the possibility  of forming  joint ventures with foteign or
domestic  parlners.
215.  Localities  appear to be excessively  optimistic  about their abilities to enhance reveaue from this source.
One vehicle some hope to use is to establish  joint ventures with a  domestic  or foreign parbter, or  nothr  state
enterpise, using local assets as the locality's equity  share.  In those localities  well endowed  with land, ths appeas
to be the preferred equity  contribution,  and loclities appear also to see potential  in developing  and seiricing empty
land so as to enhance its value as equity. Of course, real estate development  and financing  is of course One  of the
riskiest  business  areas in maket economies,  and it is not likely to be a better bet in the transitional  economie.  In
Hungary, toursm lodges, recreational  facilities  and golf coures were cited as examples  of such venturesin-process,
and in localities which inheited  important real properties similar potential  was sen  in developing thom as
contributions  to industral joint ventures such as bakeries, construction firms, and food processing. In Russa,
virtually all rayon governments  visited in the course of field work indicated  the noed to develop  and exploit their
asset base through domestic  joint ventures, and looked forward to the revenue flow from the projects,  one
completed.  Similarly,  in Poland, the provision  of private services as a means  of eaming additiond revenues  apper
to  have strong  support, with  housing  and real estate development,  food and furinitu  manufacure cited as exampls.
216.  From  the prspective of locd government,  there are good reasons for government  involvement  in these
new market ventures. With available  land that can only with difficulty  be privatized, the cost to govrment  of
contributing this resouce  to a joint venture may be perceived as very low. Also many local public officias
understandably  wish to  create buiness employment  opportunities  in their  jurisdictions,  which  are often  oca'omically-63  -
depressed  and lackng privao e  preneurship.0  However,  tho hope for profits  from  such  ventur  my quickly
tum  into  demnds on govemmet budgets  to cover  losses. Experience  everywher  shows  thtu  the  perspectives  and
goals  of public  officibl tend  to Make  them  poor  busins managers.  In piculr,  it is very  hard for a govrnmt
to close  a faling bum,  especiay whe the  local mploqynt  iSaion  is fa  from  halthy. There  is also  the  risk
that  the  local  govaunat  ald their  locallyownd  businesses  wll udcut  privat competitors,  possibly  by  playig
rogulatory  pmes to protect  locd monopolies,  with  the  reoult  t  te  trole  of govement in the econmy will  not
diminish.  And,  of course,  if local  governmen  own  busines,  thy may  fail  prey to the  ridsk  of ownerhip.  In
the indusil  market  economies,  te  rats of small  busine  failu  is high: only on  in five of such  busins
survive their first three yea.  Thee  is no ran  to expect tt  the tranitionl  eonomies can beat theom  odda.
217.  More  impotty,  in addition  to being  ddy,  rur  activity  by  local  goveanmt  is fundaimay
inconsistent  with  the  privatiuon drive,  and  reprets  a bottteck to tnuo  denrl  o-that is, d  aliton,
not from  the state  to local  govenments,  but fiom  govenment  to the private  octor. Local  etrepreneuria  ty
is neither  privadtiaonnor tru de  ition.Suchb entrdeuaiaHsm  sows down even  reverses,  tho  prooe
of privatization  -the  long-term  goal  of getting  govenmt  out of toe  activities  that  can  be handled  by the  private
sector.
218.  It is thus  critical  in reforming  socilist economiae  to provide  adequa revenue  instruments  and flexibility
at the subnational  level.  If the only flexibility  available  to local govermnts  in their stuggle to cope with
budgetary  pressure  is by using  economically  undeirable  sources  of revenue  such as profits  derived  frm  direct
public  ownership  of local busnes,  thy will  do so. Municipalities  should  not be encouraged  to develop  local
monopoly  enterprise in order to secure  the revf A they  need  to function,  just as they  should  not be forced  to
establish  small taxes  on a wide nmre  of proutsb  and  activities  which  ae  expeive  to adminise, genate
widesrad  public  ressnc,  and typically  yield  littlo.  Some  local aconss  to a robust  national  tax base (trough
tansfers), the ability  to levy  local surcha  on ctai  national  tax  whero  approprate,  and especlly  some
significant  rvenue sourcs under  Ilocal  control  are thus  essential,  if the struggle  for local revenue  is not to delay
and perhaps dstroy  prvatization reforms.
Timine  of Asset  Sales:  Sales  vs Give-wava
219.  Potentially,  selling  the  assets  (housing,  entorpdses,  land)  held  by local  govemments  could  yield  syigficat
evenues.  There is, however,  considerable  controversy  over how this procoss  should  take  place, and even  over
whether  assets  should  be sold or given  away. The metods being  employed  in diferent countries  range  fom
auctions  to 'spontaeous privatztion' to voucher  systm  In mxst  of the  countris under  study,  at the local  level
assets are being sold, not given  ay:  In Hunguy, such  are th  responibility  of the Stato  Prperty
Management  Company  (for large  enteprises).  For smal entepns  as wel u  locally  owned  houing, in both
Hungary  and  Polsnd,  local  governments  have  responsibility.  In Russi, the  housing  stock  and  locally-owned  facties
are a  subject to sba.  CSFR's privatization  prognm combines  give-aways  (through  vouchers  for aU  citizens)  with
revenue-generating  sales. Most  enterpis  will be sold  by the two republics;  the role of the local govemmonts
within  theso  republics  is not clear. Bulgada,  and  Romunia  have  yet to devise  concrete  privatization  progams, but
they  are likely  to include  both  give-aways  through  vouchs  and sales.
220.  Maximining  the yield  from  asset  sales  isa  major  challeng.  Should  they  be sold  now  or later? Selling
assets  now,  when  markets  for ownership  and  prperty rights  are underdeveloped,  may  mean  that they  do not bnog
a good  price  for the local  governm t - a process,  as oam  analysis  put it,  akin  to using  the  beat  furnitur to  uWel
!WA  note  of caution  is also needed  with repoct to the apparent  desire  of many  local  govemments  to use fiscal
incentives  to bolster  private  business  in their  judsdictios.  he record  of such  'local development  policies is not
very  encouraging  in any country,  and  efforts  in this  direction  are all too likely  to degenerate  into  a zero-sum  game
for local governments  unless  great care is exerted. On the whole, this is yet another  ares in which  a national
'fnmework law- - a binding  cael  arrangement  - seems  needed.- 64 -
the boiler on a ship running out of fuel'.  But at the same  time, government  needs revenues  now.  Selling  aM
later may improve yields, but such yields will come at a time when other local financing  sources will also be
available. Complicating  this  decision  is the fact  that  many  locally-owned  properties  are presently  costing  much  more
to operate and maintain  than they are realizing  in rents an, hence constituto  a major drain on subnational  public
finances. Getting  rid of this burden  is a high  priority. Unfortuately, in almost all countries,  the pocem of saeling
locally-owned  enterprises, and especially  housing,  is slow, impeu  by the absence  of credit (especially  mort
finance),  and the absnce  of a legal framework.
Revenues  from Privatization
221.  What should local goverments do with the proceeds from the privatization  of public  enteprise  and tdo
sale of other  assets? First, it is importnt to remember  tha  hes  rvenues are 'non-recurring' and do not rpret
permanent sources  of financing  for any local govemment  Efforts thus have to be made to develop  adequae tx
sources in addition  to user charges  for the future, when the revenues from asset sales disappear.  That said, should
such asset revenues  be capitalized  in special  funds  or invested  on capital projects, or should  they be used to finance
current expenditures?
222.  In practice,  there appear to have been  no special  strings  attached  to the use of revenues  from privatization.
Te  unsurprising  result is that  the most common  practice  appeass  to be the use of these funds  as an additional  source
of revenue  in the recurrent  budget. This is not all bad: indeed, it may be both distributily  attractive  as well 
economically  efficient  (less dead-weight  loss) to raise revenues  from privatization  than from taxes.  But, as noted
earlier, one cannot  live forever  by selling the furniture. Sometimes  such revenues  have been  kept in exrabudgetay
accounts. in Hungary, for instance, rents from locally-owned  housing  accrue to off-budget  accounts, while sles
proceeds from locaUy-owned  housing  accrue to the general budget, but are not earmarked for any partculwr
purpose. In the case of privatization  of locaUy-owned  enterprises, the proceeds also accue  to the budget,  with no
restctions  on use. In Poland and Russia, revenues  accrue to the budget, with no restrictions  on their use.
223.  A more  conservative  principle  of public finance  would  cal  for the investment  of these  proceeds  in long-
term assets to alow  local govenmerts  to draw income from assets over a long period of time. Altenatively,
revenues  could be used to repay debt.44 In Hungary, revenues  from privatization  involving  foreign  joint ventr
and generating  foreign  exchange  are channeled  through the State Property Management  Agency (SPMA)  to repay
Hungary's external debt.  In the Russian Federation, where most privatization  has been domestic, it has been
recommended  that  the stock of domestic  govemment  Treasury  debt should  be reduced  this way. In Poland, revenu
from privadzation  are being used to finance current operations,  and to compensate  for inadequate  tax yields.  In
China, no commitment  to privadzadon  is as yet apparent.
IX.  CONCLUSIONS
224.  Subnational  finance  and local government  policies  are emerging  as crucial  elements  of the ongoing  refors
in transitional  economies. Subnationai  governments  play a large role in overall economic  activity, account for a
large share of public  sector outlays, and own a significant  share of public  enterprises  and the public  housing  stok
Recent  attempts  to strmlne  government  budgets  have led to increased  local government  responsibility  for such
crucial matters as  health, education and  safety net expenditures, including unemployment  and  entepis.
X'See  Newbery,  D. 'Reform in Hungary:  Sequencing  and Privatization,' E  Economic  Review.  No 35, 1991,
pp 571-580.  Newbery argues against a rapid, 'fire-sale'  or giveaway  approach becas  many of the assots may
have been financed  with debt (as noted earlier, many local govemments  in transitional  economies  have substantial
liabilities),  in which case the proceeds should  be used to pay off this debt, rather than burdening  preset  and future
local taxpayers  with debt service.- 65  -
Underfimded  local govermments  arn seleing coping mechanisms,  not all of them constructive, to meet these new
challenges.
225.  This paper has descibed the risks to privatizaon, to macroeconomic  stability, and to an adequate  social
safety net that present policies towards local governmnt may imply.  Our themes are that the subnational  sectr
needs  to be m  realistically  factored  into national  plans, and that  subnational  expenditures  be more clearly  aigned
and revenue needs more realisticaly aessed.  Such  _  are likely to acknowledge  * larger sphero for
subnational  govermments  and the need for access to more robust  revenue  sourcs.  Giving  local government  a dsre
in the personal income tax is one possible  and perhaps desirable  approach to meeting these revenue noeds.
226.  Careful  attention also needs to be paid to the desip  and implementation  of toe intergovenmental fisa
transfers  that  are likely to remain  prominent  features  of the intergovermental landscape  for years to come. Caution
is  also  needed with  respect to  borrowing by  subnational govemment  Consolidation and  integration of
extrabudgetary  funds at the subnational  (and national)  levels is crucid to enhanced budgetary transparency  and
macro  stability.
227.  Finally, proper funding of the subnational  sector is a necessary  (albeit perhaps not sufficient)  condition  for
the successful  privaization of enterprises  now held by local governments. In its absence, local goveanments  will
continue,  as at present, to seek gains from keeping  these  enterprises,  and to add to their revenues  by setting  vp new
commercial  enterprises  and impeding  privatization.
228.  In short, local govemment  finance is not a 'local matter', but is crucial to asmost all of the key reform
goals of stabitization,  safety net and private sector development- 66 -
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Notes for Table 3
1.  Datd for total expenditure  as a percent of GDP was obtained  from the Recent Economic  Developments  of the
IMF.
Hungary: SM/92152,  March 12, 1992
Poland:  SM/9l/7O, April 11, 1991
Romani:  SM/92/96, May 8, 1992
Bulgaia:  SM/91/52, Marh  7, 1991
CSFR  SM/92/65, March 23, 1992
Russia . SM/92/26, Febnuy  6, 1992
China  SM/91/17,  January 28, 1991
Vietnam: SM/91/234, December  5, 1991
2.  Expendituie  data are for a consolidation  of the budget of the cra  govemet  and the financial  operations
of provinces,  counties, municipalities  and townsips.  Extabudgetay  financial  opaonS  of the various lovels  of
government  are not included. Data is based on budgeted  values, not actuals.
3.  Data for 1987.
4.  Data for 1988.
5.  Data for 1991.
6.  For 1986.
7.  For 1992.
8.  For 1985.
9.  For 1989.
10. 1988  data for the USSR.
I1.  Data for the first cuarter  of 1992, the Russian  Federation.
12. Data for 1990.
13. As % of USSR expenditure;  USSR  GDP.
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